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Lecture notes in computer science

McEliece and Niederreiter Cryptosystems That Resist Quantum Fourier Sampling Attacks

Hang Dinh, Cristopher Moore, Alexander C. Russell

Published Jan 1, 2011• 80 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_43

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Quantum computers can break the RSA and El Gamal public-key cryptosystems, since they can factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. If we believe that quantum computers will someday become a reality, we would like to have \emph{post-quantum} cryptosystems which can be implemented today with classical computers, but which will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks. In this article we show that the McEliece cryptosystem over \emph{well-permuted, well-scrambled} linear codes resists precisely the attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems are vulnerable---namely, those based on generating and measuring coset states. This eliminates the approach of strong Fourier sampling on which almost all known exponential speedups by quantum algorithms are based. Specifically, we show that the natural case of the Hidden Subgroup Problem to which the McEliece cryptosystem reduces cannot be solved by strong Fourier sampling, or by any measurement of a coset state. We start with recent negative results on quantum algorithms for Graph Isomorphism, which are based on particular subgroups of size two, and extend them to subgroups of arbitrary structure, including the automorphism groups of linear codes. This allows us to obtain the first rigorous results on the security of the McEliece cryptosystem in the face of quantum adversaries, strengthening its candidacy for post-quantum cryptography.

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There is a security threat to the traditional cryptography because of the emergence of quantum computation. Quantum computers can break through many cryptosystems based on mathematical puzzles. The post-cryptography has been established for the sake of the security. It has been proved that McEliece public-key cryptosystem based on error-correcting codes can resist quantum attacks. In this paper, several new generating algorithms of the quantum Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes have been proposed, and the quantum BCH codes can correct the errors including bit-flip and phase-flip. At the same time, the quantum McEliece public-key cryptosystem and quantum Niederreiter public key cryptosystem have been designed by us on the basis of quantum BCH codes in this paper, and their encryption and decryption procedures are created in detail. Our cryptosystem not only retains the advantages of postquantum computation, but also can encrypt or decrypt in quantum state. From the perspective of computational complexity theory, both cryptosystems can resist the attacks of Shor algorithm and Grover algorithm very well. The Niederreiter classical digital signature is designed by us according to the structure characteristics of quantum BCH codes.

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McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems are robust and versatile cryptosystems. These cryptosystems work with many linear error-correcting codes. They are popular these days because they can be quantum-secure. In this paper, we study the Niederreiter cryptosystem using non-binary quasi-cyclic codes. We prove, if these quasi-cyclic codes satisfy certain conditions, the corresponding Niederreiter cryptosystem is resistant to the hidden subgroup problem using weak quantum Fourier sampling. Though our work uses the weak Fourier sampling, we argue that its conclusions should remain valid for the strong Fourier sampling as well.
Quantum computers can break the RSA and El Gamal public-key cryptosystems, since they can factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. If we believe that quantum computers will someday become a reality, we would like to have \emph{post-quantum} cryptosystems which can be implemented today with classical computers, but which will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks. In this article we show that the McEliece cryptosystem over \emph{well-permuted, well-scrambled} linear codes resists precisely the attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems are vulnerable---namely, those based on generating and measuring coset states. This eliminates the approach of strong Fourier sampling on which almost all known exponential speedups by quantum algorithms are based. Specifically, we show that the natural case of the Hidden Subgroup Problem to which the McEliece cryptosystem reduces cannot be solved by strong Fourier sampling, or by any measurement of a coset state. We start with recent negative results on quantum algorithms for Graph Isomorphism, which are based on particular subgroups of size two, and extend them to subgroups of arbitrary structure, including the automorphism groups of linear codes. This allows us to obtain the first rigorous results on the security of the McEliece cryptosystem in the face of quantum adversaries, strengthening its candidacy for post-quantum cryptography.
There is a security threat to the traditional cryptography because of the emergence of quantum computation. Quantum computers can break through many cryptosystems based on mathematical puzzles. The post-cryptography has been established for the sake of the security. It has been proved that McEliece public-key cryptosystem based on error-correcting codes can resist quantum attacks. In this paper, several new generating algorithms of the quantum Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes have been proposed, and the quantum BCH codes can correct the errors including bit-flip and phase-flip. At the same time, the quantum McEliece public-key cryptosystem and quantum Niederreiter public key cryptosystem have been designed by us on the basis of quantum BCH codes in this paper, and their encryption and decryption procedures are created in detail. Our cryptosystem not only retains the advantages of postquantum computation, but also can encrypt or decrypt in quantum state. From the perspective of computational complexity theory, both cryptosystems can resist the attacks of Shor algorithm and Grover algorithm very well. The Niederreiter classical digital signature is designed by us according to the structure characteristics of quantum BCH codes.