It is shown that a lack of knowledge about the measurements of a physical system gives rise to a nonclassical probability calculus for this physical system. It is also shown that the nonclassical probability calculus of quantum mechanics can be interpreted as being the result of a lack of knowledge about the measurements. Examples are given of macroscopic real systems that have a nonclassical probability calculus. A macroscopic real system that has a quantum probability calculus is also given, and more specifically a model for the spin of a spin- 1/2 particle is constructed. These results are analyzed in light of the old hidden variable problem.
It is shown that a lack of knowledge about the measurements of a physical system gives rise to a nonclassical probability calculus for this physical system. It is also shown that the nonclassical probability calculus of quantum mechanics can be interpreted as being the result of a lack of knowledge about the measurements. Examples are given of macroscopic real systems that have a nonclassical probability calculus. A macroscopic real system that has a quantum probability calculus is also given, and more specifically a model for the spin of a spin- 1/2 particle is constructed. These results are analyzed in light of the old hidden variable problem.
An argument, due originally to J. S. Bell, is somewhat simplified and made more specific. It deals primarily with a quantum mechanical system consisting of the spins of two spin-12 particles. It shows that a description of the quantum mechanical measurement of the spin components of these two particles by means of hidden parameters is impossible if we assume that the parameters determining the outcome of the measurement of the spin of each particle are independent of the direction in which we decide to measure the spin of the other particle. The mathematical reason for the impossibility is analyzed.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
The Question of the Completeness of Quantum Mechanics When a classical system is in a pure state, that is, when its preparation represents maximal information, the value of every physical quantity is uniquely predicted. In other words, classical pure states are dispersion-free, and classical mechanics is deterministic. Only in case the state is nonpure, thus representing nonmaximal information about the system, does probability enter into the theory. Things are different with quantum systems. Even in case the state of the system is pure, it is impossible to predict a definite value of every physical quantity: only the probability distributions of the physical quantities are given. Pure quantum states have dispersion (though, of course, they can be dispersion-free for particular physical quantities), and probability enters into quantum theory at a much more fundamental level. The basic idea of so-called hidden-variable theories is to reject the fundamental role of probability in quantum theory and to argue that probability arises because quantum states, even the pure ones, do not represent the ultimate information about the system. Accordingly, it is conjectured that there are certain hidden variables, not yet subject to experimental detection, which would complete the information carried by the quantum states, thus giving rise to so precise a knowledge of the system that probabilities would disappear and precise values of all physical quantities would be uniquely determined.
I show that probabilities in quantum mechanics are a measure of belief in the presence of human ignorance, just like all other probabilities. The Born interpretation of the square of modulus of the wave function arises from the interaction of a quantum system with an observer, and probabilities will not arise unless the observer is unable to access all the information available in the system's wave function. Quantum mechanics generally does not permit all the information to be obtained, even in principle, just as in relativity information from outside the past light cone cannot be obtained. But probabilities do not imply indeterminism. Instead, quantum mechanics is more deterministic than classical mechanics.