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Lecture notes in computer science

CCA Secure IB-KEM from the Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption in the Standard Model

Yu Chen, Liqun Chen, Zongyang Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2012• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-31912-9_19

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Abstract. In this paper, we propose several selective-identity chosen-ciphertext attack secure identity based key encapsulation (IB-KEM) schemes that are provably secure under the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) assumption in the standard model. Our schemes compare favorably to previous results in efficiency. With delicate modification, our schemes can be strengthened to be full-identity CCA secure easily.

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StarFortress:

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This short paper formally specifies and analyzes the UG hybrid KEM construction from the IRTF CFRG's recent draft on hybrid (post-quantum/traditional) KEMs. The UG construction is an optimized hybrid of a Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based KEM in a nominal group and a generic IND-CCA KEM. The main optimization is that the group elements derived in the DH-based KEM are “inlined” in the key derivation, saving unnecessary hashing. We perform two security analyses of the UG construction: one shows UG is IND-CCA even if the generic IND-CCA KEM is broken; the other complementary analysis shows UG is IND-CCA even if the DH assumptions in the nominal group are broken (by, e.g., a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer).

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Revocable identity‐based matchmaking encryption in the standard model

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Abstract Identity‐based Matchmaking Encryption (IB‐ME) is an extension notion of matchmaking encryption (CRYPTO 2019), where a sender and a receiver can specify an access policy for the other party. In IB‐ME, data encryption is performed by not only a receiver identity but also a sender's encryption key. Nevertheless, previous IB‐ME schemes have not considered the problem of efficient revocation . Hence, the authors introduce a new notion of revocable IB‐ME (RIB‐ME) and formalise the syntax and security model of RIB‐ME. In particular, the authors give an effective and simple construction of RIB‐ME in the standard model, whose security is reduced to the hardness of decisional bilinear Diffie—Hellman problem and computational Diffie—Hellman problem. In addition, the authors show two extensions of our RIB‐ME scheme to consider chosen‐ciphertext security and forward privacy.

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Rafael Dowsley, Jörn Müller‐Quade, Anderson C. A. Nascimento

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2009•47 citations
This short paper formally specifies and analyzes the UG hybrid KEM construction from the IRTF CFRG's recent draft on hybrid (post-quantum/traditional) KEMs. The UG construction is an optimized hybrid of a Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based KEM in a nominal group and a generic IND-CCA KEM. The main optimization is that the group elements derived in the DH-based KEM are “inlined” in the key derivation, saving unnecessary hashing. We perform two security analyses of the UG construction: one shows UG is IND-CCA even if the generic IND-CCA KEM is broken; the other complementary analysis shows UG is IND-CCA even if the DH assumptions in the nominal group are broken (by, e.g., a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer).
Abstract Identity‐based Matchmaking Encryption (IB‐ME) is an extension notion of matchmaking encryption (CRYPTO 2019), where a sender and a receiver can specify an access policy for the other party. In IB‐ME, data encryption is performed by not only a receiver identity but also a sender's encryption key. Nevertheless, previous IB‐ME schemes have not considered the problem of efficient revocation . Hence, the authors introduce a new notion of revocable IB‐ME (RIB‐ME) and formalise the syntax and security model of RIB‐ME. In particular, the authors give an effective and simple construction of RIB‐ME in the standard model, whose security is reduced to the hardness of decisional bilinear Diffie—Hellman problem and computational Diffie—Hellman problem. In addition, the authors show two extensions of our RIB‐ME scheme to consider chosen‐ciphertext security and forward privacy.