Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

How to (properly) strengthen Bell's theorem using counterfactuals

Tomasz Bigaj

Published Jan 1, 2010• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.12.001

Related papers

Counterfactual restrictions and Bell's theorem

Jonte R. Hance

•Dec 14, 2024•0 citations

Counterfactual restrictions and Bell's theorem

Hance JR

•Jan 1, 2024•0 citations

Non-locality and Possible World

Tomasz Bigaj

This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.

De Gruyter eBooks•Dec 31, 2006•8 citations

Counterfactuality, Definiteness, and Bell's Theorem

Jonte R. Hance

Counterfactual definiteness is shown from analysis of Bell's Theorem to be the factor separating classical from quantum theories. From this, it is shown that, by replacing it with 'counterfactual semi-definiteness', the definiteness of possible options available after a measurement event, some apt analysis of possible states can be kept. While not as solid as that forbidden by the EPR paradox and Bell's Theorem, it allows us to start investigating the physical implementation of possible states in a way that has rarely been done. Working from this, the idea of counterfactuality, and interaction between counterfactual possibilities, is developed further.

•Sep 14, 2019•0 citations

Bell’s Theorem Refuted Irrefutably on Bell’s Own Terms

Gordon Watson

•Jul 1, 2018•0 citations

Counterfactual restrictions and Bell’s theorem

Jonte R. Hance

Abstract We show that the ability to consider counterfactual situations is a necessary assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that, to allow Bell inequality violations while maintaining all other assumptions, we just require certain measurement choices be counterfactually restricted, rather than the full removal of counterfactual definiteness. We illustrate how the counterfactual definiteness assumption formally arises from the statistical independence assumption. Counterfactual restriction therefore provides a way to interpret statistical independence violation different to what is typically assumed (i.e. that statistical independence violation means either retrocausality or superdeterminism). We tie counterfactual restriction to contextuality, and show the similarities to that approach.

arXiv:1909.06608•Journal of Physics Communications•Dec 1, 2024•12 citations
This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.
Counterfactual definiteness is shown from analysis of Bell's Theorem to be the factor separating classical from quantum theories. From this, it is shown that, by replacing it with 'counterfactual semi-definiteness', the definiteness of possible options available after a measurement event, some apt analysis of possible states can be kept. While not as solid as that forbidden by the EPR paradox and Bell's Theorem, it allows us to start investigating the physical implementation of possible states in a way that has rarely been done. Working from this, the idea of counterfactuality, and interaction between counterfactual possibilities, is developed further.
Abstract We show that the ability to consider counterfactual situations is a necessary assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that, to allow Bell inequality violations while maintaining all other assumptions, we just require certain measurement choices be counterfactually restricted, rather than the full removal of counterfactual definiteness. We illustrate how the counterfactual definiteness assumption formally arises from the statistical independence assumption. Counterfactual restriction therefore provides a way to interpret statistical independence violation different to what is typically assumed (i.e. that statistical independence violation means either retrocausality or superdeterminism). We tie counterfactual restriction to contextuality, and show the similarities to that approach.