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Journal of Cryptology

A Secure Protocol for the Oblivious Transfer (Extended Abstract)

Michael J. Fischer, Silvio M. Micali, Charles Rackoff

Published Jan 1, 1996• 28 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00208002

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Quantum and classical oblivious transfer: A comparative analysis

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Abstract Secure multiparty computation has the potential to be a disruptive technique in the realm of data analysis and computation. It enables several parties to compute virtually any function while preserving the privacy of their inputs. However, most of its protocols’ security and efficiency relies on the security and efficiency of oblivious transfer (OT). In this work, we make a detailed comparison between the complexity of the hybrid quantum oblivious transfer (HQOT) protocol presented in [11] and the classical OT [12], which to the best of our knowledge, is the fastest OT protocol. We also propose an optimised version of HQOT and discuss several other OT protocols generated from oblivious keys.

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On the Feasibility of Extending Oblivious Transfer.

Yehuda Lindell, Hila Zarosim

Oblivious transfer is one of the most basic and important building blocks in cryptography. As such, understanding its cost is of prime importance. Beaver (STOC 1996) showed that it is possible to obtain poly(n) oblivious transfers given only n actual oblivious transfer calls and using one-way functions, where n is the security parameter. In addition, he showed that it is impossible to extend oblivious transfer information theoretically. The notion of extending oblivious transfer is important theoretically (to understand the complexity of computing this primitive) and practically (since oblivious transfers can be expensive and thus extending them using only one-way functions is very attractive). Despite its importance, very little is known about the feasibility of extending oblivious transfer, beyond the fact that it is impossible information theoretically. Specifically, it is not known whether or not one-way functions are actually necessary for extending oblivious transfer, whether or not it is possible to extend oblivious transfers with adaptive security, and whether or not it is possible to extend oblivious transfers when starting with just a few. In this paper, we address these questions and provide almost complete answers to all of them. We show that the existence of any oblivious transfer extension protocol with security for static semihonest adversaries implies one-way functions, that an oblivious transfer extension protocol with adaptive security implies oblivious transfer with static security, and that the existence of an oblivious transfer extension protocol from only O(log n) oblivious transfers implies oblivious transfer itself.

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A New Secure Oblivious Transfer Protocol

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Generic Fully Simulatable Adaptive Oblivious Transfer.

Kaoru Kurosawa, Ryo Nojima, Le Trieu Phong

Abstract. We aim at constructing adaptive oblivious transfer protocols, enjoying fully simulatable security, from various well-known assumptions such as DDH, d-Linear, QR, DCR, and LWE. To this end, we present two generic constructions of adaptive OT, one of which utilizes verifiable shuffles together with threshold decryption schemes, while the other uses permutation networks together with what we call loosely-homomorphic key encapsulation schemes. We then show that specific choices of the building blocks lead to concrete adaptive OT protocols with fully simulatable security in the standard model under the targeted assumptions. Our generic methods can be extended to build universally composable (UC) secure, and leakage-resilient OT protocols.

•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Protocols for Authenticated Oblivious Transfer

Mehrad Jaberi, Hamid Mala

Modares Journal of Electrical Engineering•Oct 1, 2016•0 citations
Abstract Secure multiparty computation has the potential to be a disruptive technique in the realm of data analysis and computation. It enables several parties to compute virtually any function while preserving the privacy of their inputs. However, most of its protocols’ security and efficiency relies on the security and efficiency of oblivious transfer (OT). In this work, we make a detailed comparison between the complexity of the hybrid quantum oblivious transfer (HQOT) protocol presented in [11] and the classical OT [12], which to the best of our knowledge, is the fastest OT protocol. We also propose an optimised version of HQOT and discuss several other OT protocols generated from oblivious keys.
Oblivious transfer is one of the most basic and important building blocks in cryptography. As such, understanding its cost is of prime importance. Beaver (STOC 1996) showed that it is possible to obtain poly(n) oblivious transfers given only n actual oblivious transfer calls and using one-way functions, where n is the security parameter. In addition, he showed that it is impossible to extend oblivious transfer information theoretically. The notion of extending oblivious transfer is important theoretically (to understand the complexity of computing this primitive) and practically (since oblivious transfers can be expensive and thus extending them using only one-way functions is very attractive). Despite its importance, very little is known about the feasibility of extending oblivious transfer, beyond the fact that it is impossible information theoretically. Specifically, it is not known whether or not one-way functions are actually necessary for extending oblivious transfer, whether or not it is possible to extend oblivious transfers with adaptive security, and whether or not it is possible to extend oblivious transfers when starting with just a few. In this paper, we address these questions and provide almost complete answers to all of them. We show that the existence of any oblivious transfer extension protocol with security for static semihonest adversaries implies one-way functions, that an oblivious transfer extension protocol with adaptive security implies oblivious transfer with static security, and that the existence of an oblivious transfer extension protocol from only O(log n) oblivious transfers implies oblivious transfer itself.
Abstract. We aim at constructing adaptive oblivious transfer protocols, enjoying fully simulatable security, from various well-known assumptions such as DDH, d-Linear, QR, DCR, and LWE. To this end, we present two generic constructions of adaptive OT, one of which utilizes verifiable shuffles together with threshold decryption schemes, while the other uses permutation networks together with what we call loosely-homomorphic key encapsulation schemes. We then show that specific choices of the building blocks lead to concrete adaptive OT protocols with fully simulatable security in the standard model under the targeted assumptions. Our generic methods can be extended to build universally composable (UC) secure, and leakage-resilient OT protocols.