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Journal of Information Security

Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols: A Comparative Study

Areej Omar Baalghusun, Olfa Abusalem, Zahra Abbas Al Abbas, Jayaprakash Kar

Published Jan 1, 2015• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

One of the most important and challenging cryptographic primitives in Public Key Cryptography is Key Agreement Protocol where two or more parties share secret values and establish the session key. Many authors have proposed key agreement protocols. In this article, we have viewed some authenticated Key Agreement Protocols and presented a comparative study. We have also described the design principle, security requirement and various attacks on Key Agreement Protocol.

DOI
10.4236/jis.2015.61006

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One of the most important and challenging cryptographic primitives in Public Key Cryptography is Key Agreement Protocol where two or more parties share secret values and establish the session key. Many authors have proposed key agreement protocols. In this article, we have viewed some authenticated Key Agreement Protocols and presented a comparative study. We have also described the design principle, security requirement and various attacks on Key Agreement Protocol.
The main goal of cryptography is to enable secure communication over a public channel; often a secret shared among the communicating parties is used to achieve this. The process by which these parties agree on such a shared secret is called key agreement. In this thesis, we focus on two-party key agreement protocols in the public-key setting and study the various methods used to establish and validate public keys. We pay particular attention to certificateless key agreement schemes and attempt to formalize a relevant notion of security. To that end, we give a possible extension of the existing extended Canetti-Krawzcyk security model applicable to the certificateless setting. We observe that none of the certificateless protocols we have seen in the literature are secure in this model; it is an open question whether such schemes exist. We analyze several published certificateless key agreement protocols, demonstrating the existence of key compromise impersonation attacks and even a man-in-the-middle attack in one case, contrary to the claims of the authors. We also briefly describe weaknesses exhibited by these protocols in the context of our suggested security model.
As the fundamental building block for secure communication in the open network, authenticated key agreement protocols are usually constructed in the public key setting. Certificateless public key cryptography combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on the efficient certificateless public key encryption scheme due to Cheng and Comley. Security analysis shows that it achieves perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes for authenticated key agreement protocol, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Compared to other comparable schemes, it is more secure and has nice efficiency.
Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. It plays an important role for securing systems in practice. In this paper, we present the first certificateless one-way authenticated two-party key agreement protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the intractability of the standard discrete logarithm (DL) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. For efficiency, our protocol enjoys low complexity in both communication and computation.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is one of the important cryptographic primitives to ensure secure communication in an open network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) represents an interesting and potentially useful balance between public key cryptography based on certificates and identity-based cryptography. The topic of CL-PKC has undergone quite rapid development with schemes being proposed for encryption and signatures, while certificateless authenticated key agreement protocols are seldom discussed. In this paper, we present a secure two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on an efficient certificateless public key encryption with pairing. Such a scheme achieves almost all of the security attributes, including known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Meanwhile, it is also practical with nice efficiency.
In an open and distributed environment, authenticated key agreement protocol, as an important cryptographic primitive, is used to authenticate entities and establish session key in order to provide secure communications. Key escrow is essential in situations where confidentiality and audit trail are legal requirements, whilst perfect forward secrecy and known session-specific temporary information secrecy attributes are desirable to provide stronger security. In this paper, we give a cryptanalysis on the scheme due to Wang et al., which is based on the identity-based encryption scheme proposed by Gentry (Eurocrypt'06), and then present an enhanced secure two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol. The new proposed protocol achieves most of the required security attributes and can be used properly in the escrow mode. Security analysis shows that it achieves the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the perfect forward secrecy and known session-specific temporary information secrecy attributes.