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Formal Protocol Design of ESIKE Based on Authentication Tests

Rui Jiang, Aiqun Hu, Jianhua Li

Published Feb 15, 2012• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this paper, we first present a concrete formal protocol design approach, which is based on authentication tests, to create an Efficient and Secure Internet Key Exchange (ESIKE) protocol. Then we formally prove the secure properties of ESIKE with strand space model and authentication tests. The ESIKE protocol overcomes the security shortages of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE), and can provide secure negotiation of session key and Security Association (SA), protection of endpoints ’ identities, and mutual authentication between the initiator and the responder. It needs only three messages and less computational load, so it is simple and efficient.

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In this paper, we first present a concrete formal protocol design approach, which is based on authentication tests, to create an Efficient and Secure Internet Key Exchange (ESIKE) protocol. Then we formally prove the secure properties of ESIKE with strand space model and authentication tests. The ESIKE protocol overcomes the security shortages of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE), and can provide secure negotiation of session key and Security Association (SA), protection of endpoints ’ identities, and mutual authentication between the initiator and the responder. It needs only three messages and less computational load, so it is simple and efficient.
IKEv2 can not achieve active identity protection to initiator in initial exchange,and it has the security flaw of authentication failure.So an improvement protocol is presented.In the new protocol,the SIGn-andMAc approach is adopted to realize explicit key authentication and the responder is first authenticated to actively protect the initiator's identity.By including the peer's identity in the sending messages,the new protocol solves the problem of authentication failure.Moreover,the non-repudiation of the peers for their interactions is also achieved.The analysis results show that our protocol is session key secure and has a good performance.
We propose two public-key schemes to achieve deniable authentication for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Authentication in security had is the essential factor in the key establishment over Internet. The Deniable Internet key exchange protocol gives more value to the IKE standard. Our schemes can in some situations be more efficient than existing IKE protocols as well as having stronger deniability properties. Key-exchange, in particular Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHKE), is among the core cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring network security. For key-exchange over the Internet, both security and privacy are desired. In this paper, we develop a family of privacy-preserving authenticated DHKE protocols named deniable Internet key-exchange (DIKE), both in the traditional PKI setting and in the identity-based setting. The newly developed DIKE protocols are of conceptual clarity and practical (online) efficiency. They provide useful privacy protection to both protocol participants, and add novelty and new value to the IKE standard.
The new Internet key exchange protocol(IKEv2) is analyzed,and it is found that the protocol can not achieve active identity protection to the initiator and has the security flaw of authentication failure in its initial exchange.However,it is necessary to protect the identity information to the initiator under the environment of a wireless access network.In this paper,a novel key exchange protocol for the wireless network based on IKEv2 initial exchange is proposed,which realizes active identity protection to the initiator by the responder explicitly proving his true identity,and achieves successful authentication by reconstructing the authentication payload.With the Universally Composable(UC) security model,this new protocol is analyzed in detail,with the analytical results showing that it affords provably UC security.Performance analysis and simulation results show that the proposed protocol has less computation and communication overhead.
Key-exchange, in particular Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE), is among the core cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring network security. For key-exchange over the Internet, both security and privacy are desired. In this paper, we develop a family of privacy-preserving authenticated DHKE protocols named deniable Internet key-exchange (DIKE), both in the traditional PKI setting and in the identity-based setting. The newly developed DIKE protocols are of conceptual clarity and practical (online) efficiency. They provide useful privacy protection to both protocol participants, and add novelty and new value to the IKE standard. To the best of our knowledge, our protocols are the first provably secure DHKE protocols that additionally enjoy all the following privacy protection advantages: 1) forward deniability, actually concurrent non-malleable statistical zero-knowledge, for both protocol participants simultaneously; 2) the session transcript and session-key can be generated merely from DH-exponents (together with some public values), which thus cannot be traced to the pair of protocol participants; and 3) exchanged messages do not bear peer's identity, and do not explicitly bear player role information.
This paper presents an identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol in the standard model.Protocol design isinspired by bilinear pairings.Strand space knowledge and Game method in provable security are comprehensively used.Thecorrectness of the protocol is analysed and a strict proof is given.The protocol has good forward security and session keynon-hosting.At the same time,through the explicit authentication,it improves the efficiency of the implementation of the pro-tocol.Compared with the protocol in the random oracle model,the protocol has the same computational and communicationefficiencies.
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred between two endpoints, even if the means of transport are insecure. One popular protocol is Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) which operates at OSI layer 3 and protects all protocols at higher layers. Cryptographic keys in IPSec are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE negotiates security parameters for IPSec sessions. In particular, the IKEv2 protocol uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm to establish a secret key shared between two nodes on a network. Although solving such a problem remains difficult with current computing power, it is believed that generic quantum computers will be able to solve this problem, which implies that the security of IKEv2 is compromised. There are, however, several cryptographic systems that are trusted to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. This family of cryptosystems is known as quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC). In this paper, after highlighting the requirements for a secure key exchange protocol, we briefly review the QRC solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature.