The contents of this paper consist of two independent but correlated topics. In Part I the history of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy of science is traced in an effort to demonstrate the essential phenomenological aspects of the scientific methodology. Part II, on the other hand, is a technical exposition of some foundational aspects of quantum mechanics based on quantum logic. An effort is made to retain the theme that quantum mechanics is largely a phenomenological theory. As a summary, Part III constitutes an attempt to correlate the first two parts and to present tentatively some consequent reflections on the metaphysical significance of the quantum mechanical formalism.
The contents of this paper consist of two independent but correlated topics. In Part I the history of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy of science is traced in an effort to demonstrate the essential phenomenological aspects of the scientific methodology. Part II, on the other hand, is a technical exposition of some foundational aspects of quantum mechanics based on quantum logic. An effort is made to retain the theme that quantum mechanics is largely a phenomenological theory. As a summary, Part III constitutes an attempt to correlate the first two parts and to present tentatively some consequent reflections on the metaphysical significance of the quantum mechanical formalism.
This work presents a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics. From a philosophical point of view, the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism are highlighted, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of measurement in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined, as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality moving from the microcosm to the macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the ontological problem, the problem of the objectification of the wave function and the problem of the definition of discernibility. This is followed by an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories, and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics that profoundly modify the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism, the unified holistic approach.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
The establishment of the Heisenberg-Schrodinger quantum mechanics in 1926 was undoubtedly the most important event m the history of twentieth-century science - for science itself, even if not for society. One might therefore suppose that the metaphysical conclusions associated with quantum mechanics are a major part of our present view of the world The purpose of this paper is to show that two of these conclusions - indeterminism, and the denial of independent reality to atomic properties - are not unique to quantum mechanics, but emerged as the culmination of historical trends begun m the nineteenth century It postulates cyclic oscillation between 'Romantic' and 'Realist' periods m science and culture, and ascribes a gradual breakdown of belief in determinism to debates about irreversibility. Albert Einstein's opposition to the 'Copenhagen Interpretation' of quantum mechanics was based on a preference for realism as much as a dislike for indeterminism, and the 'Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox' was a formidable challenge to subjectivist instrumentalism. Following the revival of realist interpretations m the 1950s, new experiments seem to have reconfirmed the subjectivist view But there is currently strong disagreement on what kind of subjectivism is scientifically legitimate; John Wheeler's version of the 'anthropic principle' and parapsychological explanations both conflict with the naive realism that has dominated the Western Intellectual tradition since the seventeenth century.
This chapter, along with the next two chapters, sets the basic context for the readers to go into the topic of this book. Physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers struggle to clarify the foundations of quantum mechanics and debate on the interpretations of quantum mechanics. What is the foundation of quantum mechanics and how to interpret the formalism of quantum mechanics are the core issues of concern in the philosophy of physics. These two questions also involve fundamental issues in the general philosophy of science and even metaphysics and epistemology. This chapter introduces the original thoughts, historical developments, and current status of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, as well as its connection with the philosophy of science and metaphysics; it also analyzes the classifications by Bell, Leifer, and Cabello on the spectrum of interpretations of quantum mechanics, which can be regarded as a sort of “navigation map”. On this basis, the main object of discussion in this book is introduced – the quantum histories interpretation.
A short review of some recent developments in the philosophy of physics is presented. I focus on themes which illustrate relations and points of common interest between philosophy of physics and three of its `neighboring' elds: Physics, metaphysics and general philosophy of science. The main examples discussed in these three `border areas' are (i) decoherence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics; (ii) time in physics and metaphysics; and (iii)methodological issues surrounding the multiverse idea in modern cosmology.
During the past two or three centuries western philosophy and science have confirmed each other in their ontological attitude towards external reality. The particular opinion that physical objects have an existence completely independent of observation was established as the necessary basis for all scientific investigation. The discovery in quantum physics that the phenomena ultimately constituting the stability of the material world cannot be separated from the instruments of observation was necessarily felt disastrous to the scientific world-picture, and many philosophers and scientists, including celebrated physicists, are still trying by all means to save ontology in quantum physics. The motive power behind this activity is the belief that the objectivity of science can be maintained only if the elementary particles of matter can be objectified in the usual way. The present chapter deals with the fundamental conditions in quantum physics which entail a complete breakdown of the conceptual frame of classical mechanics