A straightforward explanation of fundamental tenets of quantum mechanics concerning the wave function results in the thesis that the quantum mechanical wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world. The reticence on the part of physicists to adopt this thesis is discussed. A comparison is made to the behaviorists’ consideration of mind, and the historical roots of how the problem concerning the quantum mechanical wave function arose are discussed. The basis for an empirical demonstration that the wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world is provided through developing an experiment using methodology from psychology and physics. Based on research in psychology and physics that relied on this methodology, it is likely that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen’s theoretical result that mutually exclusive wave functions can simultaneously apply to the same concrete physical circumstances can be implemented on an empirical level. Original article in The Journal of Mind and Behavior is on JSTOR at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43853678.pdf?seq=1 . Preprint on CERN preprint server at https://cds.cern.ch/record/569426 .
A straightforward explanation of fundamental tenets of quantum mechanics concerning the wave function results in the thesis that the quantum mechanical wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world. The reticence on the part of physicists to adopt this thesis is discussed. A comparison is made to the behaviorists’ consideration of mind, and the historical roots of how the problem concerning the quantum mechanical wave function arose are discussed. The basis for an empirical demonstration that the wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world is provided through developing an experiment using methodology from psychology and physics. Based on research in psychology and physics that relied on this methodology, it is likely that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen’s theoretical result that mutually exclusive wave functions can simultaneously apply to the same concrete physical circumstances can be implemented on an empirical level. Original article in The Journal of Mind and Behavior is on JSTOR at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43853678.pdf?seq=1 . Preprint on CERN preprint server at https://cds.cern.ch/record/569426 .
The aim of such paper is to explain in detail the foundations of quantum cognition and to evidence the manner in which our pioneering experiments on quantum interference in humans should be correctly interpreted in the framework of a correct quantum mechanical elaboration. Often, studies on quantum cognition are elaborated from some authors evidencing that presently we have empirical evidence that the application of quantum rules gives better results respect to classical ones. Consequently, such studies are delineated as empirical tentative. It is not true. Quantum cognition is a scientific realization structured about robust quantum foundations and this is the reason because it gives such important results. Consequently, we discuss the evidence to correctly explain the foundations of this emerging discipline. In order to reach this objective we analyze the fundamental role of the abstract entity that is called quantum mechanical wave function. Soon after we describe the manner in which quantum operators must be entered in cognition studies by using the projectors that represent logic statements and thus relate directly our cognitive functions. We also discuss in detail the logical origins of quantum mechanics outlining that it does not represent a physical theory looking at the matter at microscopic level but a God Giano two faces looking simultaneously to material and to mental reality. We also discuss results establishing the nature of our consciousness and the unquestionable result that it obeys to the basic rules of quantum mechanics. We also give a further and pressing indication: in quantum cognition studies the quantum wave function must be intended as reconstructed experimentally a posteriori in our cognitive studies and cannot be confused with the standard examining elaboration that is used in usual textbooks of quantum mechanics. Also the question of the order effect is analyzed in detail using the important notion of reaction time of psychology. In substance, we give a total reformulation of the current quantum cognition studies evidencing that previous elaborations finalized to present the current status of this discipline as empirical tentative to characterize a quantum cognitive modelling result to be only approximate, incorrect and confusing prospects that damage the information about the robust structure of quantum cognition and therefore need to be rejected.
The mind of man is central to the structure and functioning of the physical world. Modern physical theory indicates that the mind stands in a relationship of equals to the physical world. Both are fundamental, neither can be reduced to the other, and both require each other for their full understanding. This thesis is at odds with the view of the universe found in Newtonian mechanics as well as the generally held view among contemporary physicists of modern physical theory. Since the Renaissance, people have come to understand a great deal about the physical world, and they have gained significant control over it. This increased power over the physical world has occurred hand in hand with the assumption that the structure and functioning of the physical world is essentially independent from human cognition. According to this assumption, if a person’s cognitive capacity did not exist, the functioning of the physical world would not be fundamentally altered. This last statement is not in fact correct, and modern physical theory, and even fundamentals underlying Newtonian mechanics, provide evidence to attest to this. Nonetheless, contemporary physicists for the most part do not see that the relationship of human cognition to the physical world is radically altered in their own modern theory, theory that is supported by a great deal of empirical data. Instead, attempting to preserve the thesis that the structure and functioning of the physical world is independent of the mind while on a practical level relying on modern theory that contradicts this thesis, physicists have placed themselves in the position of wondering at times exactly what is the nature of the physical world at the same time they obtain experimental results concerning the physical world that can only be labeled astonishing in their precision and the scope of their implications. Modern physical theory consists of three main components: 1) the special and general theories of relativity; 2) quantum mechanics; and 3) statistical mechanics. There are very successful theories that have been developed on the basis of these three bedrock areas. An example is quantum electrodynamics. But these theories owe their conceptual foundation to the three components mentioned. The basic issues at the core of these three components also are expressed in these later theories. In addition, there are new unresolved issues of a fundamental nature concerning the conceptual integrity of these later theories that do not apply to quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and statistical mechanics. Quantum mechanics and relativity theory are areas I have written about for over twelve years. The nature of statistical mechanics has also been of interest to me during this time. But when I took a serious look in 1993 at Tolman’s (1938) The Principles of Statistical Mechanics, it became clear that the mind is linked to the physical world in statistical mechanics, a relationship I had found earlier in both relativity theory and quantum mechanics. It was after reading Tolman’s justification of the method of statistical mechanics in the original that I decided to write this book. When I found that the three components of modern physical theory all pointed to the same relationship between mind and the physical world, it became clear that the fundamental isolation of the mind from the physical world that has characterized our experience since the development of Newtonian mechanics is unfounded. Based on empirically supported principles of modern physical theory, I determined that the appropriate assumption for one’s experience, that the mind is linked to the physical world, could be stated with confidence. The impact of this change in assumption concerning the relationship of man to the cosmos in modern physical theory will find its way into our everyday experience. It will perhaps have no greater effect than in reducing the sense of isolation of man from the world that has characterized modern existence.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
It has been shown by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen that in quantum mechanics either one of two different wave functions predicting specific values for quantities represented by non-commuting Hermitian operators can characterize the same physical existent, without a physical interaction responsible for which wave function occurs. This result means that one can make predictions regarding mutually exclusive features of a physical existent. It is important to ask whether people have the capacity to make observations of mutually exclusive phenomena. Our everyday experience informs us that a human observer is capable of observing only one set of physical circumstances at a time. Evidence from psychology, though, indicates that people may have the capacity to make observations of mutually exclusive physical phenomena, even though this capacity is not generally recognized. Working independently, Sigmund Freud and William James provided some of this evidence. How the nature of the quantum mechanical wave function is associated with the problem posed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen is addressed at the end of the paper.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.