Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite recently quantum theoretical accounts of the measurement process have been appearing which sidestep direct reference to such things as “contraction” of the wave packet (see, for example, Krips and Jauch). With this development it has become increasingly popular to take a “cool” approach to these paradoxes, arguing that the new approach to measurement provides a consistent, nonbizarre account of the physical situations and that the paradoxicality was due largely to intuitive blunders—even plausible intuitive blunders—accentuated (but also disguised) by the unfortunate features of the von Neumann approach to measurement. Both Krips and Jauch, for example, adopt this approach.
Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite recently quantum theoretical accounts of the measurement process have been appearing which sidestep direct reference to such things as “contraction” of the wave packet (see, for example, Krips and Jauch). With this development it has become increasingly popular to take a “cool” approach to these paradoxes, arguing that the new approach to measurement provides a consistent, nonbizarre account of the physical situations and that the paradoxicality was due largely to intuitive blunders—even plausible intuitive blunders—accentuated (but also disguised) by the unfortunate features of the von Neumann approach to measurement. Both Krips and Jauch, for example, adopt this approach.
In most textbooks, measurement does not receive the full attention it deserves and sometimes is even not treated at all, apart a brief and cryptic mention of the “reduction of the wave packet.” However, in the last decades, the situation has profoundly changed and it is time to consider measurement a fundamental part of quantum mechanics, even, to a certain extent, an important generalization of the traditional theory (see also Chs. 14–15). This chapter consists of three major parts. In the first block (Secs. 9.1–9.4) we develop the main physical features of the measurement process: the heart of the argument is here represented by the aspects related to the interpretation. In the second part (Secs. 9.5–9.8) we discuss several special (and partly interdependent) topics of measurement: the heart here is represented by experimental aspects. In the third part (Secs. 9.9–9.12) we deal with the measurement process on a more formal plane, making use, in particular, of the generalization represented by the concepts of effect and positive operator valued measure (POVM). As we have said, the measurement problem is one of the most fundamental issues in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics (as described in Sec. 9.1) and has a long history that will be examined in Sec. 9.2. In this context, the existence of apparently paradoxical quantum states comes about: the so-called Schrödinger cat states (see Sec. 9.3).
Despite the spectacular success of quantum mechanics (QM) over the last 80 years in explaining phenomena observed at the atomic and subatomic level, the conceptual status of the theory is still a topic of lively controversy. Most of the discussion centers around two famous paradoxes (or, as some would have it, pseudoparadoxes) associated, respectively, with the names of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) and with Schrodinger's cat. In this Viewpoint, I will concentrate on the paradox of Schrodinger's cat or, as it is often known (to my mind somewhat misleadingly), the quantum measurement paradox.
Professor J. Jauch, in his recent book, Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, claims to resolve the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. Jauch's approach is representative of that adopted by the majority of physicists. I argue that, although Jauch does exhibit a consistent quantum formalism for dealing with situations of the type involved in the original paradox, that formalism, so far from doing away with the paradox, serves only to highlight the difficulties of providing an acceptable physical understanding of it. The paradox must remain, therefore, as a central clue in the search for a more adequate understanding of quantum theory.
The purpose of this paper is to resolve two paradoxes, which occur in quantum theory, by using the discussion of the theory of measurement presented in two earlier papers by the author [3], [4], [5]. The two paradoxes discussed will be the Schrödinger cat paradox and the Einstein, Podolski, Rosen paradox [2]. An introductory section will be included which summarizes the relevant results from the author's previous papers. Also a discussion will be made regarding the author's interpretation of the density operator.
Quantum measurement theory addresses several problems. All of them arise from applying a microscopically valid theory to the macroscopic domain. The most famous is the Schrödinger cat example in which the ordinary use of quantum rules suggests a superposition of macroscopically different states, something we do not seem to experience. Another problem is the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox in which a fundamental quantum concept, entanglement, creates subtle and non-classical correlations among remote sets of measurements. Although it seems mere word play to observe that such an apparent micro-macro conflict ought to be viewed as a problem in statistical mechanics—by virtue of the way that discipline is defined—until recently the importance of this observation was seldom recognized. The founders, Bohr, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Einstein did not emphasize this direction, but over the years the realization that measurement necessarily involves macroscopic objects—objects with potentially mischievous degrees of freedom of their own—began to be felt. For me this was brought home by the now classic fourth chapter of Gottfried's text on quantum mechanics. He takes up the following problem. The density matrix ρ 0 for a normalized pure state is ρ 0 = |ψ〉 〈ψ|. It follows that Tr ρ 0 = Tr ρ 0 2 = 1. After a non-trivial measurement, the density matrix ρ is supposed to be diagonal in the basis denned by the measured observable, with Tr ρ = 1 but Tr ρ 2 < 1.
A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm's formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Hardy's paradox. It is argued that wave function collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechanics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In particular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum-mechanical description in which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mysterious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.