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Lecture notes in physics

What Interpretation for Probability in Physics?

María Carla Galavotti

Published Jan 1, 2001• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-44966-3_20

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In this expository paper we discuss the role of probability in statistical physics: it should be that of a general tool guiding induction and must not be restricted only to the empirical interpretation coming from its evaluation by an observed frequency. It is true that in many cases the value of a probability can be sensibly expressed by a suitable frequency, but this does not entails that the latter can be taken as definition of probability. Moreover, in each situation in which one thinks that probabilities are physically real things and believes that something which is only “very probable” can be regarded as being “practically certain”, some “small” probabilities are actually ignored: this attitude of mind may render illegitimate also the probabilistic interpretation of the relevant physical laws. A “law” which is based on a probabilistic interpretation cannot aim at explaining why a fact that we forecast will occur, but rather at explaining why we forecast that this fact will occur. Finally, we emphasize the role of conditional probability, and we show that looking at it from the right perspective allows to avoids also classic paradoxical aspects of quantum mechanics, without the need to resort to the interpretation based on the dualism “particle-wave”.
We analyze the notion that physical theories are quantitative and testable by observations in experiments. This leads us to propose a new, Bayesian, interpretation of probabilities in physics that unifies their current use in classical physical theories, experimental physics and quantum mechanics. Probabilities are the result of quantifying the domain of possibilities that results when we interpret observations within the framework of a physical theory. They could also be said to be measures of information used to make predictions based upon a physical theory.