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Physics Today

Impressionism, Realism, and the aging of Ashcroft and Mermin

José Luis Menéndez

Published Jun 28, 2013• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

For many years I have been eagerly awaiting the second edition of Neil Ashcroft and David Mermin’s Solid State Physics (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976). It is undoubtedly one of the best physics books ever written, but it is not aging well: An insensitive community keeps advancing the field with little respect for its prophets. However, after learning in Physics Today (July 2012, page 8, and Mermin’s response to letters, December 2012, page 12) that Mermin has become a QBist, I am afraid the sharp explanations in the first edition might become as blurred as Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2). How are we supposed to understand statements such as “Filled Bands Are Inert,” one of the book’s subheadings, from a QBist perspective? What is the Bayesian account of an exciton? And how about effective masses? Are they the second derivative of a belief?My only hope is that Neil Ashcroft remains, if not a full-blown Realist, at least an Impressionist whose motifs can be clearly identified by our aging eyes.© 2013 American Institute of Physics.

DOI
10.1063/pt.3.2023

Related papers

Mermin habitually answers opinions, real and abstract

Fred Kuttner, Bruce Rosenblum

David Mermin tells us that our “bad habit” of reifying the quantum state “induces people to write books and organize conferences about ‘the quantum measurement problem.’ “ However, a quantum measurement problem does not arise only from an unfortunate perspective on quantum theory. A quantum measurement problem, as close to magic as anything in science, is displayed in quantum-theory-neutral experimental observations that assume only the free choice of the experimenters. In the two-slit experiment, one can choose to demonstrate each object concentrated at a single slit or perform the contradictory demonstration, that each object spread over both slits. Facing this dilemma, George Greenstein and Arthur Zajonc note that “even had quantum theory never been invented, these [two-slit] experiments could have been performed, and we would still find ourselves unable to understand them.” 1 1. G. Greenstein, A. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed., Jones and Bartlett, Sudbury, MA (2006), p. 124. Quantum weirdness is increasingly misappropriated as a way to buttress pseudoscience. It is a responsibility of physicists to combat such misappropriation. (See our letter in Physics Today, November 2006, page 14.)Presenting the intriguing strangeness of quantum mechanics honestly and interestingly by the use of books Mermin might seem to deplore can effectively combat the misuse of the quantum mysteries. Dismissing the measurement problem as merely a bad way of viewing quantum theory abandons a fascinating mystery in physics to the purveyors of pseudoscience.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. G. Greenstein, A. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed., Jones and Bartlett, Sudbury, MA (2006), p. 124. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Sep 1, 2009•0 citations

Mermin habitually answers opinions, real and abstract

Leonardo Colletti

I am curious to hear David Mermin’s view, in light of his May 2009 Reference Frame, of Galileo’s condemnation by the church.That episode is still considered a scandal by most scientists. For example, several physicists cited the Galileo affair as their reason for opposing the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to the University of Rome I (“La Sapienza”) last year.Could we perhaps say that Mermin would agree with those who refuse to recognize any objective truth in physical theories yet support them as useful descriptions of successions of events, thus condemning Galileo’s quest for ontologically realistic theories?Is the proposition that Earth travels around the Sun ultimately a mere calculational device?© 2009 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Sep 1, 2009•0 citations

More on the quantum measurement problem

Gregory N. Derry

Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•2 citations

Mermin habitually answers opinions, real and abstract

Rodney Brooks

I am that friend of David Mermin’s “who was enchanted by the revelation that quantum fields were the real stuff that makes up the world.” I plead guilty to reification and offer the following defense.I started out, as I think we all did, with the notion that there is a reality out there and that space and time are part of it—not just “an extremely effective way to represent relations between distinct events.” When I read Arthur Eddington’s The Nature of the Physical World (J. M. Dent & Sons, 1942) in high school, I learned that reality was not what it seemed—that Eddington’s solid writing desk, for example, was mostly empty space. The next step in my understanding of reality came in college when I found that the electromagnetic field offered a more satisfying picture of the world than action at a distance, which even Isaac Newton derided. 1 1. H. Boorse, L. Motz, eds., The World of the Atom, Basic Books, New York (1966), p. 319. When I encountered quantum mechanics, of course, everything became confusion. However, along with David, I was fortunate to attend Julian Schwinger’s courses at Harvard University just after he had perfected his treatment of quantum field theory. 2 2. J. Schwinger, Ann. Phys. 2, 407 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(57)90015-5 I sat enthralled throughout the three-year series (1956–59), in which Schwinger developed QFT as a seemingly inevitable consequence of the most basic assumptions.However, I came away with a different understanding of QFT than David’s. I understood that the fields are physical properties of space that are described by field strengths—just as in classical physics, except that in QFT the state of the field at each point is represented by a vector in Hilbert space rather than by a pure number. That use of Hilbert space, which followed naturally from Schwinger’s “measurement algebra,” allows superpositions of values. The operators in Hilbert space, as I understood it, are mathematical tools that describe the evolution of the state vectors, and they are not to be reified.When I saw how QFT resolves the paradoxes of modern physics, it became irresistible. The special relativity paradoxes—for example, Lorentz contraction and time dilation—are a natural result of the way fields behave. 3 3. J. Schwinger wrote a six-part series on the theory of quantized fields: Phys. Rev. 82, 914 (1951); 91, 713 (1953); https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.82.914 91, 728 (1953); 92, 1283 (1953); 93, 615 (1954); 94, 1362 (1954). The spacetime curvature of general relativity, which I could never really visualize, does not exist in QFT; the gravitational field equations are equivalent to spacetime curvature for those who can visualize it, but equivalent is not the same as identical. 4 4. S. Weinberg, Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Applications of the General Theory of Relativity, Wiley, New York (1972), pp. vii–147. Finally, the mysterious wave–particle duality of quantum mechanics vanishes; in QFT, reality consists of fields and only fields.Because QFT is so neglected by the public (and by many physicists), I am writing a book that presents it without equations. A draft copy of the work, The Theory That Escaped Einstein, can be found through an internet search. Feedback is appreciated.For those who can’t kick the reification habit, QFT is the way to go. It is the only theory that offers a consistent and visualizable picture of reality. Reifiers of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your abstractions.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. H. Boorse, L. Motz, eds., The World of the Atom, Basic Books, New York (1966), p. 319. Google Scholar2. J. Schwinger, Ann. Phys. 2, 407 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(57)90015-5 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. J. Schwinger wrote a six-part series on the theory of quantized fields: Phys. Rev. 82, 914 (1951); 91, 713 (1953); https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.82.914 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI 91, 728 (1953); , Google Scholar 92, 1283 (1953); Google Scholar 93, 615 (1954); Google Scholar 94, 1362 (1954). Google Scholar4. S. Weinberg, Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Applications of the General Theory of Relativity, Wiley, New York (1972), pp. vii–147. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Sep 1, 2009•0 citations

More on the quantum measurement problem

Sean M. Carroll

I appreciate David Mermin’s letter. There is, of course, an ongoing debate in the philosophy of probability about whether probability is best thought of as objective or subjective. Experts continue to disagree, which suggests that we might want to acknowledge a “problem” in that wider-than-quantum context, even if we think we have the right answer.Whatever our stance is toward probability, we can still wonder about reality (ontology). People disagree about that too, and there are respectable but mutually incompatible possibilities—which represents another problem.In particular, one can be a subjectivist about probability (as I am myself!) within different approaches to the quantum measurement problem. Both Everettian and Bohmian quantum theories invoke subjective probabilities, concerning which branch of the wavefunction you are on (Everettian) or the values of the hidden variables (Bohmian), although they treat quantum measurements differently. Taking a subjective stance toward probability does not by itself resolve the measurement problem.Objective-collapse models, by contrast, sit more comfortably in (as the name suggests) an objective picture of probability. To the extent that such models are empirically viable, it seems wrong to deny the existence of the quantum measurement problem, since, again, they address it very differently than other models.I am optimistic that the quantum measurement problem is solvable and will be solved, but I am wary about prematurely declaring victory. Section:ChooseTop of page <<© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•0 citations

Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism

Ching -Hung Woo

David Mermin’s exposition on QBism was excellent. However, it left the reconciliation between subjective and objective probability up in the air. There must be circumstances in which the subjective probabilities of different scientifically trained agents coincide, and hence the subjective and objective approaches also coincide. Quantum mechanics reminds us, if such a reminder is needed, that the human experiences that produce coinciding subjective probabilities, and hence interesting science, form a small subset of all human experiences.© 2012 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•1 citation
For many years I have been eagerly awaiting the second edition of Neil Ashcroft and David Mermin’s Solid State Physics (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976). It is undoubtedly one of the best physics books ever written, but it is not aging well: An insensitive community keeps advancing the field with little respect for its prophets. However, after learning in Physics Today (July 2012, page 8, and Mermin’s response to letters, December 2012, page 12) that Mermin has become a QBist, I am afraid the sharp explanations in the first edition might become as blurred as Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2). How are we supposed to understand statements such as “Filled Bands Are Inert,” one of the book’s subheadings, from a QBist perspective? What is the Bayesian account of an exciton? And how about effective masses? Are they the second derivative of a belief?My only hope is that Neil Ashcroft remains, if not a full-blown Realist, at least an Impressionist whose motifs can be clearly identified by our aging eyes.© 2013 American Institute of Physics.
David Mermin tells us that our “bad habit” of reifying the quantum state “induces people to write books and organize conferences about ‘the quantum measurement problem.’ “ However, a quantum measurement problem does not arise only from an unfortunate perspective on quantum theory. A quantum measurement problem, as close to magic as anything in science, is displayed in quantum-theory-neutral experimental observations that assume only the free choice of the experimenters. In the two-slit experiment, one can choose to demonstrate each object concentrated at a single slit or perform the contradictory demonstration, that each object spread over both slits. Facing this dilemma, George Greenstein and Arthur Zajonc note that “even had quantum theory never been invented, these [two-slit] experiments could have been performed, and we would still find ourselves unable to understand them.” 1 1. G. Greenstein, A. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed., Jones and Bartlett, Sudbury, MA (2006), p. 124. Quantum weirdness is increasingly misappropriated as a way to buttress pseudoscience. It is a responsibility of physicists to combat such misappropriation. (See our letter in Physics Today, November 2006, page 14.)Presenting the intriguing strangeness of quantum mechanics honestly and interestingly by the use of books Mermin might seem to deplore can effectively combat the misuse of the quantum mysteries. Dismissing the measurement problem as merely a bad way of viewing quantum theory abandons a fascinating mystery in physics to the purveyors of pseudoscience.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. G. Greenstein, A. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed., Jones and Bartlett, Sudbury, MA (2006), p. 124. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.
I am curious to hear David Mermin’s view, in light of his May 2009 Reference Frame, of Galileo’s condemnation by the church.That episode is still considered a scandal by most scientists. For example, several physicists cited the Galileo affair as their reason for opposing the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to the University of Rome I (“La Sapienza”) last year.Could we perhaps say that Mermin would agree with those who refuse to recognize any objective truth in physical theories yet support them as useful descriptions of successions of events, thus condemning Galileo’s quest for ontologically realistic theories?Is the proposition that Earth travels around the Sun ultimately a mere calculational device?© 2009 American Institute of Physics.
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
I am that friend of David Mermin’s “who was enchanted by the revelation that quantum fields were the real stuff that makes up the world.” I plead guilty to reification and offer the following defense.I started out, as I think we all did, with the notion that there is a reality out there and that space and time are part of it—not just “an extremely effective way to represent relations between distinct events.” When I read Arthur Eddington’s The Nature of the Physical World (J. M. Dent & Sons, 1942) in high school, I learned that reality was not what it seemed—that Eddington’s solid writing desk, for example, was mostly empty space. The next step in my understanding of reality came in college when I found that the electromagnetic field offered a more satisfying picture of the world than action at a distance, which even Isaac Newton derided. 1 1. H. Boorse, L. Motz, eds., The World of the Atom, Basic Books, New York (1966), p. 319. When I encountered quantum mechanics, of course, everything became confusion. However, along with David, I was fortunate to attend Julian Schwinger’s courses at Harvard University just after he had perfected his treatment of quantum field theory. 2 2. J. Schwinger, Ann. Phys. 2, 407 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(57)90015-5 I sat enthralled throughout the three-year series (1956–59), in which Schwinger developed QFT as a seemingly inevitable consequence of the most basic assumptions.However, I came away with a different understanding of QFT than David’s. I understood that the fields are physical properties of space that are described by field strengths—just as in classical physics, except that in QFT the state of the field at each point is represented by a vector in Hilbert space rather than by a pure number. That use of Hilbert space, which followed naturally from Schwinger’s “measurement algebra,” allows superpositions of values. The operators in Hilbert space, as I understood it, are mathematical tools that describe the evolution of the state vectors, and they are not to be reified.When I saw how QFT resolves the paradoxes of modern physics, it became irresistible. The special relativity paradoxes—for example, Lorentz contraction and time dilation—are a natural result of the way fields behave. 3 3. J. Schwinger wrote a six-part series on the theory of quantized fields: Phys. Rev. 82, 914 (1951); 91, 713 (1953); https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.82.914 91, 728 (1953); 92, 1283 (1953); 93, 615 (1954); 94, 1362 (1954). The spacetime curvature of general relativity, which I could never really visualize, does not exist in QFT; the gravitational field equations are equivalent to spacetime curvature for those who can visualize it, but equivalent is not the same as identical. 4 4. S. Weinberg, Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Applications of the General Theory of Relativity, Wiley, New York (1972), pp. vii–147. Finally, the mysterious wave–particle duality of quantum mechanics vanishes; in QFT, reality consists of fields and only fields.Because QFT is so neglected by the public (and by many physicists), I am writing a book that presents it without equations. A draft copy of the work, The Theory That Escaped Einstein, can be found through an internet search. Feedback is appreciated.For those who can’t kick the reification habit, QFT is the way to go. It is the only theory that offers a consistent and visualizable picture of reality. Reifiers of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your abstractions.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. H. Boorse, L. Motz, eds., The World of the Atom, Basic Books, New York (1966), p. 319. Google Scholar2. J. Schwinger, Ann. Phys. 2, 407 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(57)90015-5 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. J. Schwinger wrote a six-part series on the theory of quantized fields: Phys. Rev. 82, 914 (1951); 91, 713 (1953); https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.82.914 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI 91, 728 (1953); , Google Scholar 92, 1283 (1953); Google Scholar 93, 615 (1954); Google Scholar 94, 1362 (1954). Google Scholar4. S. Weinberg, Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Applications of the General Theory of Relativity, Wiley, New York (1972), pp. vii–147. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.
I appreciate David Mermin’s letter. There is, of course, an ongoing debate in the philosophy of probability about whether probability is best thought of as objective or subjective. Experts continue to disagree, which suggests that we might want to acknowledge a “problem” in that wider-than-quantum context, even if we think we have the right answer.Whatever our stance is toward probability, we can still wonder about reality (ontology). People disagree about that too, and there are respectable but mutually incompatible possibilities—which represents another problem.In particular, one can be a subjectivist about probability (as I am myself!) within different approaches to the quantum measurement problem. Both Everettian and Bohmian quantum theories invoke subjective probabilities, concerning which branch of the wavefunction you are on (Everettian) or the values of the hidden variables (Bohmian), although they treat quantum measurements differently. Taking a subjective stance toward probability does not by itself resolve the measurement problem.Objective-collapse models, by contrast, sit more comfortably in (as the name suggests) an objective picture of probability. To the extent that such models are empirically viable, it seems wrong to deny the existence of the quantum measurement problem, since, again, they address it very differently than other models.I am optimistic that the quantum measurement problem is solvable and will be solved, but I am wary about prematurely declaring victory. Section:ChooseTop of page <<© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
David Mermin’s exposition on QBism was excellent. However, it left the reconciliation between subjective and objective probability up in the air. There must be circumstances in which the subjective probabilities of different scientifically trained agents coincide, and hence the subjective and objective approaches also coincide. Quantum mechanics reminds us, if such a reminder is needed, that the human experiences that produce coinciding subjective probabilities, and hence interesting science, form a small subset of all human experiences.© 2012 American Institute of Physics.