Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Philosophy of Science

Can Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics Be Reconciled with Relativity?

Joseph Berkovitz, Meir Hemmo

Published Dec 1, 2005• 26 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Modal interpretations are hidden-variable, no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics that were designed to solve the measurement problem and reconcile this theory with relativity. Yet, as no-go theorems by Dickson and Clifton (1998), Arntzenius (1998) and Myrvold (2002) demonstrate, current modal interpretations are incompatible with relativity. In the mainstream modal interpretations, properties of composite systems are generally unrelated to the properties of their subsystems. We propose holistic and relational interpretations of properties to explain this failure of property composition. Based on these interpretations, we consider strategies for circumventing Myrvold's theorem, which are also effective against the other two theorems.

DOI
10.1086/508947

Related papers

How to reconcile modal interpretations of quantum mechanics with relativity

Joseph Berkovitz, Meir Hemmo

Modal interpretations 4 are hidden-variable, no-collapse (typically) indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics that were designed to solve the measurement problem and to reconcile quantum mechanics with relativity. But, as recent no-go theorems by Dickson and Clifton (1998), Arntzenius

•Jan 1, 2003•2 citations

A No-Go Theorem for Joint Property Ascriptions in Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Pieter E. Vermaas

With an interpretation of quantum mechanics one can not only predict probabilities for outcomes of measurements performed on quantum systems but also ascribe properties to these systems themselves. I consider interpretations (notably modal interpretations) that ascribe at least those properties to a system which are represented by the eigenprojections of the reduced state. Such interpretations solve the measurement problem for ideal measurements. Here, however, I prove that these interpretations cannot define joint property ascriptions to three or more systems.

Physical Review Letters•Mar 17, 1997•43 citations

A modal-Hamiltonian interpretation of quantum mechanics

Olímpia Lombardi, Mario Castagnino

The aim of this paper is to introduce a new member of the family of the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, the Hamiltonian of the quantum system plays a decisive role in the property-ascription rule that selects the definite-valued observables whose possible values become actual. We show that this interpretation is effective for solving the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions, and we argue for the physical relevance of the property-ascription rule by applying it to well-known physical situations. Moreover, we explain how this interpretation supplies a description of the elemental categories of the ontology referred to by the theory, where quantum systems turn out to be bundles of possible properties.

arXiv:quant-ph/0610121•Oct 15, 2006•1 citation

The Contextual Character of Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Graciela Domenech, Héctor Freytes, Christian DE RONDE

In this article we discuss the contextual character of quantum mechanics in the framework of modal interpretations. We investigate its historical origin and relate contemporary modal interpretations to those proposed by M. Born and W. Heisenberg. We present then a general characterization of what we consider to be a modal interpretation. Following previous papers in which we have introduced modalities in the Kochen-Specker theorem, we investigate the consequences of these theorems in relation to the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.

arXiv:0705.1660•May 11, 2007•2 citations

The Metaphysical Mismatch in Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: Beyond Necessary Equivalence

M. Coelen

The measurement problem is one of the major philosophical problems in the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics aim to overcome the measurement problem, however, not always without a hitch: other problems arise. That is, some Modal Interpretations claim that a property Q, considered in a subsystem , is a di erent property while considered in the composite physical system , this while both situations are empirically indistinguishable: a non-empirical mismatch ensues. The mismatch, that seems to manifest at the metaphysical level, implies that empirically equivalent propositions like \\the left-hand side of the table is green" (subsystem) and \\the table is green at the left-hand side" (composite system) are metaphysically di erent. Although such a conclusion is clearly at odds with our everyday idea of properties, in my thesis, I question why metaphysical equivalence should (directly) ensue from empirical equivalence. The goal is to provide an explanation why the mismatch can been seen as a correct representation. Furthermore, I question what is exactly ment by metaphysical. As it turns out, under certain circumstances, by using an injective non-surjective function f that sends ordered pairs of operators to quantitative properties, in all possible worlds, the mismatch appears to be a correct representation. Nevertheless, since there are good reasons to renounce the mismatch, I question the level of activity and I invoke a more ne-grained version of metaphysics, i.e hyperintensional metaphysics. A relation between two entities is considered as hyperintensional from the very moment the relation is more ne-grained than necessary equivalence: beyond necessary equivalence. Finally, I claim that the mismatch must be understood in terms of beyond necessary equivalence and should be seen as a correct representation of the relation between language and reality in all hyperintensional worlds.

•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

Philosophy

Pieter E. Vermaas

In this final part I analyse the modal interpretations from a more philosophical point of view. In Chapter 12 I start by arguing that modal interpretations describe noumenal states of affairs and that therefore metaphysically tenable interpretations need only to meet the criteria of Consistency and Internal Completeness. Then I analyse the relations between properties, states and outcomes of measurements in the modal description of reality. I end by discussing how modal interpretations, when restricted to the description of measurement outcomes, recover the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 13 concerns the relations between the properties ascribed to composite systems and subsystems. I show that the property ascriptions of the bi and spectral modal interpretations can be characterised as holistic and non-reductionistic, whereas the property ascription of the atomic modal interpretation is non-holistic and to a large extent reductionistic. I argue that notwithstanding the lack of reductionism, the bi and spectral modal interpretations are empirically adequate and metaphysically tenable. I also discuss the possibility of saving the metaphysical tenability of the atomic modal interpretation by taking holistic properties as dispositional properties. In Chapter 14 I give a survey of the possibilities and impossibilities of modal interpretations and in Chapter 15 I end with general conclusions.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Feb 5, 2010•0 citations
Modal interpretations are hidden-variable, no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics that were designed to solve the measurement problem and reconcile this theory with relativity. Yet, as no-go theorems by Dickson and Clifton (1998), Arntzenius (1998) and Myrvold (2002) demonstrate, current modal interpretations are incompatible with relativity. In the mainstream modal interpretations, properties of composite systems are generally unrelated to the properties of their subsystems. We propose holistic and relational interpretations of properties to explain this failure of property composition. Based on these interpretations, we consider strategies for circumventing Myrvold's theorem, which are also effective against the other two theorems.
With an interpretation of quantum mechanics one can not only predict probabilities for outcomes of measurements performed on quantum systems but also ascribe properties to these systems themselves. I consider interpretations (notably modal interpretations) that ascribe at least those properties to a system which are represented by the eigenprojections of the reduced state. Such interpretations solve the measurement problem for ideal measurements. Here, however, I prove that these interpretations cannot define joint property ascriptions to three or more systems.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a new member of the family of the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, the Hamiltonian of the quantum system plays a decisive role in the property-ascription rule that selects the definite-valued observables whose possible values become actual. We show that this interpretation is effective for solving the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions, and we argue for the physical relevance of the property-ascription rule by applying it to well-known physical situations. Moreover, we explain how this interpretation supplies a description of the elemental categories of the ontology referred to by the theory, where quantum systems turn out to be bundles of possible properties.
In this article we discuss the contextual character of quantum mechanics in the framework of modal interpretations. We investigate its historical origin and relate contemporary modal interpretations to those proposed by M. Born and W. Heisenberg. We present then a general characterization of what we consider to be a modal interpretation. Following previous papers in which we have introduced modalities in the Kochen-Specker theorem, we investigate the consequences of these theorems in relation to the modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The measurement problem is one of the major philosophical problems in the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics aim to overcome the measurement problem, however, not always without a hitch: other problems arise. That is, some Modal Interpretations claim that a property Q, considered in a subsystem , is a di erent property while considered in the composite physical system , this while both situations are empirically indistinguishable: a non-empirical mismatch ensues. The mismatch, that seems to manifest at the metaphysical level, implies that empirically equivalent propositions like \\the left-hand side of the table is green" (subsystem) and \\the table is green at the left-hand side" (composite system) are metaphysically di erent. Although such a conclusion is clearly at odds with our everyday idea of properties, in my thesis, I question why metaphysical equivalence should (directly) ensue from empirical equivalence. The goal is to provide an explanation why the mismatch can been seen as a correct representation. Furthermore, I question what is exactly ment by metaphysical. As it turns out, under certain circumstances, by using an injective non-surjective function f that sends ordered pairs of operators to quantitative properties, in all possible worlds, the mismatch appears to be a correct representation. Nevertheless, since there are good reasons to renounce the mismatch, I question the level of activity and I invoke a more ne-grained version of metaphysics, i.e hyperintensional metaphysics. A relation between two entities is considered as hyperintensional from the very moment the relation is more ne-grained than necessary equivalence: beyond necessary equivalence. Finally, I claim that the mismatch must be understood in terms of beyond necessary equivalence and should be seen as a correct representation of the relation between language and reality in all hyperintensional worlds.
In this final part I analyse the modal interpretations from a more philosophical point of view. In Chapter 12 I start by arguing that modal interpretations describe noumenal states of affairs and that therefore metaphysically tenable interpretations need only to meet the criteria of Consistency and Internal Completeness. Then I analyse the relations between properties, states and outcomes of measurements in the modal description of reality. I end by discussing how modal interpretations, when restricted to the description of measurement outcomes, recover the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 13 concerns the relations between the properties ascribed to composite systems and subsystems. I show that the property ascriptions of the bi and spectral modal interpretations can be characterised as holistic and non-reductionistic, whereas the property ascription of the atomic modal interpretation is non-holistic and to a large extent reductionistic. I argue that notwithstanding the lack of reductionism, the bi and spectral modal interpretations are empirically adequate and metaphysically tenable. I also discuss the possibility of saving the metaphysical tenability of the atomic modal interpretation by taking holistic properties as dispositional properties. In Chapter 14 I give a survey of the possibilities and impossibilities of modal interpretations and in Chapter 15 I end with general conclusions.