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Scientific Reports

Security of quantum digital signatures for classical messages

Tian‐Yin Wang, Xiao‐Qiu Cai, Yanli Ren, Ruiling Zhang

Published Mar 18, 2015• 71 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum digital signatures can be used to authenticate classical messages in an information-theoretically secure way. Previously, a novel quantum digital signature for classical messages has been proposed and gave an experimental demonstration of distributing quantum digital signatures from one sender to two receivers. Some improvement versions were subsequently presented, which made it more feasible with present technology. These proposals for quantum digital signatures are basic building blocks which only deal with the problem of sending single bit messages while no-forging and non-repudiation are guaranteed. For a multi-bit message, it is only mentioned that the basic building blocks must be iterated, but the iteration of the basic building block still does not suffice to define the entire protocol. In this paper, we show that it is necessary to define the entire protocol because some attacks will arise if these building blocks are used in a naive way of iteration. Therefore, we give a way of defining an entire protocol to deal with the problem of sending multi-bit messages based on the basic building blocks and analyse its security.

DOI
10.1038/srep09231

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Quantum digital signatures can be used to authenticate classical messages in an information-theoretically secure way. Previously, a novel quantum digital signature for classical messages has been proposed and gave an experimental demonstration of distributing quantum digital signatures from one sender to two receivers. Some improvement versions were subsequently presented, which made it more feasible with present technology. These proposals for quantum digital signatures are basic building blocks which only deal with the problem of sending single bit messages while no-forging and non-repudiation are guaranteed. For a multi-bit message, it is only mentioned that the basic building blocks must be iterated, but the iteration of the basic building block still does not suffice to define the entire protocol. In this paper, we show that it is necessary to define the entire protocol because some attacks will arise if these building blocks are used in a naive way of iteration. Therefore, we give a way of defining an entire protocol to deal with the problem of sending multi-bit messages based on the basic building blocks and analyse its security.
Digital signatures guarantee the authenticity and transferability of messages and are widely used in modern communication. The security of currently used classical digital signature schemes, however, relies on computational assumptions. In contrast, quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes offer information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. We present two QDS protocols which have the same experimental requirements as quantum key distribution, which is already commercially available. We also give a security proof for the presented QDS schemes against coherent forging attacks.
Digital signatures are the building blocks of modern communication to prevent masquerading by any party other than recipients, repudiation by signatory and forgery by any individual recipient. Digital signature scheme is said to be standard if the signature (a) is a pattern depending upon the message to be signed, (b) is built upon some information publically known and unique to the signatory, (c) can be stored by all the recipients. While classical methods provide computational security only, quantum mechanics guarantees information-theoretically secure and standard digital signature schemes. However, standard quantum digital signature schemes are based on quantum one-way functions and hence require long term quantum memory for storing quantum signatures, which is not practically feasible yet. We demonstrate here a standard quantum digital signature scheme by replacing quantum one-way functions with multiparty controlled EPR channels. It allows signatory to generate non-locally correlated quantum signatures, instead of multiple copies of a unique quantum state, and assures security against any individual since others have non-locally correlated information.
We present a quantum digital signature scheme whose security is based on fundamental principles of quantum physics. It allows a sender (Alice) to sign a message in such a way that the signature can be validated by a number of different people, and all will agree either that the message came from Alice or that it has been tampered with. To accomplish this task, each recipient of the message must have a copy of Alice's "public key," which is a set of quantum states whose exact identity is known only to Alice. Quantum public keys are more difficult to deal with than classical public keys: for instance, only a limited number of copies can be in circulation, or the scheme becomes insecure. However, in exchange for this price, we achieve unconditionally secure digital signatures. Sending an m-bit message uses up O(m) quantum bits for each recipient of the public key. We briefly discuss how to securely distribute quantum public keys, and show the signature scheme is absolutely secure using one method of key distribution. The protocol provides a model for importing the ideas of classical public key cryptography into the quantum world.
Quantum digital signatures (QDSs) allow the sending of messages from one sender to multiple recipients, with the guarantee that messages cannot be forged or tampered with. Additionally, messages cannot be repudiated--if one recipient accepts a message, she is guaranteed that others will accept the same message as well. While messaging with these types of security guarantees are routinely performed in the modern digital world, current technologies only offer security under computational assumptions. QDSs, on the other hand, offer security guaranteed by quantum mechanics. All thus far proposed variants of QDSs require long-term, high quality quantum memory, making them unfeasible in the foreseeable future. Here, we present a QDS scheme where no quantum memory is required, which also needs just linear optics. This makes QDSs feasible with current technology.
A quantum digital signature (QDS) is utilized to authenticate classical messages and offers information theoretical security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. Focusing on signing a one-bit message, previous continuous-variable quantum digital signature (CV-QDS) protocols that shared secret keys are generated by quantum key distribution, and it is only mentioned to suitably iterate the one-bit protocol for a multibit message. Although the CV-QDS protocol is unconditionally secure while sending single-bit messages, iterating the one-bit protocol in a naive way will allow some forgery attacks. In this paper, for signing one-bit and multibit messages, a CV-QDS protocol is proposed, on the condition that nonrepudiation and no forging are guaranteed. For one-bit and multibit schemes, we compare the difference in the distribution stage and messaging stage, analyzing the security as well as summarizing some formulas for calculation. We hope the protocol with continuous variables could further improve the performance of QDS.
Digital signature schemes are often used in interconnected computer networks to verify the origin and authenticity of messages. Current classical digital signature schemes based on so-called “one-way functions” rely on computational complexity to provide security over sufficiently long timescales. However, there are currently no mathematical proofs that such functions will always be computationally complex. Quantum digital signatures offers a means of confirming both origin and authenticity of a message with security verified by information theoretical limits. The message cannot be forged or repudiated. We have constructed, tested and analyzed the security of what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first example of an experimental quantum digital signature system.