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Dieks' Realistic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: A Comment

Howard Barnum

Published Jan 1, 1990• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

D. Dieks has proposed a semantical rule which he claims yields a realistic interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics without the projection postulate. I argue that his proposal is unacceptable because it violates a natural requirement of psychophysical parallelism. His "semantical rule" is not an acceptable interpretive rule because it does not identify structures in the theory with structures in our experience, but postulates a merely probabilistic relationship between the two. Dieks' interpretation is contrasted with Everett's relative state interpretation, which attempts the same task but respects psychophysical parallelism.

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dialectica•Dec 1, 1965•6 citations
D. Dieks has proposed a semantical rule which he claims yields a realistic interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics without the projection postulate. I argue that his proposal is unacceptable because it violates a natural requirement of psychophysical parallelism. His "semantical rule" is not an acceptable interpretive rule because it does not identify structures in the theory with structures in our experience, but postulates a merely probabilistic relationship between the two. Dieks' interpretation is contrasted with Everett's relative state interpretation, which attempts the same task but respects psychophysical parallelism.
We argue that quantum mechanics makes sense without such controversial postulates as the wave function collapse, the quantum probability rule and the observable postulate. We only need the existence of a wave function as a representation of a state, its dynamical evolution rule and another rather trivial postulate proposed here (Read-Off Postulate). The wave function collapse and the probability rule are replaced with intrinsic properties of the theory, i.e. decoherence and relative frequency, respectively. Interpretation of the wave function as a faithful representation of the reality naturally emerges, although quantum reality has a peculiar feature which distinguishes it from classical reality.
This chapter considers rather how Everett’s ideas relate to decoherence theory, and what difference that theory makes. The strange gap between the determinism of the Schrödinger equation and the indeterminism evident at the observational level is bridged by the so-called measurement postulates. The projection postulate is sometimes stated without the restriction to repeatability, but then it is very often false. Everett’s strategy to establish the conclusion was to show that a superposition of records of indeterminism could be obtained in this way, satisfying the Schrödinger equation – and specifically, records as could be encoded in a mechanical model. Everett took the thesis of psychophysical parallelism rather more to heart than did its author. Everett’s proposal was to use, as basis states, wavefunctions for centers of mass, as functions on three-dimensional space, well-localized in position and momentum.
In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics (QM) and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research (OLR), but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most interpretations of QM argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about "what there is", and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to "get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat". Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS)- that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the (dogmatic) idea that 'Actuality = Reality'.
In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics (QM) and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research (OLR), but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most interpretations of QM argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about ''what there is'', and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to ''get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat''. Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS)- that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the (dogmatic) idea that 'Actuality = Reality'.
A semantical and methodological analysis of physical theories is performed in order to find out their relation to reality and to human experience. It is shown that every physical theory refers immediately to an idealized model of waht is supposed to be a piece of reality-the mediate referent of the theory. Two kinds of physical interpretation of physical symbols are distinguished : objective and operational, and the difference between reference and evidence is stressed. It is claimed that for a theory to be physically meaningful it is necessary that it includes rules of objective reference. In some cases a theory contains, in addition, evidential reference rules, i.e. correspondences between some of its concepts and empirical items. But the test. of any theory requires, rather than operational rules, further theories that can bridge the gap between what the theory refers to (e.g., the passage of a cosmic ray) and its remote symptom (e.g., the click of a counter). The conditions for the semantical consistency are sketched and it is argued that there does not exist a semantically consistency inter-pretation of any of the formalisms of quantum theory. From this analysis arguments in favor of critical realism are drawn.