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Computing

Post-quantum cryptography: lattice signatures

Johannes A Buchmann, Richard Lindner, Markus Rückert, Michael Schneider

Published May 25, 2009• 18 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s00607-009-0042-y

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Digital signatures are used to ensure authentication. Blind signature schemes are a special form of digital signatures and important in scenarios which depend on anonymous and secure authentication. (e.g. e-voting) The common digital blind signature schemes are based on asymmetric cryptography with underlying hard problems like integer factorization or discrete logarithm. These hard problems will become weak with the development of quantum computers. To avoid the uselessness of classic cryptography in the post quantum era, it will be important to find alternative methods based on other hard problems. This book deals with the attempt of developing a new blind signature scheme based on lattice signature schemes.
Abstract The need for developing post-quantum cryptography, that is to say cryptographic schemes that are believed to remain secure if large-scale quantum computers are developed, is demonstrated by a discussion of the classical and the quantum algorithms for solving the factorization problem. The ongoing process by the US standards body NIST to standardize post-quantum public-key encryption and digital signatures is described. Lattice-based cryptography is introduced as a prominent area of post-quantum cryptography. Lattice problems, including the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, are introduced. The AGCD cryptosystem, based on the approximate greatest common divisor (AGCD) problem, is described.