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IEE proceedings. Information security

Attack on some multi-party key agreement protocols

Kenneth G. Paterson

Published Jan 1, 2006• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Lee et al. recently presented a collection of n + 1 different n-party key agreement protocols based on multi-linear forms. Here we show that n − 2 of the protocols are completely insecure, being vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
DOI
10.1049/ip-ifs:20060074

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