Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Nature

Feynman put a personal spin on physics

R. W. D. Nickalls

Published Sep 24, 2003• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1038/425343c

Related papers

Feynman on mechanics

Richard P. Feynman

Basic Books•Jan 1, 2005•0 citations

A Few Questions Related to Information and Symmetries in Physics

György Darvas

Information exchange between inanimate objects (like individual physical particles, or systems) involve special approaches, due to the peculiarity that conscious information emitters/recipients are excluded. This paper aims at answering a part of questions arising by these approaches. One can put the question, whether can we speak about physical information when there is no live percipient to accept, evaluate and use it? Can one speak about physical information (e.g., signal exchange) between inanimate physical objects? (Cf., e.g., Feynman diagrams.) If so, what is the nature of that information? Is (physical) information a passive phenomenon, or its existence presumes activity? What does, e.g., a signal represent if it is not perceived and used at another end, and where is that end when one can say: that signal was lost without perception or use? I try to illustrate my personal answers with a few examples quoted from the history of 20 th century physics. My answers to the questions are not intended to be enunciations and to provide final solutions, rather they serve as arguments and indicate that nothing is closed, the discussion is open.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Mar 28, 2017•0 citations

Exploring the meaning of an individual Feynman path

Debashis Gangopadhyay, Dipankar Home

Physics Letters A•Jan 1, 1988•2 citations

Spin-1 photons, spin-1/2 electrons, Bell's inequalities, and Feynman's special perspective on quantum mechanics

Masud Mansuripur

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox that argues for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a description of physical reality has been put to rest by John Bell’s famous theorem, which inspired numerous experimental tests and brought about further affirmations of quantum reality. Nevertheless, in his writings and public presentations, Richard Feynman never acknowledged the significance of Bell’s contribution to the resolution of the EPR paradox. In this paper, we discuss several variants of the Bell inequalities (including one that was specifically espoused by Feynman), and explore the ways in which they demolish the arguments in favor of local hidden-variable theories. We also examine the roots of Feynman’s attitude toward Bell’s theorem in the context of Feynman’s special perspective on quantum mechanics.

arXiv:2210.03365•Spintronics•Oct 3, 2022•3 citations

The Hard Problem for Physics: In Search of a Place for Consciousness in Physical Theories

O.A. Lange

Although it is not endorsed by every theoretical physicist, I hold that - paraphrasing Abner Shimony - a theory of everything must 'close the circle'. That is, it must provide an account of the existence of consciousness in nature. Phenomenal consciousness, this intimate 'feel of me being me', is difficult to grasp in physical terms. David Chalmers famously distinguished the 'easy' cognitive problems of the mind from the true 'hard problem': physical theories describe worlds that could have been zombie-worlds as well, i.e. worlds occupied by creatures who act the way we do, but who do not share with us that special aspect we call phenomenal consciousness. That is to say, the facts of physics do not entail it.\nIn this thesis I explore how we should understand the problem from the perspectives of a discipline that seems to be concerned by its very nature with 'a view from the outside'. The burden of the hard problem of consciousness for physics seems to be concerned with putting a shift from the third- to the first person's perspective somewhere into physics. A deeper analysis of two concrete proposals for a physical theory of the mind reveals that specific interpretations of quantum mechanics take this first person's perspective as fundamental from the outset. It turns out that views on the ontology of quantum theory sometimes perfectly align with perspectives on the ontology of consciousness. I conclude that the essence of the hard problem for physics must not be concerned with an explanation of the existence of consciousness, but that it rather should be about the identification of metaphysically reasonable grounds to decide where to put it into nature.

•Jan 1, 2019•0 citations

The Feynman Paradox

F. Lacava

Undergraduate lecture notes in physics•Jan 1, 2022•0 citations
Information exchange between inanimate objects (like individual physical particles, or systems) involve special approaches, due to the peculiarity that conscious information emitters/recipients are excluded. This paper aims at answering a part of questions arising by these approaches. One can put the question, whether can we speak about physical information when there is no live percipient to accept, evaluate and use it? Can one speak about physical information (e.g., signal exchange) between inanimate physical objects? (Cf., e.g., Feynman diagrams.) If so, what is the nature of that information? Is (physical) information a passive phenomenon, or its existence presumes activity? What does, e.g., a signal represent if it is not perceived and used at another end, and where is that end when one can say: that signal was lost without perception or use? I try to illustrate my personal answers with a few examples quoted from the history of 20 th century physics. My answers to the questions are not intended to be enunciations and to provide final solutions, rather they serve as arguments and indicate that nothing is closed, the discussion is open.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox that argues for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a description of physical reality has been put to rest by John Bell’s famous theorem, which inspired numerous experimental tests and brought about further affirmations of quantum reality. Nevertheless, in his writings and public presentations, Richard Feynman never acknowledged the significance of Bell’s contribution to the resolution of the EPR paradox. In this paper, we discuss several variants of the Bell inequalities (including one that was specifically espoused by Feynman), and explore the ways in which they demolish the arguments in favor of local hidden-variable theories. We also examine the roots of Feynman’s attitude toward Bell’s theorem in the context of Feynman’s special perspective on quantum mechanics.
Although it is not endorsed by every theoretical physicist, I hold that - paraphrasing Abner Shimony - a theory of everything must 'close the circle'. That is, it must provide an account of the existence of consciousness in nature. Phenomenal consciousness, this intimate 'feel of me being me', is difficult to grasp in physical terms. David Chalmers famously distinguished the 'easy' cognitive problems of the mind from the true 'hard problem': physical theories describe worlds that could have been zombie-worlds as well, i.e. worlds occupied by creatures who act the way we do, but who do not share with us that special aspect we call phenomenal consciousness. That is to say, the facts of physics do not entail it.\nIn this thesis I explore how we should understand the problem from the perspectives of a discipline that seems to be concerned by its very nature with 'a view from the outside'. The burden of the hard problem of consciousness for physics seems to be concerned with putting a shift from the third- to the first person's perspective somewhere into physics. A deeper analysis of two concrete proposals for a physical theory of the mind reveals that specific interpretations of quantum mechanics take this first person's perspective as fundamental from the outset. It turns out that views on the ontology of quantum theory sometimes perfectly align with perspectives on the ontology of consciousness. I conclude that the essence of the hard problem for physics must not be concerned with an explanation of the existence of consciousness, but that it rather should be about the identification of metaphysically reasonable grounds to decide where to put it into nature.