On some new concepts in probability theory

Nijalingappa Umakantha

A new approach to probability theory is presented with reference to statistics and statistical physics. At the outset, it is recognized that the “average man” of a population and the “average particle” of a gas are only objects of thought, and not real entities which exist in nature. The concept of average (man) is generalized as a new concept of represental (man) whose epistemological status is intermediate between those of the particular (the man) and the universal (a man). This new concept has become necessary as a result of emergence of statistics as a new branch of human knowledge at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Probability is defined with reference to the represental. The concept of probability is the same in probability theory and in physics. But whereas in statistics the probabilities are estimated using random sequences, in statistical physics they are determined either by the laws of physics alone or by making use of the laws of probability also. Thus in physics we deal with probability at a more basic level than in statistics. This approach is free from most of the controversies we face at present in interpreting probability theory and quantum mechanics.

C. I. J. M. Stuart

Stanley Gudder

Diederik Aerts

We consider a conception of reality that is the following: An object is 'real' if we know that if we would try to test whether this object is present, this test would give us the answer 'yes' with certainty. If we consider a conception of reality where probability plays a fundamental role it can be shown that standard probability theory is not well suited to substitute 'certainty' by means of 'probability equal to 1'. The analysis of this problem leads us to propose a new type of probability theory that is a generalization of standard probability theory. This new type of probability is a function to the set of all subsets of the interval [0, 1] instead of to the interval [0, 1] itself, and hence its evaluation happens by means of a subset instead of a number. This subset corresponds to the different limits of sequences of relative frequency that can arise when an intrinsic lack of knowledge about the context and how it influences the state of the physical entity under study in the process of experimentation is taken into account. The new probability theory makes it possible to define probability on the whole set of experiments within the Geneva-Brussels approach to quantum mechanics, which was not possible with standard probability theory. We introduce the structure of a 'state experiment probability system' and derive the state property system as a special case of this structure. The category SEP of state experiment probability systems and their morphisms is linked with the category SP of state property systems and their morphisms

Christian Hugo Hoffmann

This paper addresses the central question of what a coherent concept of probability might look like that would do justice to both classical probability theory, axiomatized by Kolmogorov, and quantum theory. At a time when quanta are receiving increased and expanded attention -- think, for example, of the advances in quantum computers or the promises associated with this new technology (National Academies of Sciences: Engineering, and Medicine, 2019) -- an adequate interpretation of probability, which is no less important, should be given due attention, particularly with regard to quantum theory.

Howard Barnum, Alexander Wilce