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Lecture notes in computer science

Efficient Constructions of Composable Commitments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Yevgeniy Dodis, Victor Shoup, Shabsi Walfish

Published Aug 20, 2008• 35 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_29

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Efficient lont-term Secure Universally Composable Commitments

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Long-term security ensures that a protocol remains secure even in the future, when the adversarial computational power could, potentially, become unlimited. The notion of universal composability preserves the security of a cryptographic protocol when it is used in combination with any other protocols, in possibly complex systems. The area of long-term universally composable secure protocols has been developed mostly by Müller-Quade and Unruh. Their research conducted so far has shown the existence of secure long-term UC commitments under general cryptographic assumptions, thus without having an emphasis on the efficiency of the protocols designed. Building on their work and using very efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge from [CL02], this thesis presents a new long-term universally composable secure commitment protocol that is both efficient and plausible to use in practice.

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations
Long-term security ensures that a protocol remains secure even in the future, when the adversarial computational power could, potentially, become unlimited. The notion of universal composability preserves the security of a cryptographic protocol when it is used in combination with any other protocols, in possibly complex systems. The area of long-term universally composable secure protocols has been developed mostly by Müller-Quade and Unruh. Their research conducted so far has shown the existence of secure long-term UC commitments under general cryptographic assumptions, thus without having an emphasis on the efficiency of the protocols designed. Building on their work and using very efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge from [CL02], this thesis presents a new long-term universally composable secure commitment protocol that is both efficient and plausible to use in practice.