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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Quantum logical interpretation of quantum mechanics: The role of time

Andrey Anatoljevich Grib

Published Dec 1, 1993• 11 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00673007

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This chapter explores the relation between logical positivism and the early development and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, we find that logical positivism did not influence physicists’ view of quantum mechanics until well into the 1930s, if at all. Special emphasis is given to Niels Bohr due to his central role in the understanding of the new physics. While Bohr was in contact with several central figures of logical positivism and on several occasions expressed his agreement with them, we find that Bohr developed his main ideas concerning quantum mechanics well before this contact was made. Instead, this chapter speculates that it was Bohr who tried to influence logical positivism: Bohr believed that understanding quantum mechanics provided us with a general philosophical lesson to which the logical positivist would be responsive. Because of similarities in viewpoints, Bohr apparently had hoped that this might compel the logical positivists to join him in the attempt to extend his ideas of complementarity and contextualism beyond quantum mechanics.
Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.
Friedman and Putnam have argued (Friedman and Putnam 1978) that the quantum logical interpretation of quantum mechanics gives us an explanation of interference that the Copenhagen interpretation cannot supply without invoking an additional ad hoc principle, the projection postulate. I show that it is possible to define a notion of equivalence of experimental arrangements relative to a pure state φ, or (correspondingly) equivalence of Boolean subalgebras in the partial Boolean algebra of projection operators of a system, which plays a role in the Copenhagen explanation of interference analogous to the role played by the material equivalence, given φ, of certain propositions in the Friedman-Putnam quantum logical analysis. I also show that the quantum logical interpretation and the Copenhagen interpretation are equally capable of avoiding the paradoxical conclusion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935). Thus, neither interference phenomena nor the correlations between separated systems provide a test case for distinguishing between the relative acceptability of the Copenhagen interpretation and the quantum logical interpretation as explanations of quantum effects.