An argument to the effect that quantum mechanics commits us to the existence of non-supervenient relations, and therefore that we should admit such relations into our quantum ontology as fundamental entities, has been given by Teller and reformulated by French. This paper aims, first, to explicate and evaluate that argument; second, to extend its premises in order to assess its relevance for other interpretations of quantum mechanics; and, third, to clarify its implications for holism and individuation in quantum ontology.
An argument to the effect that quantum mechanics commits us to the existence of non-supervenient relations, and therefore that we should admit such relations into our quantum ontology as fundamental entities, has been given by Teller and reformulated by French. This paper aims, first, to explicate and evaluate that argument; second, to extend its premises in order to assess its relevance for other interpretations of quantum mechanics; and, third, to clarify its implications for holism and individuation in quantum ontology.
The pros and cons of various forms of atomism and holism that are applicable both in physical science and today’s philosophy of nature are evaluated. To this end, Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience is presented as an important case study of an atomistic doctrine in philosophical thought. It is shown that Lewis’ ontological doctrine of Humean supervenience incorporates at its foundation the so-called separability principle of classical physics. In view of the systematic violation of the latter within quantum mechanics, it is argued that contemporary physical science posits non-supervenient relations over and above the spatiotemporal ones. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems — unit state vectors versus statistical density operators — we distinguish between strongly and weakly non-supervenient relations. It is demonstrated that in either case the relations of quantum entanglement constitute prototypical examples of irreducible physical relations that do not supervene upon a spatiotemporal arrangement of Humean qualities, weakening, thereby, the thesis of Humean supervenience. It is examined, in this respect, the status of Lewis’ recombination principle, whereas his conception of lawhood is critically investigated. It is concluded that the assumption of ontological reductionism, as expressed in Lewis’ Humean doctrine, cannot be regarded as a reliable code of the nature of the physical world and its contents. It is proposed instead that due to the undeniable existence of non-supervenient relations a metaphysic of relations of a moderate kind ought to be acknowledged as an indispensable part of our understanding of the natural world at a fundamental level.
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is often said to entail holism—that wholes are more than just the sum of their parts—and hence violate Humean supervenience. Certainly an entangled state cannot readily be interpreted in terms of the properties of the individual particles involved. But there is no clear general argument from quantum mechanics to holism. Still, each of the three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—embodies some form of holism. One might try to rescue Humean supervenience by moving to high-dimensional representation of physical systems, or by constructing a theory with backward-in-time causation, but it is unclear if such strategies will succeed. If holism is accepted, some argue further that there are no individuals at the fundamental physical level: Either relations are fundamental, or the whole universe is fundamental. The arguments for these positions are assessed and found to be wanting.
Quantum indistinguishability directly relates to the philosophical debate on the notions of identity and individuality. They are crucial for our understanding of multipartite quantum systems. Furthermore, the correct interpretation of this feature of quantum theory has implications that transcend fundamental science and philosophy, given that quantum indistinguishability is a resource in quantum information theory. Most of the conceptual analysis of quantum indistinguishability is restricted to studying the permutational invariance of quantum states, the concomitant quantum statistics and their entanglement. Here, we analyse the role of indistinguishability and non-individuality in other areas of quantum theory. We start by analysing how a very peculiar use of indistinguishability underlies Feynman's rules for summing amplitudes in interference phenomena. Next, we study how quantum indistinguishability is underestimated in several topics of debate in the quantum physics literature, such as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's inequalities and the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. Finally, we argue that an ontology of truly indistinguishable entities can serve as a basis for a quantum ontology that can give interesting answers to the interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. We claim that, in addition to superposition, contextuality and entanglement, indistinguishability (understood in a robust ontological sense) is one of the central features of quantum physics. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.
Quantum mechanics arguably provides the best evidence we have for strong emergence.Entangled pairs of particles apparently have properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the particles taken individually.But at the same time, quantum mechanics is a terrible place to look for evidence of strong emergence: the interpretation of the theory is so contested that drawing any metaphysical conclusions from it is risky at best.I run through the standard argument for strong emergence based on entanglement, and show how it rests on shaky assumptions concerning the ontology of the quantum world.In particular, I consider two objections: that the argument involves Bell's theorem, whose premises are often rejected, and that the argument rests on a contested account of parts and wholes.I respond to both objections, showing that, with some important caveats, the argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics remains intact.
This article is the first part of a three-part series developing Ontological Field Theory (OFT), a unified framework grounding quantum mechanics in foundational ontological principles. The trilogy is structured as follows: Part I — Conceptual Necessity:Why Quantum Mechanics Is Inevitable: Ontological Continuity and the Necessity of Quantum Dynamics establishes that quantum mechanics follows necessarily from minimal requirements on coherent being, independently of specific physical postulates. Part II — Technical Realization:Derivation of the Schrödinger Equation from Ontological Field Theory provides the explicit field-theoretic derivation showing how the Schrödinger equation emerges as the non-relativistic limit of a covariant ontological field. Part III — Critical Context:Why Classical Physics Is an Approximation: Decoherence, Coarse-Graining, and the Limits of Determinism explains why classical determinism and trajectories arise only as emergent, approximate descriptions of fundamentally quantum and relational dynamics. Each article is logically self-contained, but the full argument is distributed across the three contributions. The conceptual analysis motivates the mathematics; the mathematics grounds the physics; and the critical examination situates classical intuition as a limiting case rather than a foundation. The papers are intended to be read as a coherent whole. We argue that quantum mechanics is not an arbitrary empirical framework but an inevitable consequence of minimal ontological requirements. Assuming only that being must exist necessarily, remain consistent, be relational, and admit self-reference, we show that classical deterministic physics is structurally insufficient. Quantum dynamics emerges as the unique low-energy realization of coherent ontological continuity. This work complements explicit field-theoretic derivations by clarifying why quantum mechanics could not have been otherwise.