International Conference on Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP)

Secure digital archiving in post-quantum era

Vlastimil Člupek, Lukáš Malina, Václav Zeman

Published Jul 1, 2015• 8 citations

Abstract

This article introduces a solution of secure digital archiving in the post-quantum era. The basic tool at secure digital archiving of the electronic documents is the signature schemes, which are used at creation of the certificates and the timestamps. This article deals with the question of security of the signature schemes in the post-quantum era and introduces the post-quantum signature schemes, which will be resistant to the attacks leading by both conventional and quantum computers. The conventional signature schemes, based on factorization or discrete logarithm problem, in case of implementing the Shor algorithm on a quantum computer will be easy to break through. The main point of this article is the proposal of the solution of secure digital archiving with using the secure post-quantum signature schemes.

DOI: 10.1109/tsp.2015.7296338

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