Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)

Information-theoretically secure key-insulated key-agreement

Takenobu Seito, Junji Shikata

Published Oct 1, 2011• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we study key-agreement which realizes the protection against key-exposure problems in the information-theoretic security setting. And we newly define a model and security notions for information-theoretically secure key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA for short). In addition, we show tight lower bounds of sizes of entities' secret-keys required for KI-KA. We also propose constructions of KI-KA which are provably secure and optimal. Furthermore, we provide some applications of KI-KA.

DOI
10.1109/itw.2011.6089438

Related papers

Security Formalizations and Their Relationships for Encryption and Key Agreement in Information-Theoretic Cryptography

Mitsugu Iwamoto, Kazuo Ohta, Junji Shikata

This paper analyzes the formalizations of information-theoretic security for the fundamental primitives in cryptography: symmetric-key encryption and key agreement. Revisiting the previous results, we can formalize information-theoretic security using different methods, by extending Shannon's perfect secrecy, by information-theoretic analogues of indistinguishability and semantic security, and by the frameworks for composability of protocols. We show the relationships among the security formalizations and obtain the following results. First, in the case of encryption, there are significant gaps among the formalizations, and a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy or a variant of information-theoretic indistinguishability is the strongest notion. Second, in the case of key agreement, there are significant gaps among the formalizations, and a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy is the strongest notion. In particular, in both encryption and key agreement, the formalization of composable security is not stronger than any other formalizations. Furthermore, as an application of the relationships in encryption and key agreement, we simultaneously derive a family of lower bounds on the size of secret keys and security quantities required under the above formalizations, which also implies the importance and usefulness of the relationships.

arXiv:1410.1120•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Aug 28, 2017•29 citations

Formalization of information-theoretic security for key agreement, revisited

Junji Shikata

In this paper, we investigate relationships between the following formalizations of information-theoretic security for key agreement protocols which may have agreement-errors: formalizations extended (or relaxed) from Shannon's perfect secrecy by using mutual information and statistical distance; and the ones of composable security by Maurer et al. and Canetti. Then, we explicitly show that those are essentially equivalent. We also derive lower bounds on the adversary's (or distinguisher's) advantage and the size of a correlated randomness resource required under all of the above formalizations at once through our relationships. In addition, we observe impossibility results which easily follow from the lower bounds.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2013•7 citations

New bounds on the information-theoretic key agreement of multiple terminals

Amin Gohari, Venkat Anantharam

We study the problem of information-theoretically secure secret key agreement under the well-known source model and channel model. In both of these models the parties wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from an eavesdropper with unlimited computational resources. In the channel model, the first party can choose a sequence of inputs to a discrete memoryless channel, which has outputs at the other parties and at the eavesdropper. After each channel use, the parties can engage in arbitrarily many rounds of interactive authenticated communication over a public channel. At the end, each party should be able to generate the key. In the source model, the parties wishing to generate a secret key (as well as the eavesdropper) receive a certain number of independent identically distributed copies of jointly distributed random variables after which the parties are allowed interactive authenticated public communication, at the end of which each party should be able to generate the key. We derive new lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate under the source model and the channel model, and introduce a technique for proving that a given expression bounds the secrecy rate from above in the channel model. Our lower bounds strictly improve what is essentially the best known lower bound in both the source model and the channel model. Our upper bound in the channel model strictly improves the current state of art upper bound. We do not know whether our new upper bound in the source model represents an strict improvement but it includes the current best known bound as a special case.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2008•14 citations

On secret key agreement from the additive white Gaussian noise channel

Motohiko Isaka, Kawata Seiya

It is known that noise on communication channels can be a powerful resource for certain cryptographic purposes, basically by utilizing the randomness to ensure the secrecy. In this paper, we study information theoretically secure key agreement through the use of the additive white Gaussian noise channel and public discussion. We present a protocol for key agreement that defines the computation and communications between the two communicating parties to share a common secret information, about which negligible amount of information is revealed to other third parties. We discuss the signal design, secrecy and the achievable rate of the protocol.

IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC)•Sep 1, 2009•1 citation

Information-theoretically Secure Key Agreement over Partially Corrupted Channels

Reihaneh Safavi–Naini, Peng‐Wei Wang

Key agreement is a fundamental cryptographic primitive. It has been proved that key agreement protocols with security against computationally unbounded adversaries cannot exist in a setting where Alice and Bob do not have dependent variables and communication between them is fully public, or fully controlled by the adversary. In this paper we consider this problem when the adversary can "partially" control the channel. We motivate these adversaries by considering adversarial corruptions at the physical layer of communication, give a definition of adversaries that can "partially" eavesdrop and "partially" corrupt the communication. We formalize security and reliability of key agreement protocols, derive bounds on the rate of key agreement, and give constructions that achieve the bound. Our results show that it is possible to have secret key agreement as long as some of the communicated symbols remain private and unchanged by the adversary. We relate our results to the previous known results, and discuss future work.

arXiv:1604.03824•Apr 13, 2016•1 citation

Information-Theoretic Key Agreement of Multiple Terminals—Part I

Amin Gohari, Venkat Anantharam

We study the problem of information-theoretically secure secret key agreement under the well-known source model and channel model. In both of these models, multiple terminals wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from a passive eavesdropper. The terminals have access to a noiseless public communication channel and an additional resource that depends on the model. In the source model, the resource is an external source that repeatedly beams correlated randomness to the terminals; whereas in the channel model, the resource is a secure but noisy discrete memoryless broadcast channel. We derive new lower and upper bounds on the secret key capacity under both the source model and the channel model. The technique used for deriving our bound for the source model is to find certain properties of functions of joint probability distributions which, applied to the joint distribution of the source, will imply that they dominate the secret key capacity, and then prove the bound by a verification argument. A similar technique is used for the channel model. Finally, we also define a problem of communication for omniscience by a neutral observer and establish the equivalence between this new problem and the problem of secret key agreement. This generalizes an earlier result of Csiszár and Narayan.

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jul 21, 2010•130 citations
In this paper, we study key-agreement which realizes the protection against key-exposure problems in the information-theoretic security setting. And we newly define a model and security notions for information-theoretically secure key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA for short). In addition, we show tight lower bounds of sizes of entities' secret-keys required for KI-KA. We also propose constructions of KI-KA which are provably secure and optimal. Furthermore, we provide some applications of KI-KA.
This paper analyzes the formalizations of information-theoretic security for the fundamental primitives in cryptography: symmetric-key encryption and key agreement. Revisiting the previous results, we can formalize information-theoretic security using different methods, by extending Shannon's perfect secrecy, by information-theoretic analogues of indistinguishability and semantic security, and by the frameworks for composability of protocols. We show the relationships among the security formalizations and obtain the following results. First, in the case of encryption, there are significant gaps among the formalizations, and a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy or a variant of information-theoretic indistinguishability is the strongest notion. Second, in the case of key agreement, there are significant gaps among the formalizations, and a certain type of relaxed perfect secrecy is the strongest notion. In particular, in both encryption and key agreement, the formalization of composable security is not stronger than any other formalizations. Furthermore, as an application of the relationships in encryption and key agreement, we simultaneously derive a family of lower bounds on the size of secret keys and security quantities required under the above formalizations, which also implies the importance and usefulness of the relationships.
In this paper, we investigate relationships between the following formalizations of information-theoretic security for key agreement protocols which may have agreement-errors: formalizations extended (or relaxed) from Shannon's perfect secrecy by using mutual information and statistical distance; and the ones of composable security by Maurer et al. and Canetti. Then, we explicitly show that those are essentially equivalent. We also derive lower bounds on the adversary's (or distinguisher's) advantage and the size of a correlated randomness resource required under all of the above formalizations at once through our relationships. In addition, we observe impossibility results which easily follow from the lower bounds.
We study the problem of information-theoretically secure secret key agreement under the well-known source model and channel model. In both of these models the parties wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from an eavesdropper with unlimited computational resources. In the channel model, the first party can choose a sequence of inputs to a discrete memoryless channel, which has outputs at the other parties and at the eavesdropper. After each channel use, the parties can engage in arbitrarily many rounds of interactive authenticated communication over a public channel. At the end, each party should be able to generate the key. In the source model, the parties wishing to generate a secret key (as well as the eavesdropper) receive a certain number of independent identically distributed copies of jointly distributed random variables after which the parties are allowed interactive authenticated public communication, at the end of which each party should be able to generate the key. We derive new lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate under the source model and the channel model, and introduce a technique for proving that a given expression bounds the secrecy rate from above in the channel model. Our lower bounds strictly improve what is essentially the best known lower bound in both the source model and the channel model. Our upper bound in the channel model strictly improves the current state of art upper bound. We do not know whether our new upper bound in the source model represents an strict improvement but it includes the current best known bound as a special case.
It is known that noise on communication channels can be a powerful resource for certain cryptographic purposes, basically by utilizing the randomness to ensure the secrecy. In this paper, we study information theoretically secure key agreement through the use of the additive white Gaussian noise channel and public discussion. We present a protocol for key agreement that defines the computation and communications between the two communicating parties to share a common secret information, about which negligible amount of information is revealed to other third parties. We discuss the signal design, secrecy and the achievable rate of the protocol.
Key agreement is a fundamental cryptographic primitive. It has been proved that key agreement protocols with security against computationally unbounded adversaries cannot exist in a setting where Alice and Bob do not have dependent variables and communication between them is fully public, or fully controlled by the adversary. In this paper we consider this problem when the adversary can "partially" control the channel. We motivate these adversaries by considering adversarial corruptions at the physical layer of communication, give a definition of adversaries that can "partially" eavesdrop and "partially" corrupt the communication. We formalize security and reliability of key agreement protocols, derive bounds on the rate of key agreement, and give constructions that achieve the bound. Our results show that it is possible to have secret key agreement as long as some of the communicated symbols remain private and unchanged by the adversary. We relate our results to the previous known results, and discuss future work.
We study the problem of information-theoretically secure secret key agreement under the well-known source model and channel model. In both of these models, multiple terminals wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from a passive eavesdropper. The terminals have access to a noiseless public communication channel and an additional resource that depends on the model. In the source model, the resource is an external source that repeatedly beams correlated randomness to the terminals; whereas in the channel model, the resource is a secure but noisy discrete memoryless broadcast channel. We derive new lower and upper bounds on the secret key capacity under both the source model and the channel model. The technique used for deriving our bound for the source model is to find certain properties of functions of joint probability distributions which, applied to the joint distribution of the source, will imply that they dominate the secret key capacity, and then prove the bound by a verification argument. A similar technique is used for the channel model. Finally, we also define a problem of communication for omniscience by a neutral observer and establish the equivalence between this new problem and the problem of secret key agreement. This generalizes an earlier result of Csiszár and Narayan.