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Science in China Series F Information Sciences

A new approach for UC security concurrent deniable authentication

Tao Feng, Fenghua Li, Jianfeng Ma, SangJae Moon

Published Mar 26, 2008• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11432-008-0031-3

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Deniable authentication protocols allow a sender to authenticate a message for a receiver, in a way which the receiver cannot convince a third party that such au- thentication ever took place. When we consider an asynchronous multi-party net- work with open communications and an adversary that can adaptively corrupt as many parties as it wishes, we present a new approach to solve the problem of concurrent deniable authentication within the framework of universally compos- able (UC) security. We formulate a definition of an ideal functionality for deniable authentication. Our constructions rely on a modification of the verifiably smooth projective hashing (VSPH) with projection key function by trapdoor commitment. Our protocols are forward deniable and UC security against adaptive adversaries in the common reference string model. A new approach implies that security is pre- served under concurrent composition of an unbounded number of protocol execu- tions; it implies non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols and more. The novelty of our schemes is the use of witness indistinguishable protocols and the security is based on the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and se-curity reductions.

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Modeling security for protocols running in the complex network environment of the Internet can be a daunting task. Ideally, a security model for the Internet should provide the following guarantee: a protocol that implements a particular task specification will retain all the same security properties as the specification itself, even when an arbitrary set of protocols runs concurrently on the same network. This guarantee must hold even when other protocols are maliciously designed to interact badly with the analyzed protocol, and even when the analyzed protocol is composed with other protocols. The popular Universal Composability (UC) security framework aims to provide this guarantee. Unfortunately, such strong security guarantees come with a price: they are impossible to achieve without the use of some trusted setup. Typically, this trusted setup is global in nature, and takes the form of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and/or a Common Reference String (CRS). However, the current approach to modeling security in the presence of such setups falls short of providing expected security guarantees. A quintessential example of this phenomenon is the deniability concern: there exist natural protocols that meet the strongest known security notions (including UC) while failing to provide the same deniability guarantees that their task specifications imply they should provide. We introduce the Generalized Universal Composability (GUC) framework to extend the UC security notion and enable the re-establishment of its original intuitive security guarantees even for protocols that use global trusted setups. In particular, GUC enables us to guarantee that secure protocols will provide the same level of deniability as the task specification they implement. To demonstrate the usefulness of the GUC framework, we first apply it to the analysis and construction of deniable authentication protocols. Building upon such deniable authentication protocols, we then prove a general feasibility result showing how to construct protocols satisfying our security notion for a large class of two-party and multi-party tasks (assuming the availability of some reasonable trusted setup). Finally, we highlight the practical applicability of GUC by constructing efficient protocols that securely instantiate two common cryptographic tasks: commitments and zero-knowledge proofs.

•Jan 1, 2008•13 citations
Deniable authentication protocols allow a sender to authenticate a message for a receiver, in a way which the receiver cannot convince a third party that such au- thentication ever took place. When we consider an asynchronous multi-party net- work with open communications and an adversary that can adaptively corrupt as many parties as it wishes, we present a new approach to solve the problem of concurrent deniable authentication within the framework of universally compos- able (UC) security. We formulate a definition of an ideal functionality for deniable authentication. Our constructions rely on a modification of the verifiably smooth projective hashing (VSPH) with projection key function by trapdoor commitment. Our protocols are forward deniable and UC security against adaptive adversaries in the common reference string model. A new approach implies that security is pre- served under concurrent composition of an unbounded number of protocol execu- tions; it implies non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols and more. The novelty of our schemes is the use of witness indistinguishable protocols and the security is based on the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and se-curity reductions.
A new approach and an idea for exploration are presented to the concurrent deniable authentication based on witness-indistinguishable (WI) within the framework of universally composable (UC) security. A definition of an ideal functionality for deniable authentication is formulated. A new deniable authentication protocol is proposed based on two primitives of the verifiably smooth projective Hashing (VSPH) and non-committing encryptions (NCE). This new approach is practically relevant to VSPH based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and NCE based on the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. Compared with a timing constraint and public directory model, simulation of the concurrent protocols is not needed to restrict an adversary capability in a common reference string (CRS) model. The protocols are forward deniable and UC security against adaptive adversaries. Unlike previous proposals with the CCA2 public-key cryptosystem or multi-trapdoor commitments paradigm, the new paradigm leads to more efficient protocols.
Modeling security for protocols running in the complex network environment of the Internet can be a daunting task. Ideally, a security model for the Internet should provide the following guarantee: a protocol that implements a particular task specification will retain all the same security properties as the specification itself, even when an arbitrary set of protocols runs concurrently on the same network. This guarantee must hold even when other protocols are maliciously designed to interact badly with the analyzed protocol, and even when the analyzed protocol is composed with other protocols. The popular Universal Composability (UC) security framework aims to provide this guarantee. Unfortunately, such strong security guarantees come with a price: they are impossible to achieve without the use of some trusted setup. Typically, this trusted setup is global in nature, and takes the form of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and/or a Common Reference String (CRS). However, the current approach to modeling security in the presence of such setups falls short of providing expected security guarantees. A quintessential example of this phenomenon is the deniability concern: there exist natural protocols that meet the strongest known security notions (including UC) while failing to provide the same deniability guarantees that their task specifications imply they should provide. We introduce the Generalized Universal Composability (GUC) framework to extend the UC security notion and enable the re-establishment of its original intuitive security guarantees even for protocols that use global trusted setups. In particular, GUC enables us to guarantee that secure protocols will provide the same level of deniability as the task specification they implement. To demonstrate the usefulness of the GUC framework, we first apply it to the analysis and construction of deniable authentication protocols. Building upon such deniable authentication protocols, we then prove a general feasibility result showing how to construct protocols satisfying our security notion for a large class of two-party and multi-party tasks (assuming the availability of some reasonable trusted setup). Finally, we highlight the practical applicability of GUC by constructing efficient protocols that securely instantiate two common cryptographic tasks: commitments and zero-knowledge proofs.