Probability Concepts in Quantum Mechanics

Richard P. Feynman

Michael J. W. Hall

Jiří Souček

In the paper the basic concepts of extended probability theory are introduced. The basic idea: the concept of an event as a subset of Ωis replaced with the concept of an event as a partition. The partition is any set of disjoint non-empty subsets of Ω(i.e. partition=subset+its decomposition). Interpretation: elements inside certain part are indistinguishable, while elements from different parts are distinguishable. There are incompatible events, e.g {{e1},{e2}} and {e1,e2}. This is logical incompatibility analogical to the impossibility to have and simultaneously not to have the which-way information in the given experiment. The context is the maximal set of mutually compatible events. Each experiment has associated its context. In each context the extended probability is reduced to classical probability. Then the quadratic representation of events, partitions and probability measures is developed. At the end the central concept of quadratic probability spaces (which extend Kolmogorov probability spaces) is defined and studied. In the next paper it will be shown that quantum mechanics can be represented as the theory of Markov processes in the extended probability theory (Einstein's vision of QM).

L. E. Ballentine

WU Xin-zhong

According to the development of probability concept in physics histrory,this paper discusses the roles of probability concept in sciencific philosophy,molecules kinematics theory,statisticle mechanics,quantum mechanics,reveals logical relations among various probability concepts,and gives a philosophical demonstration that probabiliy concept embodies dialectical unity between determinacy and randomicity in physics process.

Leslie Ballentine, Guillaume Adenier, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov +3 more

The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probabilities that cannot be realized as quantum probabilities.