A physical theory is a construction of thought which is founded on experience so as to constitute knowledge of the natural world. Propositions in physics are constituted of concepts which express the properties and processes of the physical world. For purposes of record and communication concepts are designated by the terms of a language, such as mathematical symbols, and philosophical discussion may be based on linguistic forms. In this essay, however, the element of discussion will be the concept as a mode of thought through which are grasped the attributes of physical things and the relations exemplified in physical processes. The present philosophical analysis of a physical theory, quantum mechanics, is to be carried out by critical analysis of its basic concepts. In particular, the program is to show that in quantum mechanics the concept of physical object exhibits the characters of discontinuity, complementarity, and relativity.
A physical theory is a construction of thought which is founded on experience so as to constitute knowledge of the natural world. Propositions in physics are constituted of concepts which express the properties and processes of the physical world. For purposes of record and communication concepts are designated by the terms of a language, such as mathematical symbols, and philosophical discussion may be based on linguistic forms. In this essay, however, the element of discussion will be the concept as a mode of thought through which are grasped the attributes of physical things and the relations exemplified in physical processes. The present philosophical analysis of a physical theory, quantum mechanics, is to be carried out by critical analysis of its basic concepts. In particular, the program is to show that in quantum mechanics the concept of physical object exhibits the characters of discontinuity, complementarity, and relativity.
Modern scientists describe the universe in terms of two basic partial theories: firstly, the general theory of relativity proposed by Albert Einstein, and secondly, the theory of quantum mechanics. This theory introduces an immense reality and simultaneously creates complex questions for the world of physics. Quantum mechanics is an incompletable knowledge however scientists are finding the basic theories from this theory. They propose complex mathematical expressions from quantum mechanics to prove the basic law of atoms. Quantum mechanics is the entire knowledge of subatomic particles such as electrons, protons, and neutrons. Quantum mechanics reveals that what we see is just a part of a deeper reality. Then we can grasp from this theory that the material world is not the completed reality; there are other things beyond human physical senses. The concept of quantum mechanics describes particles that can exist in multiple states. The concept of quantum mechanics is directly proportional to contemporary world technologies. The super specialty of this theory is that scientists cannot be explained universe without quantum mechanics. The uncertainty principle of Heisenberg in quantum mechanics suggests that there are limits to what we can know about a particle state of an atom. Humans cannot yet find out what it looks like and how we can imagine the existence of subatomic particles in an atom. That was an unseen dynamite for humans' perspective observation of the material world.
Beginning with its introduction by W. Heisenberg, quantum mechanics was often seen as an overly abstract theory, mathematically and physically, vis‐à‐vis classical physics or relativity. This perception was amplified by the fact that, while the quantum‐mechanical formalism provided effective predictive algorithms for the probabilistic predictions concerning quantum experiments, it appeared unable to describe, even by way idealization, quantum processes themselves in space and time, in the way classical mechanics or relativity did. The aim of the present paper is to reconsider the nature of mathematical and physical abstraction in modern physics by offering an analysis of the concept of “physical fact” and of the concept of “physical concept,” in part by following G. W. F. Hegel’s and G. Deleuze’s arguments concerning the nature of conceptual thinking. In classical physics, relativity, and quantum physics alike, I argue, physical concepts are defined by the following main features—1) their multi‐component multiplicity; 2) their essential relations to problems; 3) and the interactions between physical, mathematical, and philosophical components within each concept. It is the particular character of these interactions in quantum mechanics, as defined by its essentially predictive (rather than descriptive) nature, that distinguishes it from classical physics and relativity.
Beginning with its introduction by W. Heisenberg, quantum mechanics was often seen as an overly abstract theory, mathematically and physically, vis‐à‐vis classical physics or relativity. This perception was amplified by the fact that, while the quantum‐mechanical formalism provided effective predictive algorithms for the probabilistic predictions concerning quantum experiments, it appeared unable to describe, even by way idealization, quantum processes themselves in space and time, in the way classical mechanics or relativity did. The aim of the present paper is to reconsider the nature of mathematical and physical abstraction in modern physics by offering an analysis of the concept of “physical fact” and of the concept of “physical concept,” in part by following G. W. F. Hegel’s and G. Deleuze’s arguments concerning the nature of conceptual thinking. In classical physics, relativity, and quantum physics alike, I argue, physical concepts are defined by the following main features—1) their multi‐component multiplicity; 2) their essential relations to problems; 3) and the interactions between physical, mathematical, and philosophical components within each concept. It is the particular character of these interactions in quantum mechanics, as defined by its essentially predictive (rather than descriptive) nature, that distinguishes it from classical physics and relativity.
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the key concepts of quantum mechanics in the language of Hilbert spaces. The reader who has not previously met the physical ideas motivating quantum mechanics, and some of the more elementary applications of Schrödinger's equation, is encouraged to read any of a number of excellent texts on the subject such as [1–4]. Otherwise, the statements given here must to a large extent be taken on trust – not an altogether easy thing to do, since the basic assertions of quantum theory are frequently counterintuitive to anyone steeped in the classical view of physics. Quantum mechanics is frequently presented in the form of several postulates, as though it were an axiomatic system such as Euclidean geometry. As often presented, these postulates may not meet the standards of mathematical rigour required for a strictly logical set of axioms, so that little is gained by such an approach. We will do things a little more informally here. For those only interested in the mathematical aspects of quantum mechanics and the role of Hilbert space see [5–8]. Many of the standard applications, such as the hydrogen atom, will be omitted here as they can be found in all standard textbooks, and we leave aside the enormous topic of measurement theory and interpretations of quantum mechanics. This is not to say that we need be totally comfortable with quantum theory as it stands. Undoubtedly, there are some philosophically disquieting features in the theory, often expressed in the form of socalled paradoxes.
Quantum theory has created a fundamental change in our ideas as relativity theory had done before. But while relativity theory is essentially classical in its conceptions—it is in fact the culmination of classical physics—quantum mechanics is founded on some new principles. The quantum laws are very different in character from the laws we find in classical theory. In particular, quantum mechanics is a strictly statistical type of theory : from this arises the different conception of causality that marks the new outlook of modern physics. Classical theory describes the so-called macroscopic phenomena, that is, things and events which are more or less of the same size and kind as we find them in ordinary life; and so a description can be given in terms of concepts close to the ones we use in ordinary language. The language of quantum mechanics is based upon a duality principle ; and most of our ordinary language is equally dualistic.
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.