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One mind or many ? A note on the everett interpretation of quantum theory

Euan J. Squires

Published Nov 1, 1991• 56 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00413909

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A note on the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics

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Despite its enormous practical success, many physicists and philosophers alike agree that the quantum theory is so full of contradictions and paradoxes which are difficult to solve consistently. Even after 90 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the so-called quantum measurement problem can be defined as follows: the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed? Among some alternatives to resolve the above QM measurement problem, a very counterintuitive one was suggested by Hugh Everett III in his 1955 dissertation, which was subsequently called the Many-Worlds Interpretation of QM (MWI). In this paper we will not discuss all possible scenarios to solve the measurement problem, but we will only shortly discuss Everett’s MWI, because it has led to spurious debates on possibility of multiverses, beyond the Universe we live in. We also discuss two alternatives against MWI proposal: (a) the so-called scale symmetry theory, (b) the Maxwell-Dirac isomorphism.

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Many Minds and Single Mind Interpretations of Quantum Theory

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Lecture notes in physics•Jan 1, 2000•3 citations
If we take seriously literal interpretations of quantum theory and general relativity then the question posed in the title is no. This article highlights where incompatibilities arise by considering our experience in the context of modern physics. Implied nonmaterial minds possess a property that no physical entity does-localisation in the configuration space. The principle of localisation (PL) is proposed, and is used to show that there is no need to resort to the Everett interpretation to show that minds exist outside of physics. Post relativity physics is enough. However, in this regime, there is no free will, minds are destined to experience a predetermined but unknown future. Free will is restored when we reinstate the Everett interpretation of quantum theory.
Despite its enormous practical success, many physicists and philosophers alike agree that the quantum theory is so full of contradictions and paradoxes which are difficult to solve consistently. Even after 90 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the so-called quantum measurement problem can be defined as follows: the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed? Among some alternatives to resolve the above QM measurement problem, a very counterintuitive one was suggested by Hugh Everett III in his 1955 dissertation, which was subsequently called the Many-Worlds Interpretation of QM (MWI). In this paper we will not discuss all possible scenarios to solve the measurement problem, but we will only shortly discuss Everett’s MWI, because it has led to spurious debates on possibility of multiverses, beyond the Universe we live in. We also discuss two alternatives against MWI proposal: (a) the so-called scale symmetry theory, (b) the Maxwell-Dirac isomorphism.