We construct an efficient statistical zero-knowledge authentication protocol for smart cards based on general assumptions. We show how it can be instantiated using lattice-based primitives, which are conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks. We illustrate the practicality of our protocol on smart cards in terms of storage, computation, communication, and round complexities. Furthermore, we compare it to other lattice-based authentication protocols, which are either zero-knowledge or have a similar structure. The comparison shows that our protocol improves the best previous protocol in several aspects.
We construct an efficient statistical zero-knowledge authentication protocol for smart cards based on general assumptions. We show how it can be instantiated using lattice-based primitives, which are conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks. We illustrate the practicality of our protocol on smart cards in terms of storage, computation, communication, and round complexities. Furthermore, we compare it to other lattice-based authentication protocols, which are either zero-knowledge or have a similar structure. The comparison shows that our protocol improves the best previous protocol in several aspects.
We construct statistical zero-knowledge authentication protocols for smart cards based on general assumptions. The main protocol is only secure against active attacks, but we present a modication based on trapdoor commitments that can resist concurrent attacks as well. Both protocols are instantiated using lattice-based primitives, which are conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks. We illustrate the practicality of our main protocol on smart cards in terms of storage, computation, communication, and round complexities. Furthermore, we compare it to other lattice-based authentication protocols, which are either zero-knowledge or have a similar structure. The comparison shows that our protocol improves the best previous protocol.
In emerging environments such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT), secure authentication and key negotiation play a crucial role in protecting data transmitted over public networks. However, many existing authentication protocols are still designed based on classical public-key cryptography primitives, and quantum computing may threaten their security. To address this challenge, we propose a post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol that uses the lattice-based Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Our proposed protocol integrates cryptographic authentication, smart card protection, and post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, enabling mutual authentication between users and servers and securely establishing session keys. The security of the protocol is formally analyzed in the Real-or-Random (ROR) model under the random oracle assumption and the IND-CCA security of the underlying KEM scheme. Furthermore, through informal security analysis, we have further demonstrated that the protocol possesses important security properties, including anonymity, untraceability, perfect forward confidentiality, and resistance to known attacks. In addition, the computational cost and communication overhead of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with several representative authentication protocols. The results show that the proposed protocol can provide strong security while maintaining low computational cost and communication overhead.
Summary Nowadays, authentication protocols are essential for secure communications specially for roaming networks, distributed computer networks, and remote wireless communication. The numerous users in these networks rise vulnerabilities. Thus, privacy‐preserving methods have to be run to provide more reliable services and sustain privacy. Anonymous authentication is a method to remotely authenticate users with no revelation about their identity. In this paper, we analyze 2 smart card–based protocols that the user's identity is anonymous. However, we represent that they are vulnerable to privileged insider attack. It means that the servers can compromise the users' identity for breaking their privacy. Also, we highlight that the Wen et al protocol has flaws in both stolen smart card and stolen server attacks and the Odelu et al protocol is traceable. Then, we propose 2 modified anonymous authentication protocols. Finally, we analyze our improved protocols with both heuristic and formal methods.
Card-based cryptography enables players to compute logical and arithmetic operations securely, such as bitwise AND and addition of integers. Several multiparty computation protocols and zero-knowledge proof protocols utilizing these secure computations have been developed as its applications. However, the realization of an efficient protocol for an arithmetic operation other than addition and subtraction remains an open problem. This paper proposes card-based protocols, based on integer commitment, for multiplication, division, and square root. Compared to general constructions for protocols for these operations based on binary integer commitment, the proposed protocols exhibit superior simplicity and efficiency. Furthermore, these protocols introduce novel applications for card-based cryptography to secure statistical data aggregation.
A smart grid network (SGN) is an advanced electrical grid system based on information and communication technology. The system uses digital technology, sensors, and two-way communication to manage electricity flow from generation to consumption, enabling real-time monitoring, efficiency, reliability, and seamless integration of renewable and electric vehicles. In the present time, SG network systems are vulnerable to cyber security attacks because these systems use sensors as well as the internet during two-way communication. So, there is a critical need of cryptosystems that can ensure the security of two-way smart grid communication. There are numerous authentication protocols proposed by researchers to protect smart grid networks (SGNs) from cyber security attacks. But, most of them are based on prime factorization and discrete logarithmic problems, which are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. The researchers have found that lattice-based cryptographic primitives are important candidates to form cryptosystems that are hard to break even on quantum computers. The aim of this article is to find out lattice-based cryptosystems that are suitable to design the cryptographic protocols secure against quantum computing attacks. This survey provides an overview of lattice-based cryptosystems and their applications in securing SG networks.
We propose a novel quantum-resistant mutual authentication scheme for radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems. Our scheme uses lattice-based cryptography and, in particular, achieves quantum-resistance by leveraging the hardness of the inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS) problem. In contrast to prior work, which assumes that the reader-server communication channel is secure, our scheme is secure even when both the reader-server and tag-reader communication channels are insecure. Our proposed protocol provides robust security against man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, impersonation, and reflection attacks, while also ensuring unforgeability and preserving anonymity. We present a detailed security analysis, including semi-formal analysis and formal verification using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool. In addition, we analyze the storage, computation, and communication costs of the proposed protocol and compare its security properties with those of existing protocols, demonstrating that our scheme offers strong security guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first quantum-resistant authentication protocol for RFID systems that comprehensively addresses the insecurity of both the reader-server and tag-reader communication channels.