Many problems shadow the traditional method of casting votes. The chief predicament faced is that the voting area is usually politically tense and votes are in the danger of being compromised or coerced while they are stored in each constituency and also when they are being transported to the final tallying destination. We propose a novel method in which votes are not cached in the voting machines but are transferred in real time to a predetermined secure location. To achieve this transfer we propound to use cryptographic methods and proceed to analyze which cryptosystem would be best suited for this application. We introduce our voting scheme which utilizes Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and propose a novel latency examination technique to detect and thwart man-in-the-middle attacks that might be employed to hack QKD systems. Further we discuss the necessity for post quantum cryptography and research how we might use multivariate public key cryptography for our voting scheme in the post-quantum era.
Many problems shadow the traditional method of casting votes. The chief predicament faced is that the voting area is usually politically tense and votes are in the danger of being compromised or coerced while they are stored in each constituency and also when they are being transported to the final tallying destination. We propose a novel method in which votes are not cached in the voting machines but are transferred in real time to a predetermined secure location. To achieve this transfer we propound to use cryptographic methods and proceed to analyze which cryptosystem would be best suited for this application. We introduce our voting scheme which utilizes Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and propose a novel latency examination technique to detect and thwart man-in-the-middle attacks that might be employed to hack QKD systems. Further we discuss the necessity for post quantum cryptography and research how we might use multivariate public key cryptography for our voting scheme in the post-quantum era.
Ensuring the security and integrity of voting systems is crucial for maintaining democratic processes. With the rise of cyber threats targeting electronic voting, traditional cryptographic methods are proving inadequate in safeguarding against sophisticated attacks. Quantum cryptography, particularly Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), offers a promising solution to enhance the security of voting systems by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This research explores the application of quantum cryptography in secure voting, highlighting its potential to address vulnerabilities in current systems. The study examines the technological, practical, and legal challenges of implementing quantum-based voting systems, including infrastructure requirements and public acceptance. Furthermore, it assesses how quantum cryptography ensures voter privacy, prevents tampering, and provides robust protection against future quantum computing threats. While significant hurdles remain, the integration of quantum cryptographic techniques presents a transformative opportunity to create more secure and transparent voting processes. This paper outlines the roadmap for adopting quantum cryptography in voting systems and its potential impact on electoral integrity.
In the age of digital transformation, the integrity and security of online voting systems have become a growing concern. Traditional cryptography methods are vulnerable to advances in quantum computing, demanding the need for more secure alternatives. This paper explores the application of quantum cryptography in enhancing the security of blockchain-based voting systems, a decentralized and transparent approach to conduct elections. We introduce a novel quantum-resistant voting protocol that integrates Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, ensuring secure voter authentication, vote casting, and tallying. The methodology combines quantum encryption with blockchain's immutability to create a tamper-proof voting ledger, preventing unauthorized access and vote manipulation. It gives an analysis of potential real-world implementations, positioning a hybrid quantum-blockchain framework as a promising solution for future secure electronic voting systems.
The rapid advancement of internet technology has raised attention to the importance of electronic voting in maintaining democracy and fairness in elections. E-voting refers to the use of electronic technology to facilitate the casting and counting of votes in elections. The need for designated verification arises from concerns about voter privacy, auditability, and the prevention of manipulation. Traditional e-voting systems use cryptographic techniques for security but lack verifiable proof of integrity. Integrating e-voting with a quantum designated verifier could address these challenges by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics to enhance security and trustworthiness. In light of this, we propose a quantum e-voting scheme that uses a designated verifier signature. To ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of the voting process, the scheme uses quantum features like the no-cloning theorem and quantum key distribution. The proposed scheme has security properties like source hiding, non-transferability, and message anonymity. The proposed scheme is resistant to many quantum attacks, such as eavesdropping and impersonation. Due to designated verification, the scheme minimizes the risk of tempering. This paper provides a detailed description of the proposed scheme and analyzes its security properties. Therefore, the proposed scheme is efficient, practical, and secure.
Abstract Security (privacy, confidentiality and integrity) of pre-electoral, electoral and post electoral phases of the electioneering process is fundamental to the success of Electronic Voting (E-Voting) Systems. Crystography, which is the combination of cryptography and steganography could be a fitting ‘tool kit’ for enhancing the security of sensitive election-related information transmitted over public networks, thereby also ensuring free, fair and credible election/voting. Most of the existing secure e-voting systems are based on public key cryptographic schemes like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), whose security depends on the difficulty of solving Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) and Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP) respectively. However, techniques for solving IFP and DLP problems, improves continually. One of such is the quantum algorithm discovered by Peter Shor in 1994, which can solve both IFP and DLP problems in polynomial time. Consequently, the existence of quantum computers in the range of 1000 bits would spell doom to systems based on those problems. This paper presents the development of a new crystographic system that combines Post Quantum Cryptography with steganography to ensure that the security of e-voting is maintained both in classical computing era as well as post-quantum computing era. Our experiments’ results shows that our proposed system performed better than existing ones.
The potential of quantum computing to compromise traditional public-key cryptography (PKC) has led to a pressing need for more efficient and resilient cryptographic methods. Recent advancements, such as the 800x improvement in the logical error rate by Microsoft and QUANTINUUM, underscore the urgency of this issue. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) offers a promising solution designed to withstand quantum attacks. This paper examines how PQC and other advanced cryptographic techniques can enhance the security and efficiency of PKC in the quantum era. Current PKC methods, despite revolutionizing secure online communication, are vulnerable to flaws in their underlying algorithms. The proposed hybrid model integrates PQC with traditional PKC, leveraging both technologies' strengths to mitigate quantum threats while preserving established security benefits. The investigation addresses critical research questions: how to enhance PKC key management for better efficiency and security, and which PQC techniques can protect PKC from quantum attacks. This paper's contribution includes identifying vulnerabilities in existing PKC, comparing RSA and post-quantum algorithms, and implementing a PQC algorithm between a client and server to analyze integration with existing protocols. Finally, the paper recommends security mechanisms to improve PQC protocols, ensuring robust protection against emerging quantum computing capabilities.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the cryptographic foundations of current electronic voting (e-voting) systems, which commonly rely on algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). These algorithms are believed to be vulnerable to attacks imposed by quantum computers, jeopardizing core e-voting properties, including ballot secrecy, integrity, and auditability. To address these challenges, this work presents a quantum-resistant electronic-voting (e-voting) system, named post-quantum e-voting system (PQEVS) built entirely upon cryptographic primitives standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for post-quantum security. The proposed PQEVS utilizes Dilithium for secure voter authentication, Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV)-based Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) for privacy-preserving vote tallying, and Picnic-based Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to ensure vote validity without compromising voter anonymity. Designed for modularity and scalability, our PQEVS delivers enhanced security while achieving significant performance gains, reducing vote processing latency by 85% and supporting throughputs of up to 36,000 votes per second. These results highlight the practicality and robustness of post-quantum cryptography in securing large-scale electoral processes, setting a new benchmark for verifiable and future-proof e-voting systems.