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Lecture notes in computer science

Secure Two-Party Computation with Low Communication

Ivan Damgård, Sebastian Faust, Carmit Hazay

Published Jan 1, 2012• 119 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_4

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Efficient Secure Two-Party Computation

Thomas H. Schneider, Michael Zohner

•Dec 7, 2012•0 citations

Low Communication Secure Computation From Semi-Trusted Hardware

Yibiao Lu, Bingsheng Zhang, Kui Ren

In privacy-preserving machine learning and many other applications, the involved parties want to obtain the computation result without revealing their private inputs. Secure computation aims to solve this problem, but current secure computation protocols often fail to provide efficient solutions due to large communication, especially in a real-life Internet network where the bandwidth and the delay can be unsatisfying. Assuming the existence of a trusted hardware component that is resilient to side-channel attacks and will faithfully compute a pre-agreed program, secure computation can be realized by each party sending its input to the hardware and receiving the execution result back. However, a recent work of Luet al. (ESORICS’21) points out that the hardware components can’t be fully trusted. In this work, we improve the semi-trusted hardware model of Luet al., and we propose secure computation protocols with low communication in the new model. We observe that the ESORICS’21 two-party computation protocol have some security flaws; in this work, we fix them and improve its online efficiency. Moreover, we propose an efficient constant-round secure multi-party computation protocol which has a communication cost of (n– 1)λ + 2(n– 1)ℓ bits, wherenis the number of the parties, λ is the security parameter and ℓ is the input/output size. The computation cost of our multi-party protocol is also much smaller than current best-known constant-round protocols.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Jan 1, 2023•6 citations

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Post‐quantum secure two‐party computing protocols against malicious adversaries

Yachao Huo, Zongqu Zhao, Panke Qin +2 more

Summary Secure two‐party computation allows a pair of parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Ultimately, each party receives only its own correct output. In this paper, a post‐quantum secure two‐party computation protocol is proposed that can be used to effectively block malicious parties. The protocol solves the problems of traditional protocols based on garbled circuits, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks, high communication costs and low computational efficiency. The input garbled keys of the circuit constructor is structured as a Learning with Error (LWE) equation, enabling the circuit constructor to employ a zero‐knowledge proof that demonstrates the uniformity of inputs across all circuits.In the key transfer phase, an LWE‐based batch single‐choice cut‐and‐choose oblivious transfer is proposed to avoid selective failure attacks. In addition, the protocol employs a penalty mechanism to detect if the circuit constructor has generated an incorrect circuit. We have compared the communication overhead of this protocol with three other secure two‐party computation protocols based on Cut‐and‐Choose technology. The analytical results show that this protocol has the best error probability and is resilient to quantum attacks under the malicious adversary model. In addition, with appropriate parameters, the protocol is able to reduce its communication bandwidth by an average of 40.41%.

Concurrency and Computation Practice and Experience•Oct 4, 2023•1 citation

Secure Multi-party Computation

Nigel Paul Smart

Information security and cryptography•Nov 12, 2015•50 citations

Server-Aided Two-Party Computation with Minimal Connectivity in the Simultaneous Corruption Model

Ignacio Cascudo, Ivan Damg, Oriol Farr +1 more

We consider secure two-party computation in the client-server model. In our scenario, two adversaries operate separately but simultaneously, each of them corrupting one of the parties and a restricted subset of servers that they interact with. We model security in this setting via the local universal composability framework introduced by Canetti and Vald and show that informationtheoretically secure two-party computation is possible if and only if there is always at least one server which remains uncorrupted. Moreover, in our protocols each of the servers only needs to communicate with the two clients, i.e. no messages are exchanged directly between servers. This communication pattern is minimal.

•Jan 1, 2014•1 citation
In privacy-preserving machine learning and many other applications, the involved parties want to obtain the computation result without revealing their private inputs. Secure computation aims to solve this problem, but current secure computation protocols often fail to provide efficient solutions due to large communication, especially in a real-life Internet network where the bandwidth and the delay can be unsatisfying. Assuming the existence of a trusted hardware component that is resilient to side-channel attacks and will faithfully compute a pre-agreed program, secure computation can be realized by each party sending its input to the hardware and receiving the execution result back. However, a recent work of Luet al. (ESORICS’21) points out that the hardware components can’t be fully trusted. In this work, we improve the semi-trusted hardware model of Luet al., and we propose secure computation protocols with low communication in the new model. We observe that the ESORICS’21 two-party computation protocol have some security flaws; in this work, we fix them and improve its online efficiency. Moreover, we propose an efficient constant-round secure multi-party computation protocol which has a communication cost of (n– 1)λ + 2(n– 1)ℓ bits, wherenis the number of the parties, λ is the security parameter and ℓ is the input/output size. The computation cost of our multi-party protocol is also much smaller than current best-known constant-round protocols.
Summary Secure two‐party computation allows a pair of parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Ultimately, each party receives only its own correct output. In this paper, a post‐quantum secure two‐party computation protocol is proposed that can be used to effectively block malicious parties. The protocol solves the problems of traditional protocols based on garbled circuits, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks, high communication costs and low computational efficiency. The input garbled keys of the circuit constructor is structured as a Learning with Error (LWE) equation, enabling the circuit constructor to employ a zero‐knowledge proof that demonstrates the uniformity of inputs across all circuits.In the key transfer phase, an LWE‐based batch single‐choice cut‐and‐choose oblivious transfer is proposed to avoid selective failure attacks. In addition, the protocol employs a penalty mechanism to detect if the circuit constructor has generated an incorrect circuit. We have compared the communication overhead of this protocol with three other secure two‐party computation protocols based on Cut‐and‐Choose technology. The analytical results show that this protocol has the best error probability and is resilient to quantum attacks under the malicious adversary model. In addition, with appropriate parameters, the protocol is able to reduce its communication bandwidth by an average of 40.41%.
We consider secure two-party computation in the client-server model. In our scenario, two adversaries operate separately but simultaneously, each of them corrupting one of the parties and a restricted subset of servers that they interact with. We model security in this setting via the local universal composability framework introduced by Canetti and Vald and show that informationtheoretically secure two-party computation is possible if and only if there is always at least one server which remains uncorrupted. Moreover, in our protocols each of the servers only needs to communicate with the two clients, i.e. no messages are exchanged directly between servers. This communication pattern is minimal.