An Exceptionally Simple Argument Against the Many-worlds Interpretation: Further Consolidations

Shan Gao

Published Dec 29, 2012• 0 citations

Abstract

It is argued that the components of the superposed wave function of a measuring device, each of which represents a definite measurement result, do not correspond to many worlds, one of which is our world, because all components of the wave function can be measured in our world by a serious of protective measurements, and they all exist in this world.

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An exceptionally simple argument against the many-worlds interpretation

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