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АналіЗ стІйкостІ трьоХ ВаріантіВ пінГ–понГ протоколУ дО атакИ пасивнОгО перехопленнЯ

Є.В. Васіліу

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Based on the analysis of eavesdropping attacks on the three variants of the ping–pong protocol the estimations of information leakage depending on probability of attack detection are obtained. It is shown, that the information capacity and security of various variants of the ping–pong protocol are in the inverse proportion.
DOI
10.15587/1729-4061.2010.2548

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On the basis of methods of quantum information theory the eavesdropping attack with the use of auxiliary quantum systems on ping – pong protocol with completely entangled pair of three – dimensional quantum systems – qutrits is analyzed. The formula for quantity of the eavesdropper’s information as functions from probability of attack’s detection is deduced. It is shown, that the resistance against the attack of ping – pong protocol with pairs of qutrits is above the resistance of the protocol with pair of qubits
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Quantum secure direct communication protocols offer confidential transmission of classic information over quantum channel without prior key agreement. The ping-pong based protocols provide asymptotic security and detailed analysis of security level provided by each variant of the protocol is required. The paper presents a general method of calculation of the eavesdropped information as a function of the attack detection probability. The method is applied to the ping-pong protocol based on completely entangled pairs of qudits. The upper and lower bounds on the amount of the leaked information and eavesdropping detection probability are provided.
Ping-Pong protocol is a Quantum Secure Direct Communication protocol that fails to transfer a secure key or secret message optimally in a lossy or noisy channel. The reason is an eavesdropper who possibly hides in the light of these channel losses and gains information about the secure key bits or secret messages. We propose an efficient modification to the control mode of the original Ping-Pong protocol leading to the detection of an eavesdropper with a much higher probability which may not allow her to hide in the light of lossy channels. Assuming that Eve knows and makes a fixed number of right guesses about the modification in the protocol, an optimum ratio of modification can be evaluated. In addition, it is shown that incorporation of the proposed modification in the protocol doubles the eavesdropper’s detection probability for certain eavesdropping operations.
Quantum secure direct communication protocols offer confidential transmission of classic information over the quantum channel without a prior key agreement. The ping-pong based protocols provide asymptotic security and detailed analysis of the security level provided by each variant of the protocol is required. The paper presents a general method of calculation of the eavesdropped information as a function of the attack detection probability. The method is applied to the ping-pong protocol based on completely entangled pairs of qudits. The lower and upper bound on the amount of the leaked information is provided.