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Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science

Robust device independent quantum key distribution

Umesh V. Vazirani, Thomas Vidick

Published Jan 12, 2014• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum cryptography is based on the discovery that the laws of quantum mechanics allow levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world [2, 8, 12]. Can such levels of security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted? This fundamental question in quantum cryptography dates back to the early nineties when the challenge of achieving device independent quantum key distribution, or DIQKD, was first formulated [9]. We answer this challenge affirmatively by exhibiting a robust protocol for DIQKD and rigorously proving its security. The protocol achieves a linear key rate while tolerating a constant noise rate in the devices. The security proof assumes only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and any adversary's laboratory. In particular, we emphasize that the devices may have quantum memory. All previous proofs of security relied either on the use of many independent pairs of devices [6, 4, 7], or on the absence of noise [10, 1].

DOI
10.1145/2554797.2554802

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Quantum cryptography is based on the discovery that the laws of quantum mechanics allow levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world [2, 8, 12]. Can such levels of security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted? This fundamental question in quantum cryptography dates back to the early nineties when the challenge of achieving device independent quantum key distribution, or DIQKD, was first formulated [9]. We answer this challenge affirmatively by exhibiting a robust protocol for DIQKD and rigorously proving its security. The protocol achieves a linear key rate while tolerating a constant noise rate in the devices. The security proof assumes only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and any adversary's laboratory. In particular, we emphasize that the devices may have quantum memory. All previous proofs of security relied either on the use of many independent pairs of devices [6, 4, 7], or on the absence of noise [10, 1].
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving device-independent quantum key distribution was first formulated. We answer this challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of a slight variant of Ekert's original entanglement-based protocol against the most general (coherent) attacks. The resulting protocol is robust: While assuming only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary's laboratory, it achieves a linear key rate and tolerates a constant noise rate in the devices. In particular, the devices may have quantum memory and share arbitrary quantum correlations with the eavesdropper. The proof of security is based on a new quantitative understanding of the monogamous nature of quantum correlations in the context of a multiparty protocol.
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to attain in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed to classical users of a quantum protocol, who may not even trust the quantum devices used to implement the protocol? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (DIQKD) was first formulated. We answer the challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of an entanglement-based protocol building on Ekert's original proposal for quantum key distribution. The proof of security builds on techniques from the classical theory of pseudo-randomness to achieve a new quantitative understanding of the non-local nature of quantum correlations.
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world.Can this security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted?This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving device-independent quantum key distribution was first formulated.We answer this challenge by rigorously proving the deviceindependent security of a slight variant of Ekert's original entanglement-based protocol against the most general (coherent) attacks.The resulting protocol is robust: While assuming only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary's laboratory, it achieves a linear key rate and tolerates a constant noise rate in the devices.In particular, the devices may have quantum memory and share arbitrary quantum correlations with the eavesdropper.The proof of security is based on a new quantitative understanding of the monogamous nature of quantum correlations in the context of a multiparty protocol.
ABSTRACT Quantum key distribution (QKD) is based on the laws of quantum mechanics to enable provably secure communication. Despite its theoretical security promise, practical QKD systems are vulnerable to serious attacks, including side‐channel attacks and detector loopholes, and assumes a trusted device characterisation. Device‐independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) overcomes these limitations by relying solely on observed nonlocal correlations, certified through Bell inequality violations, thereby removing assumptions about the internal workings of the measurement devices. In this paper, we first review the foundational principles underlying DIQKD, including Bell tests and security definitions. We then examine a range of protocol designs, including CHSH‐based schemes, and non‐local game frameworks, alongside with their security proofs. We also assess recent experimental implementations and discuss source architectures, detection technologies and finite‐key analyses. Finally, we identify current open problems, such as noise tolerance, generation rates and integration with quantum networks and outline promising directions for future research to realize robust high‐performance DIQKD.
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In this paper, we present in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in Acín et al (2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 230501). This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit only the no-signaling principle), but only holds against collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically in each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) aims to achieve secure key distribution with only minimal assumptions, by basing its security on the violation of Bell inequalities. While this offers strong security guarantees, it comes at the cost of being challenging to implement experimentally. In this thesis, we present security proofs for several techniques that help to improve the keyrates and noise tolerance of DIQKD, such as noisy preprocessing, random key measurements, and advantage distillation. We also show finite-size security proofs for some protocols based on combining several of these techniques. These results and proof techniques should be useful for further development of DIQKD protocols.