This article provides a critical evaluation of the prevailing paradigms in modern physics, specifically focusing on Quantum Mechanics (QM) and the Special/General Theories of Relativity (SR/GR). The study highlights the epistemological tension between physical realism—defined by the continuity of material processes—and the probabilistic, non-deterministic models currently accepted in mainstream science. An alternative interpretation of atomic clock experiments (e.g., Hafele-Keating, GPS) is proposed, suggesting that observed time dilation reflects gravitational influence on physical mechanisms rather than a kinematic shift in the temporal dimension itself. Furthermore, the paper posits that "quantum jumps" are an artifact of measurement constraints rather than an intrinsic property of nature. The necessity of returning to a continuous wave-based model for the photoelectric effect is also discussed.
A century after its formulation, we discuss the multifaceted implications for education of the vast cultural connections that quantum mechanics (QM) has helped establish between physics and other disciplines. Drawing on the most recent research in QM education, we will address the epistemological paradigms that underpin our understanding of nature and the cultural significance of this theory for the intellectual development of students at various educational levels; always maintaining a careful focus on the fundamental educational challenge of teaching and learning about the nature of science through physics education.
This article deals with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and its epistemological discussion by Ernst Cassirer and Richard Hönigswald. The starting point is Cassirer's treatise Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, published in Stockholm. Both philosophers and several physicists were involved in the subsequent exchange of letters. From a physical point of view, the Copenhagen interpretation was particularly criticised by v. Laue and Einstein. Both demanded a revision of the foundations of quantum mechanics or a critical examination of essential physical concepts. The epistemological implications of the Copenhagen interpretation were rejected, in particular that the interactions between observation, the observed and the observer in quantum physics experiments should lead to a renunciation of the concept of causality or an objectively unambiguous description of natural processes. Cassirer argues here that quantum mechanics fulfils the epistemological requirement of transforming ontological “concepts of things” into epistemological concepts of relations and is therefore compatible with the neo-critical approach he advocates. At the same time, Hönigswald was working on two major treatises on the structure of physics and the concept of causality. Here he undertakes an epistemological foundation of physics as a whole. A transcendental foundation of the concept of experience and its specifications in principles such as contemplation, observation or experiment appears to be called for. Hönigswald therefore essentially rejects the Copenhagen interpretation, as it draws epistemological consequences by physical means and thus inadmissibly reverses the transcendentally necessary relations of justification. These arguments are examined and could be used for a current discussion on the epistemological foundations of quantum mechanics and physics as a whole. A post-Neo-Kantian, transcendental philosophical foundation of scientific knowledge, especially of modern physics, seems possible and necessary.