This paper concerns the question of whether Pauli's Exclusion Principle (EP) vindicates the contingent truth of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) for fermions as H. Weyl first suggested with the nomenclature ‘Pauli–Leibniz principle’. This claim has been challenged by a time‐honoured argument, originally due to H. Margenau and further articulated and champione by other authors. According to this argument, the Exclusion Principle—far from vindicating Leibniz's principle—would refute it, since the same reduced state, viz. an improper mixture, can be assigned as a separate state to each fermion of a composite system in antisymmetric state. As a result, the two fermions do have the same monadic state‐dependent properties and hence are indiscernibles. PII would then be refuted in its strong version (viz. for monadic properties). I shall argue that a misleading assumption underlies Margenau's argument: in the case of two fermions in antisymmetric state, no separate states should be invoked since the states of the two particles are entangled and the improper mixture—assigned to each fermion by reduction—cannot be taken as an ontologically separate state nor consequently as encoding monadic properties. I shall then conclude that the notion of monadic properties together with the strong version of PII are inapplicable to fermions in antisymmetric state and this undercuts Margenau's argument.
This paper concerns the question of whether Pauli's Exclusion Principle (EP) vindicates the contingent truth of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) for fermions as H. Weyl first suggested with the nomenclature ‘Pauli–Leibniz principle’. This claim has been challenged by a time‐honoured argument, originally due to H. Margenau and further articulated and champione by other authors. According to this argument, the Exclusion Principle—far from vindicating Leibniz's principle—would refute it, since the same reduced state, viz. an improper mixture, can be assigned as a separate state to each fermion of a composite system in antisymmetric state. As a result, the two fermions do have the same monadic state‐dependent properties and hence are indiscernibles. PII would then be refuted in its strong version (viz. for monadic properties). I shall argue that a misleading assumption underlies Margenau's argument: in the case of two fermions in antisymmetric state, no separate states should be invoked since the states of the two particles are entangled and the improper mixture—assigned to each fermion by reduction—cannot be taken as an ontologically separate state nor consequently as encoding monadic properties. I shall then conclude that the notion of monadic properties together with the strong version of PII are inapplicable to fermions in antisymmetric state and this undercuts Margenau's argument.
Both bosons and fermions satisfy a strong version of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), and so are ontologically on a par with respect to the PII. This holds for non-entangled, non-product states and for physically entangled states—as it has been established in previous work. In this paper, the Leibniz strategy is completed by including the (bosonic) symmetric product states. A new understanding of Pauli’s Exclusion Principle is provided, which distinguishes bosons from fermions in a peculiar ontological way. Finally, the program as a whole is defended against substantial objections.
We demonstrate that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in all their admissible states, mixed or pure, for all finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, is not in conflict with Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). We discern the fermions by means of physically meaningful, permutation-invariant categorical relations, i.e. relations independent of the quantum-mechanical probabilities. If, indeed, probabilistic relations are permitted as well, we argue that similar bosons can also be discerned in all their admissible states; but their categorical discernibility turns out to be a state-dependent matter. In all demonstrated cases of discernibility, the fermions and the bosons are discerned (i) with only minimal assumptions on the interpretation of quantum mechanics; (ii) without appealing to metaphysical notions, such as Scotusian haecceitas, Lockean substrata, Postian transcendental individuality or Adamsian primitive thisness; and (iii) without revising the general framework of classical elementary predicate logic and standard set theory, thus without revising standard mathematics. This confutes: (a) the currently dominant view that, provided (i) and (ii), the quantum-mechanical description of such composite physical systems always conflicts with PII; and (b) that if PII can be saved at all, the only way to do it is by adopting one or other of the thick metaphysical notions mentioned above. Among the most general and influential arguments for the currently dominant view are those due to Schrödinger, Margenau, Cortes, Dalla Chiara, Di Francia, Redhead, French, Teller, Butterfield, Giuntini, Mittelstaedt, Castellani, Krause and Huggett. We review them succinctly and critically as well as related arguments by van Fraassen and Massimi. 1. Introduction: The Currently Dominant View1.1. Weyl on Leibniz's principle1.2. Intermezzo: Terminology and Leibnizian principles1.3. The rise of the currently dominant view1.4. Overview2. Elements of Quantum Mechanics2.1. Physical states and physical magnitudes2.2. Composite physical systems of similar particles2.3. Fermions and bosons2.4. Physical properties2.5. Varieties of quantum mechanics3. Analysis of Arguments3.1. Analysis of the Standard Argument3.2. Van Fraassen's analysis3.3. Massimi's analysis4. The Logic of Identity and Discernibility4.1. The language of quantum mechanics4.2. Identity of physical systems4.3. Indiscernibility of physical systems4.4. Some kinds of discernibility5. Discerning Elementary Particles5.1. Preamble5.2. Fermions5.3. Bosons6. Concluding Discussion
This paper is concerned with the question of whether atomic particles of the same species, i. e. with the same intrinsic state-independent properties of mass, spin, electric charge, etc, violate the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, in the sense that, while there is more than one of them, their state-dependent properties may also all be the same. The answer depends on what exactly the state-dependent properties of atomic particles are taken to be. On the plausible interpretation that these should comprise all monadic and relational properties that can be expressed in terms of physical magnitudes associated with self-adjoint operators that can be defined for the individual particles, then the weakest form of the Principle is shown to be violated for bosons, fermions and higher-order paraparticles, treated in first quantization
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is one of the most debatably discussed subjects in the philosophy of quantum physics. Gen- erally, the discussions focus on the domain of the predicate variables involved in the standard formulation of the principle, with versions where the properties are restricted in several ways. We argue that if we restrict the domain of properties, as happens with Henkin semantics for second- order language, we have no more PII, but only a weaker form of indistin- guishability. In quantum physics, we claim that under the non-individuals interpretation, which accepts that the standard notion of identity does not apply to quantum entities, PII fails not because of the properties, but due to the lack of sense of the notion of identity involved in the principle.
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) states that if two systems are qualitatively identical then they are logically identical. French and Redhead (1988) and Butterfield (1993) have shown the sense in which bosons and fermions violate the PII, but did not investigate the issue for particles of other kinds of statistics: i.e., for the (p,q) particles -- or `quarticles' -- of Hartle, Stolt and Taylor (1970). This paper shows that for any type of indistinguishable quarticle the PII is violated but that for distinguishable quarticles there are states in which it is violated by any pair of particles, states in which it is violated only by some pairs of particles and states in which it is violated by no pairs of particles. The updated version corrects a minor statement of mathematical fact, and provides a short proof for a conjecture made in the original.