Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Erkenntnis

A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Jul 1, 2006• 15 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10670-006-9016-z

Related papers

A quantum mechanical mind-body interaction

L. Bass

Foundations of Physics•Mar 1, 1975•26 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Dualism

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

De Gruyter eBooks•Aug 6, 2014•3 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Free Will: Counter-Arguments

Martín López-Corredoira

Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.

arXiv:quant-ph/0208104•NeuroQuantology•Sep 1, 2009•3 citations

A Quantum Mechanical model of Consciousness

JOHN M. COWLEY

Intellect Books•Sep 1, 2000•0 citations

Locality and Mentality in Everett Interpretations: Albert and Loewer’s Many Minds

Laura Felline, Guido Bacciagaluppi

This paper, together with a planned companion treating contemporary decoherence-based approaches, reviews and analyses the approaches to locality and to mind-body dualism proposed in Everett interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we treat the explicitly mentalistic many-minds interpretation proposed by David Albert and Barry Loewer (1988). In particular, we investigate what kind of supervenience of the mind on the body is implied by Albert and Loewer's many-minds interpretation, and how the interpretation of the related "mindless hulks" problem affects the issue of locality within this interpretation. © 2013 Imprint Academic.

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations

Quantum Mechanics as Dualism

Robert B. Jones

Bulletin of the American Physical Society•Mar 22, 2011•0 citations
Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.
This paper, together with a planned companion treating contemporary decoherence-based approaches, reviews and analyses the approaches to locality and to mind-body dualism proposed in Everett interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we treat the explicitly mentalistic many-minds interpretation proposed by David Albert and Barry Loewer (1988). In particular, we investigate what kind of supervenience of the mind on the body is implied by Albert and Loewer's many-minds interpretation, and how the interpretation of the related "mindless hulks" problem affects the issue of locality within this interpretation. © 2013 Imprint Academic.