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Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Paradoxes of Measurement

Patrick A. Heelan

Published May 1, 2003• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Applying Husserl's Eidetic Phenomenology to the transcendental structure (or "phenomenological reduction") of scientific data "given" in measurement to a first-person individual observer (the experimenter, S(1)) and a related third-person individual observer (the observer of the measurement process, S(3)), and comparing the outcomes, two paradoxical theses, "paradoxes of measurement," are derived. Thesis I: classical science necessarily entails "complementarity," "uncertainty relations," and the "entanglement" of observers and the data they observe. This situation is analogous in structure to that of quantum physics. Thesis II: a quantum object is a physical object with footprints in the perceptual world, but lacking a space-time "body"; it exists ontologically before the constitution of the perceptual world of the laboratory.

DOI
10.1111/j.1749-6632.2003.tb06090.x

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Applying Husserl's Eidetic Phenomenology to the transcendental structure (or "phenomenological reduction") of scientific data "given" in measurement to a first-person individual observer (the experimenter, S(1)) and a related third-person individual observer (the observer of the measurement process, S(3)), and comparing the outcomes, two paradoxical theses, "paradoxes of measurement," are derived. Thesis I: classical science necessarily entails "complementarity," "uncertainty relations," and the "entanglement" of observers and the data they observe. This situation is analogous in structure to that of quantum physics. Thesis II: a quantum object is a physical object with footprints in the perceptual world, but lacking a space-time "body"; it exists ontologically before the constitution of the perceptual world of the laboratory.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics
Measurement is an important scientific activity. In most of science, including classical physics, is may be understood as a way of finding out about the physical world and representing the results numerically. No-go theorems show that measurement of quantum observables is not like that: the recorded outcome is typically created rather than revealed in a quantum measurement, in which case there is no objective fact about the observable's prior value. Other no-go theorems show that unitary quantum theory can generally neither explain nor even represent a unique recorded outcome, thereby threatening that outcome's objectivity. Methodological norms inherent in quantum physical practice nevertheless institute the objectivity, not only of unique recorded outcomes of quantum measurements, but also of non-quantum features of the world that physicists and other scientists take their models to represent.
Measurement outcomes provide data for a physical theory. Unless they are objective they support no objective scientific knowledge. So the outcome of a quantum measurement must be an objective physical fact. But recent arguments purport to show that if quantum theory is universally applicable then there is no such fact. This calls for a reappraisal of the notions of fact and objectivity. If quantum theory is universally applicable the facts about the physical world include a fact about each quantum measurement outcome. These physical facts lack an ideal kind of objectivity but their more modest objectivity is all that science needs.
Two narratives – natural science and religious, intersect in the area of ​​unobserv­able ontology – an immaterial, transcendental, but real area that paradoxically exists outside and inside ordinary physical space-time. It is assumed that mathe­matical constructs, physical laws, physical constants, quantum objects, and even biological laws can be associated with this area. It is argued that physical laws are not invented by man, but are discovered, since they contain physical con­stants measured in special experimental works. Universal constants were not invented for reasons of convenience – physics accepts them as an inevitable con­sequence of the coincidence of the results of all special measurements. Observa­tional data are presented that indicate an extremely small change in fundamental constants or even their constancy over the entire time of the existence of the Uni­verse, although this interesting problem cannot be considered finally solved. The ontology of quantum objects is considered within the framework of Seval­nikov's polyiontic paradigm, according to which two modes are distinguished – potential and actual. The potential existence of quantum objects is described by the Schrödinger wave function, and the actual one appears during the transition from the spectrum of possible states to the only observable one. It is emphasized that potential being does not belong to the classical space, but is in an unobserv­able ontology. The observed state, on the contrary, is already in ordinary space – time and can be recorded by the device. This determines the existence of a spe­cial transcendental layer of reality, along with the material, which may indicate a certain duality in the structure of the Universe. Then it should be assumed that our Universe is not a universal, but a multiverse – a set of different worlds onto­logically having a different nature. In addition, the polyiontic paradigm leads to the idea that, at the quantum level, matter can be derived from information hid­den in an unobservable ontology.
After an initial discussion of the general aims of scientific theories, the quantum measurement problem is presented. Non-Everettian solutions to the problem are briefly discussed; the aim of the discussion is to show that these solutions require significant change either to our philosophical approach to science or to quantum theory itself. In this context, the Everett interpretation is introduced and motivated as the result of simply applying our normal approach to scientific theories to the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics and following where it leads. The chapter ends with a introductory discussion of potential problems, and with references to subsequent chapters where they are discussed more fully.
The paradox of Wigner’s friend presents a challenge to the objectivity of description in quantum theory. Distinguishing several aspects of objectivity, I address this challenge. Relativization of quantum state assignment to agent situation disposes of the main problem and a residual worry concerning the objective content of magnitude claims about macroscopic records of outcomes. While Quantum Darwinism cannot alone secure the objectivity of outcomes, it can then help to show why claims about them are intersubjectively verifiable as multiple observers examine records of the outcome in different parts of the environment. A recent extension of the paradox shows why even a true claim about the outcome of a measurement is not transcendentally objective in the sense that it corresponds to a reality that transcends all possibility of observational access by the scientific community.