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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Examining the compatibility of special relativity and quantum theory

Gordon N. Fleming

Published Dec 1, 1995• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/1355-2198(95)00013-5

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It is generally assumed that compatibility with special relativity is guaranteed by the invariance of the fundamental equations of quantum physics under Lorentz transformations and the impossibility of transferring energy or information faster than the speed of light. Despite this, various contradictions persist, which make us suspect the solidity of that compatibility. This paper focuses on collapse theories—although they are not the only way of interpreting quantum theory—in order to examine what seems to be insurmountable difficulties we encounter when trying to construct a space–time picture of such typically quantum processes as state vector reduction or the non-separability of entangled systems. The inescapable nature of such difficulties suggests the need to go further in the search for new formulations that surpass our current conceptions of matter and space–time.
Are probabilism and special relativity compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal “now” (and is thus incompatible with special relativity), or amounts to a many world universe (which I have discussed, and rejected as too ad hoc to be taken seriously), or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure (and thus differs drastically from special relativity as ordinarily understood). Probabilism and special relativity appear to be incompatible after all. What is at issue is not whether “the flow of time” can be reconciled with special relativity, but rather whether explicitly probabilistic versions of quantum theory should be rejected because of incompatibility with special relativity.