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International Conference on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing (WCSP)

Fairness-guaranteed pricing and power allocation with a friendly jammer against eavesdropping

Jianting Yue, Bo Yang, Xinping Guan

Published Oct 1, 2012• 15 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In wireless communication, jamming is a promising solution to provide improvement in secrecy rate, especially when security requirement is difficult to satisfy in realistic environment. Users could pay the friendly jammer for some interference to the eavesdropper and consequently improve the secrecy rate of their own, while the jammer wants to get maximum revenue within its capability. Thereby a Stackelberg game is introduced. Fairness also deserves particular attention, as unfair allocation of the limited resource deteriorates the performance of whole network. In this paper, we discuss a network with one jammer and several users, where they participate in the game and reach equilibrium ultimately. We utilize Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to guarantee fairness among users, making them balance their utility so as to make the best of the interference from the jammer. Moreover, we propose implementation of algorithm and demonstrate the performance.

DOI
10.1109/wcsp.2012.6542898

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In wireless communication, jamming is a promising solution to provide improvement in secrecy rate, especially when security requirement is difficult to satisfy in realistic environment. Users could pay the friendly jammer for some interference to the eavesdropper and consequently improve the secrecy rate of their own, while the jammer wants to get maximum revenue within its capability. Thereby a Stackelberg game is introduced. Fairness also deserves particular attention, as unfair allocation of the limited resource deteriorates the performance of whole network. In this paper, we discuss a network with one jammer and several users, where they participate in the game and reach equilibrium ultimately. We utilize Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to guarantee fairness among users, making them balance their utility so as to make the best of the interference from the jammer. Moreover, we propose implementation of algorithm and demonstrate the performance.
In this paper, the problem of improving the secrecy communication for a cooperative jamming based network in which there is a friendly jammer, an eavesdropper and N pairs of sources and destinations is addressed. A Stackelberg game is formulated to tackle the joint utility maximization of the jammer and sources subject to a maximum jamming power constraint at the jammer. In this game, the jammer behaves as the leader and the sources are followers. A uniform pricing algorithm is proposed and we prove in theory that it can maximize the secrecy rate of the system. The Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is characterized, and an effective distributed algorithm with guaranteed convergence is proposed. Numerical examples are presented to validate our analysis. It is shown that the proposed distributed algorithm can obtain almost the same performance as the optimal power allocation algorithm. Besides, we also investigate the performance of the proposed distributed algorithm in different scenarios. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can obtain significant improvement for secrecy rate in the sparse scenario where all the nodes are deployed sparsely. It can enhance the secrecy rate for about 0.3 dB.
To improve the physical layer security in the wireless communication network with an eavesdropper and a friendly jammer, this paper make use of beamforming to aim the jamming signal's main lobe to the eavesdropper and to diminish the jamming signal to the destination node, improving the efficiency of jamming power usage. On this basis, we propose a power auction model, in which we regard the source node as the buyer and the destination node as the seller and build corresponding utility function respectively. Then by using a distributed algorithm, Stackelberg equilibrium can be reached, maximizing the system utility and obtaining the corresponding secrecy capacity.
In this paper we investigate a cooperative jamming (CJ) strategy based Stackelberg security game to improve physical layer security over multiuser OFDMA networks. Each source node tries to deliver messages to its intended destination node securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Fortunately, these node pairs can resort to a friendly jammer to enhance their communication. But the jamming service is not free and the friendly jammer charges each pair for some cost. Obviously there is a tradeoff between the friendly jammer and the source-destination pairs. Consequently, a two-level Stackelberg game model is proposed, where the friendly jammer plays the seller and the source-destination pairs are the buyers. We analyze the Stackelberg Equilibrium from two sides respectively and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium. Correspondingly, we also develop a distributed iterative power allocation algorithm to reach the Stackelberg Equilibrium point. Numerical Results demonstrate that the system sum secrecy rate is really improved and the physical layer security performance is effectively meliorated.
In this paper, we investigate a multi-source multi-destination wireless communication network in the presence of an eavesdropper and a cooperative jammer. Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is introduced to investigate the negotiation among the sources on jammer power allocation. In order to improve the network sum-secrecy-rate and maintain sources' fairness at the same time, the optimization problem is formulated as a Nash bargaining game (NBG), which is proved to be a convex optimization problem. The effect of bargaining power selection on sum-secrecy-rate and sources' fairness is investigated analytically and a simple but efficient centralized algorithm is proposed to implement the NBS-based scheme. Simulation results validate the effectiveness and fairness of our proposed scheme.
This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interference to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers. Therefore, this secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and the transmitter are the leaders and the follower of the game, respectively. A fixed interference price scenario is considered first, in which a closed-form solution is derived for the optimal amount of interference generated by the jammers to maximize the revenue of the legitimate transmitter. Based on this solution, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at which both legitimate transmitter and the private jammers achieve their maximum revenues, is then derived. Simulation results are also provided to validate these theoretical derivations.
This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interference to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers. Therefore, this secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and the transmitter are the leaders and the follower of the game, respectively. A fixed interference price scenario is considered first, in which a closed-form solution is derived for the optimal amount of interference generated by the jammers to maximize the revenue of the legitimate transmitter. Based on this solution, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at which both legitimate transmitter and the private jammers achieve their maximum revenues, is then derived. Simulation results are also provided to validate these theoretical derivations.