Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Conference on Computer Engineering & Systems (ICCES)

New authenticated key agreement protocols

Hassan M. A. Elkamchouchi, Yasmine A. Saleh, Aliaa M. Sary

Published Nov 1, 2011• 12 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Key agreement protocols are used to establish common keys between two or more entities. The established key can then be used to assure confidentiality of exchanged messages through encryption. Additionally, authenticated key agreement protocols offer implicit authentication. In this paper, new authenticated key agreement protocols are proposed and their security properties are investigated. We start by examining the two-party case and then develop extensions to three parties as well as extensions to any group of k parties. The proposed protocols try to keep exchanged messages and computations minimal, while offering adequate security guarantees. Finally, we develop a variant of our multi-party key agreement protocol tailored for secure group communications among mobile devices.

DOI
10.1109/icces.2011.6141012

Related papers

A new certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement

YuXiu-Ying, ZhangWen-Fang, HeDa-Ke

Authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol allows two or multi-parties exchange messages, authenticate each other and establish shared session keys for later secure communications over an open network. The certificateless -based authenticated key agreement protocols combined the advantages of the traditional PKI and the identity-based cryptography. This paper analyzes a proposed AKA protocol[6] and presents a new certificateless AKA protocol. Furthermore, we examines the security of the new protocol and compare it to the existing certificateless key agreement protocols in efficiency. The new proposed scheme achieves almost all of the desired security attributes and is more practicable.

IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Automation Engineering•Jun 1, 2011•0 citations

Modelling and Security Analysis of Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols

Olivier Pereira

Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols are protocols allowing\na group of principals to contributively generate a key by the\nexchange of messages on a network possibly controlled by an\nattacker. Furthermore, their execution also guarantees all group\nmembers that the key they obtained can only be known by the other\nintended protocol participants. These protocols can be exploited\nin many applications such as audio or videoconferencing,\nreplicated servers (such as database, web, time servers), chat or\nnetwork games for instance. \n AGKAP's present several particularities that make them interesting\ncase studies for research in the theory of security. At first, the\nconsideration of the number of protocol participants as a\nparameter raises several complexity problems that are not present\nin the classical two or three-party frameworks. Furthermore, up to\nnow, the security properties of group protocols have roughly been\nconsidered as direct extensions of two-party properties, what does\nnot capture several plausible attack scenarios. A second\ninteresting aspect of the analysis of AGKAP's is the consideration\nof Diffie-Hellman-type primitives, that present properties out\nof the scope of most classical models. \n We started our study with the construction of a simple model for\nthe analysis of a classical family of protocols: the Cliques\nAGKAP's. This allowed us to discover several attacks and define\ndifferent flavors of group security properties. We then tried to\nfix these protocols, what led us to extend our model in order to\nprove that it is in fact impossible to build a secure AGKAP based\non the same design assumptions as the Cliques protocols. Finally,\nwe designed a new AGKAP based on different cryptographic\nprimitives (signature and hash functions) for which we proved\nauthentication, freshness and secrecy properties. A comparison\nwith a similar AGKAP developed in parallel to ours is also\nproposed.

•Jan 1, 2003•19 citations

Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement Protocol and Its Application

L. Zhang, Qianhong Wu, B. Qin

A recent primitive known as asymmetric group key agreement allows a group of users to negotiate a common encryption key which is accessible to any entities while each user holds her respective secret decryption key. This concept not only enables confidential communications among group users but also permits any outsider to send encrypted messages to the group. The existing instantiation is only secure against passive adversaries. In this paper, we first propose an authenticated asymmetric group key agreement protocol which captures the practical security properties against active attacks. Based on our protocol, we then propose a broadcast encryption system without relying on a trusted dealer to distribute the secret keys to the users. Our system has also short ciphertexts. Furthermore, the proposal is equipped with the perfect forward security property.

International Conference on Communications•May 1, 2010•12 citations

Pairing-Based Two-Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol.

Rongxing Lu, Zhenfu Cao, Renwang Su +1 more

Abstract. To achieve secure data communications, two parties should be authenticated by each other and agree on a secret session key by exchanging messages over an insecure channel. In this paper, based on the bilinear pairing, we present a new two-party authenticated key agreement protocol, and use the techniques from provable security to examine the security of our protocol within Bellare-Rogaway model. 1

•Jan 1, 2005•6 citations

Efficient three-party authenticated key agreement protocol in certificateless cryptography

Hu Xiong, Zhong Chen, Zhiguang Qin

Key agreement protocols are multi-party protocols in which entities exchange public information allowing them to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities and which cannot be predetermined by any party. Key agreement can be achieved using a public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography. However, the former suffers from a heavy certificate management burden, while the latter is subject to the so-called key escrow problem. Recently, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced to mitigate these limitations. In this paper, we introduce the notion of three-party authenticated key agreement into CL-PKC and propose a concrete certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocol. We show that the proposed protocol is secure (i.e. conforms to defined security attributes) while being efficient.

International Journal of Computer Mathematics•Jun 13, 2011•2 citations

Yet Another Certificateless Three-Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Jianbin Hu, Hu Xiong, Zhi Guan +4 more

Key agreement protocols are multi-party protocols in which entities exchange public information allowing them to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities and which cannot be predetermined by any party. Recently, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography was introduced to mitigate the heavy certificate management burden in traditional public key infrastructure and key escrow problem in ID-based cryptosystem. In this paper, we present an efficient certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on certificateless signature scheme. We show that the proposed protocol is secure (i.e. conforms to defined security attributes) while being efficient.

IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications (ISPA)•May 1, 2011•1 citation
Key agreement protocols are used to establish common keys between two or more entities. The established key can then be used to assure confidentiality of exchanged messages through encryption. Additionally, authenticated key agreement protocols offer implicit authentication. In this paper, new authenticated key agreement protocols are proposed and their security properties are investigated. We start by examining the two-party case and then develop extensions to three parties as well as extensions to any group of k parties. The proposed protocols try to keep exchanged messages and computations minimal, while offering adequate security guarantees. Finally, we develop a variant of our multi-party key agreement protocol tailored for secure group communications among mobile devices.
Authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol allows two or multi-parties exchange messages, authenticate each other and establish shared session keys for later secure communications over an open network. The certificateless -based authenticated key agreement protocols combined the advantages of the traditional PKI and the identity-based cryptography. This paper analyzes a proposed AKA protocol[6] and presents a new certificateless AKA protocol. Furthermore, we examines the security of the new protocol and compare it to the existing certificateless key agreement protocols in efficiency. The new proposed scheme achieves almost all of the desired security attributes and is more practicable.
Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols are protocols allowing\na group of principals to contributively generate a key by the\nexchange of messages on a network possibly controlled by an\nattacker. Furthermore, their execution also guarantees all group\nmembers that the key they obtained can only be known by the other\nintended protocol participants. These protocols can be exploited\nin many applications such as audio or videoconferencing,\nreplicated servers (such as database, web, time servers), chat or\nnetwork games for instance. \n AGKAP's present several particularities that make them interesting\ncase studies for research in the theory of security. At first, the\nconsideration of the number of protocol participants as a\nparameter raises several complexity problems that are not present\nin the classical two or three-party frameworks. Furthermore, up to\nnow, the security properties of group protocols have roughly been\nconsidered as direct extensions of two-party properties, what does\nnot capture several plausible attack scenarios. A second\ninteresting aspect of the analysis of AGKAP's is the consideration\nof Diffie-Hellman-type primitives, that present properties out\nof the scope of most classical models. \n We started our study with the construction of a simple model for\nthe analysis of a classical family of protocols: the Cliques\nAGKAP's. This allowed us to discover several attacks and define\ndifferent flavors of group security properties. We then tried to\nfix these protocols, what led us to extend our model in order to\nprove that it is in fact impossible to build a secure AGKAP based\non the same design assumptions as the Cliques protocols. Finally,\nwe designed a new AGKAP based on different cryptographic\nprimitives (signature and hash functions) for which we proved\nauthentication, freshness and secrecy properties. A comparison\nwith a similar AGKAP developed in parallel to ours is also\nproposed.
A recent primitive known as asymmetric group key agreement allows a group of users to negotiate a common encryption key which is accessible to any entities while each user holds her respective secret decryption key. This concept not only enables confidential communications among group users but also permits any outsider to send encrypted messages to the group. The existing instantiation is only secure against passive adversaries. In this paper, we first propose an authenticated asymmetric group key agreement protocol which captures the practical security properties against active attacks. Based on our protocol, we then propose a broadcast encryption system without relying on a trusted dealer to distribute the secret keys to the users. Our system has also short ciphertexts. Furthermore, the proposal is equipped with the perfect forward security property.
Key agreement protocols are multi-party protocols in which entities exchange public information allowing them to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities and which cannot be predetermined by any party. Key agreement can be achieved using a public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography. However, the former suffers from a heavy certificate management burden, while the latter is subject to the so-called key escrow problem. Recently, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced to mitigate these limitations. In this paper, we introduce the notion of three-party authenticated key agreement into CL-PKC and propose a concrete certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocol. We show that the proposed protocol is secure (i.e. conforms to defined security attributes) while being efficient.
Key agreement protocols are multi-party protocols in which entities exchange public information allowing them to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities and which cannot be predetermined by any party. Recently, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography was introduced to mitigate the heavy certificate management burden in traditional public key infrastructure and key escrow problem in ID-based cryptosystem. In this paper, we present an efficient certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on certificateless signature scheme. We show that the proposed protocol is secure (i.e. conforms to defined security attributes) while being efficient.