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Annalen der Physik

Reflections Concerning Niels Bohr's Refutation of the Einstein‐Podolsky‐Rosen‐Paradox

Klaus Fuchs

Published Jan 1, 1985• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The controverse discussion between Bohr and Einstein concerning the interpretation of quantum theory is resumed by a reappraisal of some arguments in the view of epistemological problems, which have come to the fore in recent times.
DOI
10.1002/andp.19854970112

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Dec 28, 1984•0 citations
The chapter discusses Bohr’s response to the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criticism of quantum mechanics, illuminating the clash between Bohr’s approach, firmly grounded in the existing experimental context, and Einstein’s prescient philosophical concerns. Given its accord with Ernst Mach’s influential double-aspect philosophical view, Bohr’s broader philosophical argument reads as a conventional piece of philosophical thought aimed at further clarifying the account already produced by the inductive process.
This paper discusses the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox from a new point of view. In section II, the arguments by which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen reach their paradoxical conclusions are presented. They are found to rest on two critical assumptions: (a) that before a measurement is made on a system consisting of two non-interacting but correlated sub-systems, the state of the entire system is exactly represented by: (b) that the exact measurement of an observable A in one of the sub-systems is possible. In section III it is shown that assumption (b) is incorrect. Thus we conclude, as did Bohr, that the results of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are not valid. The arguments of section III are quite distinct from Bohr's, and therefore in Section IV this work is related to that of Bohr.
ASPECTS OF THE DEBATE The debate between Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics extended from the fifth Solvay Conference in 1927 until the end of Einstein's life. The most dramatic exchange occurred in 1935, when Einstein, in collaboration with B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, published a paper in Physical Review entitled “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?”, concluding with a negative answer, and Bohr replied in the same journal, with a paper of the same title but giving a positive answer. Their arguments were restated, in some respects with greater clarity, in the Library of Living Philosophers volume on Einstein in 1949. The disagreements between Bohr and Einstein concerned not only the physical question expressed in the common title of their papers, but also philosophical questions about physical reality and human knowledge. Much light was thrown upon the Bohr–Einstein debate by the theorem of J. S. Bell (1964) and the experiments which it inspired. Bell showed that any physical theory which applies to a pair of spatially separated systems (as considered in the thought experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen) and satisfies a certain locality condition will, in certain circumstances, disagree statistically with quantum mechanics. Consequently, the supplementation of the quantum mechanical description envisaged by Einstein and his collaborators (usually referred to as a “hidden variables theory”) must either violate the locality condition or clash with quantum mechanical predictions.
Discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory are at present obstructed by (1) the increasing axiomania in physics and philosophy which replaces fundamental problems by problems of formulation within a certain preconceived calculus, and (2) the decreasing (since 1927) philosophical interest and sophistication both of professional physicists and of professional philosophers which results in the replacement of subtle positions by crude ones and of dialectical arguments by dogmatic ones. More especially, such discussions are obstructed by the ignorance of both opponents, and also defenders of the Copenhagen point of view, as regards the arguments which once were used in its defence. The publication of Bunge's Quantum Theory and Reality and especially of Popper's contribution to it are taken as an occasion for the restatement of Bohr's position and for the refutation of some quite popular, but surprisingly naive and uninformed objections against it. Bohr's position is distinguished both from the position of Heisenberg and from the vulgarized versions which have become part of the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation” and whose inarticulateness has been a boon for all those critics who prefer easy victories to a rational debate. Einstein's main counterargument is discussed, and Bohr's refutation restated. The philosophical background and earlier forms of Bohr's views are stated also. Considering that these views are more detailed, better adapted to the facts of the microdomain than any existing alternative it follows that fundamental discussion must first return to them. Their uniqueness is not asserted, however. Here the author still maintains that a hundred shabby flowers are preferable to a single blossom, however exquisite. But a hundred shabby flowers plus an exquisite blossom are more desirable still.
For many years the physical interpretation of quantum theory has been dominated by the “wave-particle duality” attitude of the “Copenhagen school.” This point of view is eloquently described in Bohr's collection of essays on the subject. Despite persistent concerns with apparent paradoxes and limitations to this interpretation (as exemplified by Schrodinger's cat, the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, among others), the Copenhagen view persists de facto in the daily life of the modern physicist. Traditional quantum theory has so successfully explained such a vast amount of data in atomic and molecular physics, solid state physics (and to a lesser extent, elementary particle physics) that little doubt can exist concerning its essential validity. As a consequence of the overwhelming practical success of the “Copenhagen interpretation, ” the latter has acquired the status of dogma. For many years, therefore, most physicists have found it expedient to relegate the puzzling aspects of the theory to philosophers, and mathematicians. Nevertheless, a persistent interest in this subject has produced a significant and fascinating literature, reviewed by Jammer. In recent years, concerns over the proper meaning to be ascribed to quantum theory have produced an increasingly deep and incisive series of investigations. These investigations fall generally into two categories: either (1) discussion of the philosophical content of the theory, or (2) analyses of the mathematical variants of the theory and their connection with differing interpretational schemes. Physicists tend to be detached from a commitment to philosophical issues, because of their realization of the transient character of the meanings attached to theories of the day. As a simple illustration of this we can mention the profound differences between nonrelativistic and relativistic quantum mechanics.