We are concerned with the formulation of the essential features of quantum theory in an abstract way, utilizing the mathematical language of proposition lattice theory. We review this approach giving a set of consistent axioms which enables to achieve the relevant results: the formulation and the essential role of the superposition principle is particularly examined.
We are concerned with the formulation of the essential features of quantum theory in an abstract way, utilizing the mathematical language of proposition lattice theory. We review this approach giving a set of consistent axioms which enables to achieve the relevant results: the formulation and the essential role of the superposition principle is particularly examined.
This paper deals with the foundations of quantum mechanics. We start by outlining the characterisation, due to Birkhoff and Von Neumann, of the logical structures of the theories of classical physics and quantum mechanics, as boolean and modular lattices respectively. We then derive these descriptions from what we claim are basic properties of any physical theory - i.e. the notion that a quantity in such a theory may be analysed into parts and that the results of this analysis may be treated in languages with an underlying boolean structure. We shall see that in the course of constructing a model of a theory with these properties different indistinguishable possibilities will arise for how the elements of the model may be named, that is to say different possibilities arise for how they can be associated with points from Set. Taking a particular collection of possibilities gives the usual boolean lattice of the propositions of classical physics. Taking all possibilities - in a sense, the set of all things that may be described by physical theories - gives the lattice of quantum mechanical propositions. This gives an interpretation of quantum mechanics as the complete set of such possible descriptions, the complete physical description of the world.
Are there quantum objects? What are they if they are neither given nor resemble anything familiar? To answer these questions we have to abstract from the substantive features of familiar things, delineate the pure logical forms by which we acknowledge objects and show how the forms are fulfilled in quantum theories. We have to explicate, in general terms and without resorting to the given, what we mean by objects. The clear criteria will enable us to affirm the objectivity of quantum theories. Auyang 1995, p. 5 Introduction Cantor, famously, defined a set as ‘… collections into a whole of definite, distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought’ (Cantor 1955, p. 85, our emphasis). On this basis the standard formulations of set theory, and consequently much of contemporary mathematics, are erected. Reflecting upon this definition, and the underlying ontological presuppositions, the question immediately arises, how are we to treat, mathematically, collections of objects which are not distinct individuals? This question becomes particularly acute in the quantum mechanical context, of course. As Yu. I. Manin noted at the 1974 American Mathematical Society Congress on the Hilbert Problems, We should consider possibilities of developing a totally new language to speak about infinity [that is, axioms for set theory]. Classical critics of Cantor (Brouwer et al. ) argue that, say, the general choice is an illicit extrapolation of the finite case.
Originally published in 1981, this book forms volume 15 of the Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications. The text provides a clear and thorough treatment of its subject, adhering to a clean exposition of the mathematical content of serious formulations of rational physical alternatives of quantum theory as elaborated in the influential works of the period, to which the authors made a significant contribution. The treatment falls into three distinct, logical parts: in the first part, the modern version of accumulated wisdom is presented, avoiding as far as possible the traditional language of classical physics for its interpretational character; in the second part, the individual structural elements for the logical content of the theory are laid out; in part three, the results of section two are used to reconstruct the usual Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics in a novel way.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the key concepts of quantum mechanics in the language of Hilbert spaces. The reader who has not previously met the physical ideas motivating quantum mechanics, and some of the more elementary applications of Schrödinger's equation, is encouraged to read any of a number of excellent texts on the subject such as [1–4]. Otherwise, the statements given here must to a large extent be taken on trust – not an altogether easy thing to do, since the basic assertions of quantum theory are frequently counterintuitive to anyone steeped in the classical view of physics. Quantum mechanics is frequently presented in the form of several postulates, as though it were an axiomatic system such as Euclidean geometry. As often presented, these postulates may not meet the standards of mathematical rigour required for a strictly logical set of axioms, so that little is gained by such an approach. We will do things a little more informally here. For those only interested in the mathematical aspects of quantum mechanics and the role of Hilbert space see [5–8]. Many of the standard applications, such as the hydrogen atom, will be omitted here as they can be found in all standard textbooks, and we leave aside the enormous topic of measurement theory and interpretations of quantum mechanics. This is not to say that we need be totally comfortable with quantum theory as it stands. Undoubtedly, there are some philosophically disquieting features in the theory, often expressed in the form of socalled paradoxes.
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset PTf of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular, PTf turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language LTQ(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.