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American Journal of Physics

Probability interpretation of quantum mechanics

Roger G. Newton

Published Dec 1, 1980• 24 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The paper draws attention to the frequency meaning of the probability concept and its implications for quantum mechanics. It emphasizes that the very meaning of probability implies the ensemble interpretation of both pure and mixed states. As a result some of the ’’paradoxical’’ aspects of quantum mechanics lose their counterintuitive character.

DOI
10.1119/1.12299

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The paper draws attention to the frequency meaning of the probability concept and its implications for quantum mechanics. It emphasizes that the very meaning of probability implies the ensemble interpretation of both pure and mixed states. As a result some of the ’’paradoxical’’ aspects of quantum mechanics lose their counterintuitive character.
We investigate epistemologically the meaning of probability as implied in quantum physics in connection with a proposed direct interpretation of the state function and of the related quantum theoretical quantities in terms of physical systems having physical properties, through an extension of meaning of the notion of physical quantity to complex mathematical expressions not reductible to simple numerical values. We show how the changes occurred in the implication of probabilities in quantum physics, from a penetration tool (probability as statistics and frequencies of occurencies of events) to a theoretical concept (probability given by a physically aimed at «amplitude of probability») actually make this view a somewhat «natural» one.
The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency interpretation of R. von Mises) reveals that this notion always refers to an observing system. Therefore the instrumentalist aspects of quantum mechanics, and in particular the enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation, derive from a precise understanding of probability.
In this expository paper we discuss the role of probability in statistical physics: it should be that of a general tool guiding induction and must not be restricted only to the empirical interpretation coming from its evaluation by an observed frequency. It is true that in many cases the value of a probability can be sensibly expressed by a suitable frequency, but this does not entails that the latter can be taken as definition of probability. Moreover, in each situation in which one thinks that probabilities are physically real things and believes that something which is only “very probable” can be regarded as being “practically certain”, some “small” probabilities are actually ignored: this attitude of mind may render illegitimate also the probabilistic interpretation of the relevant physical laws. A “law” which is based on a probabilistic interpretation cannot aim at explaining why a fact that we forecast will occur, but rather at explaining why we forecast that this fact will occur. Finally, we emphasize the role of conditional probability, and we show that looking at it from the right perspective allows to avoids also classic paradoxical aspects of quantum mechanics, without the need to resort to the interpretation based on the dualism “particle-wave”.
Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality.
In the following we revisit the frequency interpretation of probability of Richard von Mises, in order to bring the essential implicit notions in focus. Following von Mises, we argue that probability can only be defined for events that can be repeated in similar conditions, and that exhibit 'frequency stabilization'. The central idea of the present article is that the mentioned 'conditions' should be well-defined and 'partitioned'. More precisely, we will divide probabilistic systems into object, environment, and probing subsystem, and show that such partitioning allows to solve a wide variety of classic paradoxes of probability theory. As a corollary, we arrive at the surprising conclusion that at least one central idea of the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is a direct consequence of the meaning of probability. More precisely, the idea that the "observer influences the quantum system" is obvious if one realizes that quantum systems are probabilistic systems; it holds for all probabilistic systems, whether quantum or classical.
The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency theory of R. von Mises) reveals that the latter concept always refers to an observing system. The enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation therefore derives from a precise understanding of probability. Besides explaining several elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, our model also allows to reinterpret recent results from 'relational quantum mechanics', and to question the premises of the 'subjective approach to quantum probabilities'.