In recent years there has been an upsurge in the discussion of so-called delayed-choice experiments, as exemplified in the interferometer experiment discussed by Wheeler [1]. In commenting on this experiment Bohm et al. [2] claim that their quantum potential interpretation gives results entirely compatible with Bohr's views on wholeness and complementarity. It seems to me, however, that this discussion to a large extent completely misses the fundamental point in Bohr's argumentation as given in his famour answer [3] to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen as well as in his paper on his discussions with Einstein [4]. Expressing it a bit paradoxically one might say that in the examples discussed the experiments are not sufficiently delayed. I shall therefore here discuss a different thought experiment, much closer to Bohr's own examples, which brings out this point.
In recent years there has been an upsurge in the discussion of so-called delayed-choice experiments, as exemplified in the interferometer experiment discussed by Wheeler [1]. In commenting on this experiment Bohm et al. [2] claim that their quantum potential interpretation gives results entirely compatible with Bohr's views on wholeness and complementarity. It seems to me, however, that this discussion to a large extent completely misses the fundamental point in Bohr's argumentation as given in his famour answer [3] to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen as well as in his paper on his discussions with Einstein [4]. Expressing it a bit paradoxically one might say that in the examples discussed the experiments are not sufficiently delayed. I shall therefore here discuss a different thought experiment, much closer to Bohr's own examples, which brings out this point.
I present here a thought experiment which violates the most widely accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics “The Copenhagen Interpretation” and Bohr’s complementarity which says that there is no meaning of the state of a particle until it is observed and the act of observation might change it. The experiment consists of a double slit apparatus which is modified by putting a second double slit apparatus between the source and the original apparatus with certain conditions imposed on both the apparatuses using the facts of interference and diffraction. A striking paradox emerges if we consider the arguments of Bohr’s complementarity, i.e. the photon travels through both the paths simultaneously in a double slit apparatus whenever there is interference. It turns out that this paradox can be resolved only if the photon travels through one path even if interference fringes are visible.
In an interesting series of articles published few years ago Afshar and coworkers [1,2] reported an optical experiment in which they claimed to refute the well known N. Bohr principle of complementarity [3, 4]. Obviously this result, if justified, would constitute a serious attack against the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics (known as the Copenhagen interpretation). This work stirred much debate in different journals (see for examples references [5–12]). We think however that there are still some important misunderstandings concerning the interpretation of this experiment. In a preprint written originally in 2004 [5] (and following some early discussions with Afshar) we claimed already that the interpretation by Afshar et al. can be easily stated if we stay as close as possible from the texts written by Bohr. The aim of the present article (which was initially written in 2005 to precise a bit the thought developed in [5]) is to comment the interpretation discussed in [1]. We will in the following analyze the meaning of Bohr principle and show that far from disproving its content the experiment [1] is actually a complete confirmation of its general validity. The difficulties associated with the understanding of this principle are not new and actually complementarity created troubles even in Einstein mind [3] so that we are here in good company. To summarize a bit emphatically Bohr’s complementarity we here remind that this principle states that if one of a pair of non commuting observables of a quantum object is known for sure, then information about the second (complementary) is lost [3, 4, 15, 16]. This can be equivalently expressed as a kind of duality between different descriptions of the quantum system associated with different experimental arrangements which mutually exclude each other (read in particular [3,4]). Later in the discussion we will try to precise this definition but for the moment it is enough to illustrate the concepts by examples Consider for instance the well known Young double-pinholes interference experiment made with photons. The discrete nature of light precludes the simultaneous observation of a same photon in the aperture plane and in the interference pattern: the photon cannot be absorbed twice. This is already a trivial manifestation of the principle of Bohr. Here it implies that the two statistical patterns associated with the wave in the aperture plane and its Fourier (i. e., momentum) transform require necessarily different photons for their recording. It is in that sense that each experiment excludes and completes reciprocally the other. In the case considered before the photon is absorbed during the first detection (this clearly precludes any other detection). However even a non-destructive solution for detection implying entanglement with other quantum systems has a radical effect of the same nature: the complementarity principle is still valid. For example, during their debate Bohr and Einstein [3] discussed an ideal which-way experiment in which the recoil of the slits is correlated to the motion of the photon. Momentum conservation added to arguments based on the uncertainty relations are sufficient to explain how such entanglement photon-slits can erase fringes [15–19]. It is also important for the present discussion to remind that the principle of complementarity has a perfidious consequence on the experimental meaning of trajectory and path followed by a particle. Indeed the unavoidable interactions existing between photons and detectors imply that a trajectory existing independently of any measurement process cannot be unambiguously defined. This sounds even like a tragedy when we consider once again the two-holes experiment. Indeed for Bohr this kind of experiments shows definitely the essential element of ambiguity which is involved in ascribing conventional physical attributes to quantum systems. Intuitively (i. e., from the point of view of classical particle dynamic) one would expect that a photon detected in the focal plane of the lens must have crossed only one of the hole 1 or 2 before to reach its final destination. However, if this is true, one can not intuitively understand how the presence of the second hole (through which the photon evidently did not go) forces the photon to participate to an interference pattern (which obviously needs an influence coming from both holes). Explanations to solve this paradox have been proposed by de Broglie, Bohm, and others using concepts such as empty waves or quantum potentials [20, 21]. However all these explanations are in agreement with Bohr principle (since they fully reproduce quantum predictions) and can not be experimentally distinguished. Bohr and Heisenberg proposed for all needed purposes a much more pragmatic and simpler answer: don’t bother, the complementarity principle precludes the simultaneous observation of a photon trajectory and of an interference pattern. For Bohr [3]: This point is of great logical consequence, since it is only the circumstance that we are presented with a choice of either tracing the path
The delayed-choice experiments of the type introduced by Wheeler and extended by Englert, Scully, Süssmann and Walther (ESSW) (1992 Z. Naturf. a 47 1175–86), and others, have formed a rich area for investigating the puzzling behaviour of particles undergoing quantum interference. The surprise provided by the original delayed-choice experiment led Wheeler to the conclusion that 'no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon', a radical explanation which implied that 'the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present'. However Bohm et al (1985 Nature 315 294–97) have shown that the Bohm interpretation (BI) gives a straightforward account of the behaviour of the particle without resorting to such a radical explanation. The subsequent modifications of this experiment led both Aharonov and Vaidman (1996 Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal ed J T Cushing, A Fine and S Goldstein (Dordrecht: Kluwer) pp 141–54) and ESSW to conclude that the resulting Bohm-type trajectories in these new situations produce unacceptable properties. For example, if a cavity is placed in one arm of the interferometer, it will be excited by a particle travelling down the other arm. In other words, it is the particle that does not go through the cavity that gives up its energy! If this analysis is correct, this behaviour would be truly bizarre and could only be explained by an extreme non-local transfer of energy that is even stronger than that required in an Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)-type process. In this paper, we show that this conclusion is not correct and that if the BI is used correctly, it gives a local explanation, which actually corresponds exactly to the standard quantum mechanics explanation offered by ESSW.
“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.
The locality problem of quantum measurements is considered in the framework of the algebraic approach. It is shown that contrary to the currently widespread opinion one can reconcile the mathematical formalism of the quantum theory with the assumption of the existence of a local physical reality determining the results of local measurements. The key quantum experiments: double-slit experiment on electron scattering, Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiment, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and quantum teleportation are discussed from the locality-problem point of view. A clear physical interpretation for these experiments, which does not contradict the classical ideas, is given.