Journal of Physics Conference Series

Probability as a logic for measurement representations

Giovanni Battista Rossi, Francesco Crenna

Published Sep 6, 2013• 3 citations

Abstract

Measurement can be defined on the basis of the notion of empirical relation, which appears as a primitive term in the representational theory. Here a language is introduced for dealing with empirical relations and a probabilistic logic is applied to statements concerning them.

DOI: 10.1088/1742-6596/459/1/012005

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