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Lecture notes in computer science

Quantum Key Distribution in the Classical Authenticated Key Exchange Framework

Michele Mosca, Douglas Stebila, Berkant Ustaoğlu

Published Jan 1, 2013• 54 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-38616-9_9

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Quantum Key Distribution in the Classical Authenticated Key Exchange Framework

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Key establishment is a crucial primitive for building secure channels: in a multi-party setting, it allows two parties using only public authenticated communication to establish a secret session key which can be used to encrypt messages. But if the session key is compromised, the confidentiality of encrypted messages is typically compromised as well. Without quantum mechanics, key establishment can only be done under the assumption that some computational problem is hard. Since digital communication can be easily eavesdropped and recorded, it is important to consider the secrecy of information anticipating future algorithmic and computational discoveries which could break the secrecy of past keys, violating the secrecy of the confidential channel. Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used generate secret keys that are secure against any future algorithmic or computational improvements. QKD protocols still require authentication of classical communication, however, which is most easily achieved using computationally secure digital signature schemes. It is generally considered folklore that QKD when used with computationally secure authentication is still secure against an unbounded adversary, provided the adversary did not break the authentication during the run of the protocol. We describe a security model for quantum key distribution based on traditional classical authenticated key exchange (AKE) security models. Using our model, we characterize the long-term security of the BB84 QKD protocol with computationally secure authentication against an eventually unbounded adversary. By basing our model on traditional AKE models, we can more readily compare the relative merits of various forms of QKD and existing classical AKE protocols. This comparison illustrates in which types of adversarial environments different quantum and classical key agreement protocols can be secure.

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A scalable quantum-safe authentication framework for multi-site QKD networks using post-quantum cryptography

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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security for key exchange; however, its effective implementation is contingent upon the security of the classical communication channel, especially for authentication purposes. This work presents a system-level study of quantum-safe authentication for the classical channel in multi-site QKD networks, comparing two post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) approaches within a unified evaluation framework: one based on lattice-based digital signatures, and one based on message authentication codes (MACs) bootstrapped by PQC key establishment. We develop a multi-site network model to analyze the scalability and deployment limitations of traditional pre-shared key methods. The framework is evaluated using both simulations and hardware-based experiments, considering communication cost, computational overhead, and the impact on the key generation rate. The results show that signature-based authentication offers stateless per-message verification at a higher per-block cost, while MAC-based authentication is better suited to high-throughput environments, both at the same linear onboarding cost. The study quantifies the trade-offs between security, scalability, and performance, and provides practical guidance for deploying quantum-safe authentication in real-world QKD systems.

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Security of Quantum Key Distribution

이충만

•Jan 1, 2018•0 citations
Key establishment is a crucial primitive for building secure channels: in a multi-party setting, it allows two parties using only public authenticated communication to establish a secret session key which can be used to encrypt messages. But if the session key is compromised, the confidentiality of encrypted messages is typically compromised as well. Without quantum mechanics, key establishment can only be done under the assumption that some computational problem is hard. Since digital communication can be easily eavesdropped and recorded, it is important to consider the secrecy of information anticipating future algorithmic and computational discoveries which could break the secrecy of past keys, violating the secrecy of the confidential channel. Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used generate secret keys that are secure against any future algorithmic or computational improvements. QKD protocols still require authentication of classical communication, however, which is most easily achieved using computationally secure digital signature schemes. It is generally considered folklore that QKD when used with computationally secure authentication is still secure against an unbounded adversary, provided the adversary did not break the authentication during the run of the protocol. We describe a security model for quantum key distribution based on traditional classical authenticated key exchange (AKE) security models. Using our model, we characterize the long-term security of the BB84 QKD protocol with computationally secure authentication against an eventually unbounded adversary. By basing our model on traditional AKE models, we can more readily compare the relative merits of various forms of QKD and existing classical AKE protocols. This comparison illustrates in which types of adversarial environments different quantum and classical key agreement protocols can be secure.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers theoretically unbreakable key exchange, but is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if the identities of the communicating parties are not rigorously verified. This paper proposes a novel QKD protocol integrating classical authentication to provide a layered security approach. The core concept involves utilizing a QKD system alongside a robust classical authentication mechanism. This layered approach significantly reduces the risk of successful attacks by ensuring that both parties are who they claim to be before key exchange occurs. The protocol's security relies on the assumption that the classical authentication system is itself secure. We detail the protocol's components, focusing on the integration of Bennett-Brassard (BB84) or a similar QKD scheme with a practical authentication protocol, and analyze its security properties. The proposed system is designed to mitigate the threats posed by adversaries who can intercept and manipulate the quantum key exchange without compromising the authentication process. The potential for improved security and resilience is demonstrated, representing a significant advancement in the practical application of QKD.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security for key exchange; however, its effective implementation is contingent upon the security of the classical communication channel, especially for authentication purposes. This work presents a system-level study of quantum-safe authentication for the classical channel in multi-site QKD networks, comparing two post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) approaches within a unified evaluation framework: one based on lattice-based digital signatures, and one based on message authentication codes (MACs) bootstrapped by PQC key establishment. We develop a multi-site network model to analyze the scalability and deployment limitations of traditional pre-shared key methods. The framework is evaluated using both simulations and hardware-based experiments, considering communication cost, computational overhead, and the impact on the key generation rate. The results show that signature-based authentication offers stateless per-message verification at a higher per-block cost, while MAC-based authentication is better suited to high-throughput environments, both at the same linear onboarding cost. The study quantifies the trade-offs between security, scalability, and performance, and provides practical guidance for deploying quantum-safe authentication in real-world QKD systems.