We demonstrate an attack on a clock synchronization protocol that attempts to detect tampering of the synchronization channel using polarization-entangled photon pairs. The protocol relies on a symmetrical channel, where propagation delays do not depend on the propagation direction, for correctly deducing the offset between clocks—a condition that could be manipulated using optical circulators, which rely on static magnetic fields to break the reciprocity of propagating electromagnetic fields. Despite the polarization transformation induced within a set of circulators, our attack creates an error in time synchronization while evading detection.
We propose a multiparty quantum clock synchronization protocol that makes optimal use of the maximal multipartite entanglement of GHZ-type states. To realize the protocol, different versions of maximally entangled eigenstates of collective energy are generated by local transformations that distinguish among different groupings of the parties. The maximal sensitivity of the entangled states to time differences between the local clocks can then be accessed if all parties share the results of their local time-dependent measurements. The efficiency of the protocol is evaluated in terms of the statistical errors in the estimation of time differences and the performance of the protocol is compared to alternative protocols proposed previously.
Quantum clock synchronization achieves picosecond-level precision by compensating for channel delays based on reciprocity, which is intrinsically vulnerable to asymmetric delay attacks. In this Letter, we propose a slow and persistent asymmetric channel delay strategy that superimposes delays onto the channel, thereby producing a subtle, time-varying clock-offset error that can remain concealed within intrinsic timing fluctuations. In a 50 km round-trip quantum clock synchronization experiment, we demonstrate that the proposed attack successfully evades both threshold alarms and sliding window anomaly detection under varying delay intensities and modulation periods. This work uncovers key vulnerabilities in synchronization protocols under customizable attacks and provides a foundation for developing secure and resilient quantum clock synchronization systems.