1. The philosophical version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a) the ‘real’ properties of matter, (b) the epistemology of sensation, and (c) a contrast challenged by Berkely as illusory. The scientific version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a′) the physical properties of matter, (b′) a contrast essential within the history of atomism, and (c′) a contrast challenged by 20th century microphysics as de facto untenable. 2. The primary-secondary distinction within physics can be interpreted in two ways: a. it can refer to content; e.g. ‘Matter has the properties of mass, shape, density… etc. — it only appears to have the properties of warmth, fragrance, etc.’ Or, b. it can refer to form; e.g. ‘Whatever properties our best theories accord to primary matter, e.g., electrons, these are by definition primary. All other properties of, e.g., macromatter, are derivative.’ Concerning 2.a., this interpretation is simply false when 17th, 18th, or 19th century values for the property-variables are introduced. Concerning 2.b., this either uninformative or misleading. It is uninformative when it constitutes no more than a decision to use the word ‘primary’ as an umbrella-word for all the properties contemporary micro-physics accords to fundamental material particles, whatever these may be. It is misleading when it turns on an implicit contrast between certain properties particles may be said to have when ‘harnessed’ to a detector, and certain other properties these particles have when free and unharnessed to any detector. This contrast does not exist. Quantum-theoretic information is always about particles-and-their-detectors-in-combination. Dissolve this combination and you destroy any possible knowledge of the particle. Hence the notion of ‘completely objectifiable properties of particles’ is in principle unsound. (Cf. Hanson, American Journal of Physics, 27 January, 1959).
The philosophical version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a) the ‘real’ properties of matter, (b) the epistemology of sensation, and (c) a contrast challenged by Berkely as illusory. The scientific version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a′) the physical properties of matter, (b′) a contrast essential within the history of atomism, and (c′) a contrast challenged by 20th century microphysics as de facto untenable. 2. The primary-secondary distinction within physics can be interpreted in two ways: a. it can refer to content; e.g. ‘Matter has the properties of mass, shape, density… etc. — it only appears to have the properties of warmth, fragrance, etc.’ Or, b. it can refer to form; e.g. ‘Whatever properties our best theories accord to primary matter, e.g., electrons, these are by definition primary. All other properties of, e.g., macromatter, are derivative.’ Concerning 2.a., this interpretation is simply false when 17th, 18th, or 19th century values for the property-variables are introduced. Concerning 2.b., this either uninformative or misleading. It is uninformative when it constitutes no more than a decision to use the word ‘primary’ as an umbrella-word for all the properties contemporary micro-physics accords to fundamental material particles, whatever these may be. It is misleading when it turns on an implicit contrast between certain properties particles may be said to have when ‘harnessed’ to a detector, and certain other properties these particles have when free and unharnessed to any detector. This contrast does not exist. Quantum-theoretic information is always about particles-and-their-detectors-in-combination. Dissolve this combination and you destroy any possible knowledge of the particle. Hence the notion of ‘completely objectifiable properties of particles’ is in principle unsound. (Cf. Hanson, American Journal of Physics, 27 January, 1959).
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics
MORE than any other word of the language, the word atom is implicated with the history of human speculations concerning the nature uf things. It is introduced when people cease to content themselves with observing, and begin to philosophize. There are many of the fundamental and essential writings of the literature of physics in which it does not appear, or appears without warrant. These are the descriptions of things observed, the accounts of experiments, the records of measurements, on which the edifice of theoretical physics is founded. There are many articles of what is commonly called the “theoretical” sort in which it does not occur. Such are the papers on the motions of planets, on the vibrations of elastic solids, on the currents in electrical networks, on the courses of light-rays through optical systems-papers which are essentially descriptions, although they give the impression of being something greater and deeper because they relate to idealized cases, and are phrased in the laconic language of mathematics. When the word atom appears justifiably in a discourse, it means that the author has departed from the safe routine of describing observed and observable events, however selectively, however skilfully, however intelligently. It signifies that he has gone beyond the limits of observation, and has entered upon the audacious adventure of constructing by the side of the real universe an ideal one, which shall act as the real one does, and be intelligible through and through.
The growth of modern science resulted in a radically new cognitive approach to many problems of classical philosophy. In the context of contemporary theoretical physics, if only one avoids easy apologetic, it is no longer possible to defend this version of epistemological empiricism that was defended half a century ago. Whereas in the 1930’s the traditional distinction between theoretical and observational terms was called into question, due to its arbitrary nature, in the 1980’s the basic philosophical opposition between material and immaterial (resp. between physical and mathematical) objects seems arbitrary since the very notion of matter appears nothing but a terminological relic of the bygone epoch.
It has become ever more clear over the past 70 years that reality is best described by a theory that no one fully understands and which cannot be applied to most everyday phenomena. Quantum theory has been subjected to many stringent tests and all of its predictions, however strange, have always been borne out. Originally developed to account for why atoms do not collapse and why they radiate and absorb energy in discrete amounts (quanta), it has now gone far beyond these rather simple beginnings. It is essentially a mathematical theory, so trying to describe it in words is analogous to transforming a picture into a poem. Inaccuracies, distortions and over-simplifications inevitably creep in. Nevertheless, one can convey the essence of the picture, and that is what is attempted here. Some grasp of what the material world is really like, and of the unfamiliar ways in which it can behave, is probably necessary to reaching an understanding of awareness and is certainly needed to comprehend the experimental evidence set out in Chapter 5.
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – I took the one less traveled by , And that has made all the difference . Robert Frost (1916) The explanatory role of empty waves in quantum theory In this chapter we are concerned with two classes of interpretations of quantum mechanics: the epistemological (the historically dominant view) and the ontological. The first views the wave function as just a repository of (statistical) information on a physical system. The other treats the wave function primarily as an element of physical reality, whilst generally retaining the statistical interpretation as a secondary property. There is as yet only theoretical justification for the program of modelling quantum matter in terms of an objective spacetime process; that some way of imagining how the quantum world works between measurements is surely better than none. Indeed, a benefit of such an approach can be that “measurements” lose their talismanic aspect and become just typical processes described by the theory. In the quest to model quantum systems one notes that, whilst the formalism makes reference to “particle” properties such as mass, the linearly evolving wave function ψ( x ) does not generally exhibit any feature that could be put into correspondence with a localized particle structure. To turn quantum mechanics into a theory of matter and motion, with real atoms and molecules consisting of particles structured by potentials and forces, it is necessary to bring in independent physical elements not represented in the basic formalism. The notion of an “empty wave” is peculiar to those representatives of this class of extended theories which postulate that the additional physical element is a corpuscle-like entity or point particle. For clarity, we shall develop the discussion in terms of a definite model of this kind whose properties are well understood and which it is established reproduces the empirical content of quantum mechanics: the de Broglie–Bohm theory, a prominent representative of the class of ontological interpretations (Holland, 1993).
COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE I T HE Heisenberg uncertainty principle, like its rival theory of relativity/ has been one of the truly crucial phases in the physics of our day~ It did not, like the discovery of a new element or the Maxwell equations, simply indent the story of classical physics for a new paragraph. It was not only a new chapter but a new book. Detected, in the words of Heisenberg himself, when physics became self-critical, the principle is a statement of what is observable-like its contemporary, the theory of relativity. It was anew advance in method, so revolutionary indeed that physics has virtually lost meaning as content and become synonymous , as logical empiricism amply indicates, with mere rules of procedure. That science is developing into a system of logic, combining the Cartesian stress on clearness with the Kantian regulative idea, actually confirms a contention of traditional philosophy. It reveals that once we deny the colors and sounds, the life, lights, and purpose in our universe-as pure scientific method actually does-we are fated to deny much more than quality. Quality is in the order of form, substance, and being. The moment quality is banished from the real world, by the same 1 That all is not as peaceful and unified in physics as the layman sometimes believes can be seen in the deep cleavage between quantum and relativity mechanics. For the first, the exact specification of space (position) and time (velocity, momentum) has no meaning, while in relativity theory such exact description is the only meaning that can be had. Despite the efforts 'of leading physicists, including Dirac, to unite the two theories, the contradiction is so profound that one of these systems must eventually be abandoned or, more probably, both of them will be superseded. The recent work .of Schroedinger and apparently also of Einstei~ himself are directed to extend the general theory of relativity, making the current theory a special case just as Newtonian physics is a special case of present relativity mechanics. 474 COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE 475 decree being itself-because it is an immediate, non-inertial (formal) thing like quality-is driven into its only possible exile, nothingness. It is not surprising then that, after modern physics· has finished its task, the universe should not only be emptied of its lights, its fragrance, its sweetness, and its music but should also be without being and without existence. The uncertainty principle has been much debated in modern thought. Its impact has brought a sad end to the pride of 19th century science since it prevents a complete knowledge of anything at all by shading into the darkness at least one of the two major factors that specify it. Shortly after the principle was born it was hailed by various authors as a proof of free will, of the possibility of religion, and of non-mechanistic concepts in biology. In a more consistent and challenging sense, it has often been taken to refute what the physicist calls causality and what the philosopher calls the order of nature. The fact of the matter is that if the senses alone supply knowledge, truly only one thing at a time can be apprehended. If Hume was right in philosophy, so is Heisenberg. But when sensism yields to an intellectual insight into reality, it is easy to refute the scientist's claim to dethrone the doctrine of nature's order which he could never detect, even in classical physics, by pointerreadings .2 But whatever the fate of the Heisenberg principle in cosmology , it has had a most fruitful career in the field of physics. To Heisenberg himself, the principle was a point of departure for an original development of quantum mechanics based on the " uncertainty " of position and momentum,.: 3 If, for example, measurements are made, under a microscope, of the position of an electron, the photon (light-particle), which impinges on the eye and thus conveys the required knowledge to the physicist, has had to collide with the electron, thus imparting an impact known as the Compton recoil. When • For ·a discussion of the order of nature, cf. J. Marling: The...