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Philosophy of Science

The Decline and Fall of Quantum Dualism

Alfred Landé

Published Jun 1, 1971• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The Bohr-Heisenberg doctrine of wave-particle duality has been attacked in the past for its methodical defects, over-complication, internal contradictions, its positivistic phenomenalism, etc. The present investigation shows that duality, the doctrine of equivalence of the particle picture and the wave picture of matter, is untenable since its wave part leads to empirically wrong results in the relativistic domain, and violates the postulate of independence of the arbitrary choice of reference system in the non-relativistic realm. Therefore, when methodical objections were never quite conclusive, the physical failure of the duality idea seals its fate irrefutably, together with all its pseudo-philosophical implications.

DOI
10.1086/288356

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The Bohr-Heisenberg doctrine of wave-particle duality has been attacked in the past for its methodical defects, over-complication, internal contradictions, its positivistic phenomenalism, etc. The present investigation shows that duality, the doctrine of equivalence of the particle picture and the wave picture of matter, is untenable since its wave part leads to empirically wrong results in the relativistic domain, and violates the postulate of independence of the arbitrary choice of reference system in the non-relativistic realm. Therefore, when methodical objections were never quite conclusive, the physical failure of the duality idea seals its fate irrefutably, together with all its pseudo-philosophical implications.
(1) The idea that diffraction of matter particles can only be understood in terms of a temporary wave transformation or ‘double manifestation’ is an uneconomical ad hoc hypothesis, shattered already in 1923 by the unitary quantum theory of diffraction of Duane which in 1926 became part of the quantum mechanics, with a statistical interpretation of wave-like appearances. (2) Bohr's re-interpretation of Heisenberg's uncertainty of prediction as an indeterminacy of existence rests on an illegitimate literal translation of a wave result into particle language which is at variance with experience as well as with the statistical interpretation. (3) The fact that one can transform the simple and unitary particle mechanics into a complicated wavelike form is only a weak substitute for genuine dualism — as if one would see dualism in the transformability from the geo- to the heliocentric reference system. (4) The strongest argument against a symmetry of the particle and the wave theory of matter is the explainability of the former in terms of simple postulates of invariance, leaving the wave formalism as a purely ad hoc construction.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
The basic premise of Quantum Mechanics, embodied in the doctrine of wave-particle duality, assigns both, a particle and a wave structure to the physical entities. The classical laws describing the motion of a particle and the evolution of a wave are assumed to be correct. Gauge Mechanics treats the discrete entities as particles, and their motion is described by an extension of the corresponding classical laws. Quantum mechanical interpretations of various observations and their implications, including some issues that are usually ignored, are presented and compared here with the gauge mechanical descriptions. The considerations are confined mainly to the conceptual foundations and the internal consistency of these theories. Although no major differences between their predictions have yet been noticed, some deviations are expected, which are indicated. These cases may provide the testing grounds for further investigations.
The formalism of quantum mechanics produces spectacular results, but its rules, its parameters are empirical, either deduced from classical physics, or from experimental results rather than from the postulates. Thus, quantum mechanics is purely phenomenological; for instance, the computation of the eigenvalues of the energy is generally a simple interpolation in the discrete space of the quantum numbers. The attempts to show that quantum electrodynamics is more precise than classical electrodynamics are based on wrong computations. The lack of paradoxes in the classical theory, the appearance of classical, true interpretations of the wave-particle duality justify the criticism of Ehrenfest and Einstein. The obscurity of the quantum concepts leads to wrong conclusions that handicap the development of physics. Just as building a laser was considered absurd before the first maser worked, the concept of photon leads to deny a type of coherent Raman scattering necessary to understand some redshifts of spectra in astrophysics, and able to destroy the two fundamental proofs to the expansion of the universe.
Interpreting quantum mechanics is a hard problem basically because it means explaining why and how the mathematics exploited to formulate wave-particle duality are related to observations or reality in classical physics (due to Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, gravity and entropy). Here, we first prove the limitation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle by invoking the wave-particle duality and apply it to revise and/or extend the Copenhagen postulates. In particular, even though the said uncertainty exists due to non-commuting operators, but these operators do not commute simply because one of the operators is well-defined in classical physics (particle-like), while the other is wave-like (well-defined in quantum mechanics), or the eigenvalue is not at all defined in classical physics. We also construct a new quantum mechanical postulate (Postulate 9) to deduce why the forbidden gap between discrete energy levels should exist in atoms, molecules and condensed matter phases. In fact, we tackle all the problems arising from the Copenhagen interpretation without violating established experiments and without proposing ideas that violate physical reality.